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I. Introduction 
Imagine two different cases over which the California courts 
might wish to assert personal jurisdiction. Case one is brought 
against Walmart by a California plaintiff who was injured by a 
defective Walmart product he bought in Ellsworth, Maine, while 
on a vacation to Acadia National Park. Although he was injured in 
Maine, the plaintiff now wishes to sue Walmart in his home state 
of California where Walmart has 303 retail outlets, fourteen 
distribution centers, 89,736 employees, and to which it pays $492.8 
million in taxes.1 Case two is brought by a California plaintiff 
against an individual defendant who lives in Maine. The claim 
arose in Maine and has no connection to the state of California, but 
the defendant was served with process while on a three-day 
business trip to California. In each case the defendant moves to 
dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction in 
California. 
It might surprise you to learn that, under current Supreme 
Court case law, the California court would have to rule that the 
California suit would violate Walmart’s due process rights because 
the claim did not arise in California and because Walmart is 
neither incorporated in California nor has its principal place of 
business in California.2 On the other hand, current Supreme Court 
precedent would permit the suit against the individual defendant 
                                                                                                     
 1. Location Facts, WALMART, INC., https://corporate.walmart.com/our-
story/locations/united-states/california#/united-states/california (last visited Jan. 
9, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 2. See BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1559 (2017) (holding that 
“in-state business . . . does not suffice to permit the assertion of general 
jurisdiction over claims . . . that are unrelated to any activity occurring in [that 
state]”); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017) 
(rejecting the California Supreme Court’s sliding scale approach for specific 
jurisdiction); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 136 (2014) (“Even if we were 
to assume that [Daimler’s subsidiary, MBUSA,] is at home in California, and 
further to assume MBUSA's contacts are imputable to Daimler, there would still 
be no basis to subject Daimler to general jurisdiction in California . . . .”); 
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (“A 
court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign . . . corporations to hear any 
and all claims against them when their affiliations with the State are so 
‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum 
State.”); see also infra Part III (analyzing four recent Supreme Court cases on 
personal jurisdiction and discussing mistaken assumptions based off of them).  
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notwithstanding the difficulties in defending against a suit so far 
from home on a matter unconnected with the state of California.3 
How is it that a lawsuit that would be easy for a huge corporation 
like Walmart to defend, in a state where it has such massive 
continuous contact, would violate Walmart’s due process rights, 
while a lawsuit that would be arduous for an individual to defend, 
in a state where his only contact was an unrelated three-day 
business trip, would not violate the individual’s due process rights? 
This Article posits that two significant problems in the 
Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction case law have led to 
incoherent and irreconcilable results in cases involving individual 
and corporate defendants. First, the Court has imposed 
substantive due process limitations on a state’s assertion of 
personal jurisdiction without ever explaining why such limitations 
are constitutionally required. Beginning with Pennoyer v. Neff,4 
the Court has ruled that the Due Process Clause of the 14th 
Amendment requires some kind of contact between a defendant 
and the forum state. Although the kinds of contact that would 
permit personal jurisdiction have both expanded and contracted 
since then,5 the requirement for some kind of contact has 
remained, regardless of how convenient it might be for the 
defendant to litigate the case. This contacts requirement is the sole 
remaining branch of 19th Century substantive due process law.6 
The absence of a theoretical explanation for why there should be 
any substantive due process limitation on personal jurisdiction has 
impoverished the Court’s personal jurisdiction jurisprudence and 
                                                                                                     
 3. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 628 (1990) (“[T]he Due 
Process Clause does not prohibit the California courts from exercising jurisdiction 
over petitioner based on the fact of in-state service of process . . . .”); see also infra 
Part II.C (examining the consequences of the Court’s failure to identify the 
rationale for the substantive due process contacts requirement). 
 4. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
 5. See infra Part II (discussing the Court’s failure to provide a convincing 
theoretical justification for imposing substantive due process limitations on 
personal jurisdiction).  
 6. See Wendy Collins Perdue, Sin, Scandal and Substantive Due Process: 
Personal Jurisdiction and Pennoyer Reconsidered, 62 WASH. L. REV. 479, 518 
(1987) (noting that “the Court has continued to emphasize that a purposeful 
‘contact’ with the forum is still required, even if that contact need not be 
physical”). 
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confused lower courts when they have tried to apply Supreme 
Court case law. 
Moreover, because the Supreme Court initially imposed only 
substantive due process limitations on personal jurisdiction, the 
procedural due process issues have received short shrift and rarely 
determine the scope of personal jurisdiction. Only in 1945 did the 
Court hint that procedural due process issues, such as the burden 
on a defendant, might have a role to play in personal jurisdiction 
analysis,7 and it was not until 1987 that the Court decided a 
personal jurisdiction case based upon a procedural due process 
analysis.8 By not placing the procedural due process analysis first, 
the Court has exacerbated the substantive due process issues that 
have confused lower courts and the academic commentators. 
Second, in the absence of clearly enunciated principles of 
substantive due process, the Supreme Court has relied on poorly 
defined categories of the types of contacts that would satisfy the 
substantive due process requirement. After Pennoyer, the 
categories included service on the defendant in the forum state, 
seizure of the defendant’s property in the forum state, and 
citizenship or domicile of the defendant in the forum state. In 
addition, because a defendant could waive its 14th Amendment 
rights, consent to suit in the forum state was an adequate basis of 
personal jurisdiction. These traditional bases of jurisdiction all 
allowed personal jurisdiction regardless of where the claim arose, 
a category of jurisdiction that later became known as general 
jurisdiction.9  
                                                                                                     
 7. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945) (“To require 
the corporation in such circumstances to defend the suit away from its home or 
other jurisdiction where it carries on more substantial activities has been thought 
to lay too great and unreasonable a burden on the corporation to comport with 
due process.”). 
 8. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 115 
(1987) (explaining the need “for a court to consider the procedural and substantive 
policies of other nations whose interests are affected by the assertion of 
jurisdiction by the California court”). 
 9. See Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to 
Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136–44 (1966) 
(detailing the nuances of general jurisdiction). 
660 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 655 (2019) 
 
In International Shoe Co. v. Washington,10 the Court held, in 
part because it was so difficult to determine whether a corporation 
was “present” in a state when served with process, that it was only 
necessary that a defendant have certain “minimum contacts” with 
the forum state to satisfy the requirements of the Due Process 
Clause.11 If the defendant’s contacts gave rise to the claim, a state 
might exercise “specific jurisdiction” even if the contacts were 
isolated and sporadic.12 Alternatively, if a corporation’s contacts 
with a state were sufficiently “continuous and systematic,” a state 
could exercise personal jurisdiction without regard to where the 
claim arose, a subcategory that also came to be known as “general 
jurisdiction.”13  
These rigid and inflexible categories gave rise to two types of 
problems. First, the Court has tended to discuss the rules 
applicable to a particular category without reference to the rules 
that applied to other categories, which has created the kinds of 
anomalous results hypothesized above. For example, in Burnham 
v. Superior Court,14 the Court upheld the continuing validity of 
service on an individual within the forum state as a basis of 
personal jurisdiction, with one opinion (written by Justice Scalia 
on behalf of four members of the Court) stating that it was not 
necessary to harmonize this category with the Court’s modern 
specific and general jurisdiction cases15 and another opinion 
(written by Justice Brennan for four members of the Court) stating 
that it was necessary to harmonize the category, but then utterly 
failing to apply the tests that the Court had developed for specific 
                                                                                                     
 10. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 11. See id. at 316 (“[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a 
defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of 
the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it . . . .”). 
 12. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478–82 (1985) 
(discussing the contacts requirement in a breach of contract case); Calder v. 
Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789–90 (1984) (discussing the contacts requirement in an 
intentional tort case). 
 13. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414–16 
(1985). 
 14. 495 U.S. 604 (1990). 
 15. See id. at 618 (“Due process does not necessarily require the States to 
adhere to the unbending territorial limits on jurisdiction set forth in Pennoyer.”). 
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and general jurisdiction.16 
Second, the rigidity of the categories is exacerbated by the 
ambiguity of the labeling. The term “general jurisdiction” gives the 
courts and commentators the most problems because it refers to 
two different jurisdictional concepts. It can refer to all 
jurisdictional categories that are dispute-blind, that is, they allow 
jurisdiction without regard to where the claim arose. For example, 
all of the traditional bases of jurisdiction are dispute-blind.17 
Alternatively, general jurisdiction can refer to the subcategory of 
“minimum contacts” based jurisdiction that arose after 
International Shoe in which dispute-blind jurisdiction was allowed 
based upon a corporation’s continuous and systematic contacts 
with the forum state. For the sake of clarity, this Article will refer 
to that category as corporate-activities-based jurisdiction. 
The problem caused by this linguistic ambiguity is nowhere 
more apparent than in four recent Supreme Court cases where the 
plaintiffs asserted personal jurisdiction based upon 
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction.18 Over those cases, Justice 
                                                                                                     
 16. See id. at 631–33 (“[Many] have interpreted International Shoe and 
Shaffer to mean that every assertion of state-court jurisdiction . . . must comport 
with contemporary notions of due process. Notwithstanding the nimble 
gymnastics of Justice SCALIA’s opinion today, it is not faithful to our decision in 
Shaffer.”) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 17. See Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 
610, 622 (1988) (“Because service on an individual physically present in the forum 
gave the state jurisdiction over any transitory cause of action, regardless of its 
relationship to the defendant's forum activities, these courts held that corporate 
‘presence’ based on ‘doing business’ in the state created equally broad 
jurisdiction.”). 
 18. See BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1559 (2017) (holding that 
“in-state business . . . does not suffice to permit the assertion of general 
jurisdiction over claims like [defendants’] that are unrelated to any activity 
occurring in [the forum state]”); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 
S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017) (stating that “only a limited set of affiliations with a 
forum will render a defendant amenable to” general jurisdiction in that State”); 
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 136 (2014) (“The Ninth Circuit’s agency 
theory thus appears to subject foreign corporations to general jurisdiction 
whenever they have an in-state subsidiary or affiliate, an outcome that would 
sweep beyond even the ‘sprawling view of general jurisdiction’ we rejected in 
Goodyear.”); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 920 
(2011) 
Some of the tires made abroad by Goodyear’s foreign 
subsidiaries . . . had reached North Carolina through “the stream of 
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Ginsburg essentially eliminated corporate-activities-based 
jurisdiction (and with it, hundreds of lower court cases basing 
jurisdiction on that standard) by limiting it to cases in which a 
corporation is “at home,” by which she meant, the state of 
incorporation and principal place of business.19 As we will see 
below, the problem is that, in discussing corporate-activities-based 
jurisdiction, Justice Ginsburg, used the term “general 
jurisdiction”20 and relied on commentary discussing the term 
“general jurisdiction” in the larger sense of all-purpose 
jurisdiction. She then limited corporate-activities-based 
jurisdiction to the kinds of contacts required for the traditional 
basis of citizenship or domicile jurisdiction, which is a different 
subcategory of all-purpose jurisdiction.21 In so doing, Justice 
Ginsburg left nothing in the formerly well-established separate 
category of corporate-activities-based jurisdiction.22 
This is not simply a theoretical problem. It is a problem that 
affects plaintiffs, like the California plaintiff in the first 
hypothesized case above, who are injured by a corporate defendant 
outside of their home state and wish to sue on their home turf 
rather than incur the burden of litigating where the claim arose. 
The plaintiff’s home state clearly has an interest in allowing their 
citizen to sue, and, if the corporation has substantial ongoing 
contacts with the plaintiff’s home state, it is hard to see why such 
a suit would violate the corporation’s due process rights. 
                                                                                                     
commerce”; that connection, the Court of Appeals believed, gave North 
Carolina courts the handle needed for the exercise of general 
jurisdiction over the foreign corporations. A connection so limited 
between the forum and the foreign corporation, we hold, is an 
inadequate basis for the exercise of general jurisdiction. 
 19. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919 (“A court may assert general jurisdiction over 
foreign . . . corporations to hear any and all claims against them when their 
affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them 
essentially at home in the forum State.”). 
 20. Id. 
 21. See id. at 924 (“As a rule in these cases, this Court has inquired whether 
there was ‘some act by which the defendant purposefully avail[ed] itself of the 
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the 
benefits and protections of its laws’”). 
 22. See infra Part III.B (examining the disappearance of 
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction through the Daimler holding).  
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This Article addresses these problems in five Parts. In Part I, 
the Article discusses the history of the Court’s substantive due 
process limitations on personal jurisdiction and, in particular, the 
standards for corporate-activities-based jurisdiction before the 
Court’s recent cases on that issue. Part II discusses the Court’s 
failure to provide a convincing theoretical justification for 
imposing substantive due process limitations on personal 
jurisdiction. It also discusses the consequences of that failure in 
three doctrinal areas of personal jurisdiction law, the traditional 
basis of service on an individual in the forum state, specific 
jurisdiction and corporate-activities-based jurisdiction. Part III 
then analyzes in detail the four recent Supreme Court cases on 
personal jurisdiction, and discusses the mistaken assumptions 
underlying those decisions. Part IV explains how the Court’s 
personal jurisdiction rules, as a whole, suffer from theoretical 
bareness, the ambiguity of the substantive due process categories 
of jurisdiction, and the rigidity of the Court’s substantive due 
process analysis. Finally, in Part V, the Article offers some ideas 
for how the Court could begin to remedy the many problems with 
personal jurisdiction law. 
II. The Substantive Due Process Limitations on Personal 
Jurisdiction 
The Supreme Court first addressed personal jurisdiction at 
the beginning of the 19th Century in order to decide whether to 
enforce judgments under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the 
Constitution.23 The Court needed to create common law rules of 
personal jurisdiction in order to decide whether judgments were 
valid and therefore enforceable.24 Because these decisions were 
                                                                                                     
 23. See Roger H. Trangsrud, The Federal Common Law of Personal 
Jurisdiction, 57 GEO. WASH L. REV. 849, 850–84 (1989) (detailing the origins of 
personal jurisdiction and how the establishment of the Constitution necessitated 
it); James Weinstein, The Early American Origins of Territoriality in Judicial 
Jurisdiction, 37 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 7–42 (1992) (examining the history of judicial 
jurisdiction and the role territoriality played in that history). 
 24. See Transgurd, supra note 23, at 867 (“The most plausible explanation 
then is that the first Congress intended that the Supreme Court would develop 
federal common law rules of jurisdiction to measure the scope of state court 
664 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 655 (2019) 
 
based upon the common law, they could, of course, be overruled by 
an act of Congress. 
That situation changed in 1877 when the Court decided 
Pennoyer v. Neff.25 Writing for the Court, Justice Steven Field 
concluded that a state court could exercise jurisdiction over a 
defendant only if that person were served with process within the 
state, or if that person owned property within the state (and that 
property was attached at the beginning of the litigation) or if that 
person was a citizen of the state, or if that person consented to the 
jurisdiction of the state court.26 Justice Field stated that these 
rules were not simply a matter of federal common law, they were 
also mandated by the Due Process Clause of the 14th 
Amendment.27 After Pennoyer v. Neff, a court could not render a 
binding judgment on a defendant without satisfying the due 
process principles set forth by Justice Field, regardless of how easy 
or convenient it was for the defendant to appear and litigate the 
case.28 Although Justice Field never explained why these 
principles were required by the Due Process Clause, it seems fairly 
clear that these rules are a matter of substantive, rather than 
procedural, due process.29 
                                                                                                     
jurisdiction over noncitizens.”); see generally D’Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 
How.) 165 (1850); Mils v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481 (1813). 
 25. 95 U.S. 714 (1877), overruled by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1997). 
 26. Id. at 722. This part of the Court’s decision was dictum because the 14th 
Amendment did not come into effect until 1868, two years after the 1866 judgment 
was rendered in the case under consideration in Pennoyer v. Neff. 
 27. See id. at 733 (“[T]he validity of such judgments may be directly 
questioned . . . on the ground that proceedings in a court of justice to deter mine 
the personal rights and obligations of parties over whom that court has no 
jurisdiction do not constitute due process of law.”). 
 28. See Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of Personal 
Jurisdiction: From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
19, 38–51 (1990) (arguing the Court was not clear on whether the Due Process 
Clause actually provided the content of personal jurisdiction rules); John B. 
Oakley, The Pitfalls of “Hint and Run” History: A Critique of Professor Borchers’s 
“Limited View” of Pennoyer v. Neff, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 591, 595–97 (1995) 
(disagreeing with parts of Borcher’s analysis, but agreeing that the due process 
basis for the rule was implicitly recognized in Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills 
v. Menefee, in which the Court treated the issue as a well-established rule). 
 29. Perdue, supra note 6, at 508. 
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The four traditional bases of jurisdiction that were allowed 
after Pennoyer, territorial service, seizure of defendants’ property 
in the forum, citizenship, and consent, were all examples of 
dispute-blind jurisdiction—that is to say, general jurisdiction in 
the larger sense of any basis of jurisdiction that exists without 
regard to whether the claim arose in the forum state and would 
allow jurisdiction for any claim wherever it arose.30 Thus, for 
example, as long as a defendant was served in the forum state, it 
was permissible for the forum to take jurisdiction over any claim 
wherever it arose.31 The same was true for the other three 
categories within the traditional bases of jurisdiction.32 
By the early 20th century, however, the four traditional bases 
of jurisdiction proved to be too restrictive for a society that was on 
the move and growing economically.33 First, increasing numbers of 
drivers were heading to other states where they became involved 
in accidents and then quickly returning to their home state before 
they could be served with process in the state where the accident 
took place.34 States responded to this circumstance by creating 
statutes that required drivers on their roads either to expressly 
consent to personal jurisdiction in cases arising out of their use of 
the state’s roads, or that simply asserted drivers had impliedly 
consented to the state’s jurisdiction by driving on their roads.35 
                                                                                                     
 30. See Twitchell, supra note 17, at 622 (“[T]he contours of general 
jurisdiction initially expanded as states developed rules permitting jurisdiction 
over corporate defendants based on theories of ‘consent,’ ‘doing business,’ or 
‘presence’ in the state.”). 
 31. See id. (“[S]ervice on an individual physically present in the forum gave 
the state jurisdiction over any transitory cause of action, regardless of its 
relationship to the defendant's forum activities . . . .”). 
 32. See id. at 625 (“General jurisdiction would serve as a secondary basis for 
jurisdiction, important primarily when the cause of action did not arise from 
defendant's forum activities.”). 
 33. See id. at 623 (“[I]t was only in the early twentieth century that American 
courts and commentators incorporated this concept of limited, dispute-specific 
jurisdiction into their core jurisdiction theory.”). 
 34. See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 354 (1927) (explaining that a 
nonresident accused of negligently causing an accident would not be held 
accountable to an injured resident if not for Massachusetts law creating implied 
consent for drivers). 
 35. See, e.g., id. at 356–57 (“[T]he State may declare that the use of the 
highway by the non-resident is the equivalent of the appointment of the registrar 
as agent on whom process may be served.”); Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160, 
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Even though the idea of implied consent was clearly a legal fiction, 
the Supreme Court chose to expand the jurisdictional parameters 
of Pennoyer by stretching the meaning of consent to include the 
new implied consent statutes because of the state’s interests in 
providing a forum for accidents arising out the inherent dangers of 
motor vehicles used on the state’s roads.36  
The second difficulty with the Court’s personal jurisdiction 
jurisprudence involved the increasingly multi-state nature of 
corporate activity in the United States.37 It was easy to apply the 
traditional basis of service within the forum state to individuals, 
whose physical presence within a state could easily be tracked.38 It 
was much more difficult, however, to apply the territorial presence 
concept to corporations.39 Originally, because a corporation is a 
fictitious entity whose existence is established solely through the 
laws of the state where it is incorporated, the Supreme Court ruled 
that corporations could only be sued in that state.40 After Pennoyer, 
however, the courts first began to apply the traditional basis of 
consent to justify personal jurisdiction over corporations, but, as 
                                                                                                     
164 (1916) (explaining that the law provides “that a nonresident owner shall 
appoint the Secretary of State his attorney upon whom process may be served ‘in 
any action or legal proceeding caused by the operation of his registered motor 
vehicle, within this State, against such owner’”).  
 36. See Hess, 274 U.S. at 356 (“In the public interest the state may make and 
enforce regulations reasonabl[y] calculated to promote care on the part of all, 
residents and non-residents alike, who use its highways.”). 
 37. See Twitchell, supra note 17, at 669–70 (“[A] strong argument can be 
made that the automatic exercise of "pure" general jurisdiction over a domestic 
corporation is inappropriate when so many corporations lack any other significant 
ties with their state of incorporation.”). 
 38. See id. at 633–34 (“As was true before International Shoe, substantial 
activities outside the state that affect forum residents are less likely to result in 
general jurisdiction than is physical activity within the state's borders . . . .”). 
 39. See Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930) 
(“[F]or it is as hard to judge what dealings make it just to subject a foreign 
corporation to local suit, as to say when it is ‘present,’ but at least it puts the real 
question . . . .”). 
 40. See Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 588–89 (1839) (“[A] 
corporation can have no legal existence out of the boundaries of the sovereignty 
which it is created. It exists only in contemplation of law, and by force of the law; 
and where that law ceases to operate, and is no longer obligatory the corporation 
can have no existence.”). 
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the Supreme Court later noted in Schaffer v. Heitner,41 the theory 
that a forum corporation consented to personal jurisdiction in a 
state in which it was doing business “was later supplemented by 
the doctrine that a corporation doing business in a State could be 
deemed ‘present’ in the State, and so subject to service of process 
under the rule of Pennoyer.”42  
The concept of service on corporations within the forum state 
was based on the idea that corporations were present in any state 
where they were “doing business.”43 In some of these cases, the 
claims arose out of the business the corporations performed in the 
forum state.44 In other cases, however, the corporations’ presence 
in the forum state permitted the state to exercise personal 
jurisdiction even over claims that did not arise the forum state.45 
In these cases jurisdiction was justified based on the traditional 
basis of service on the corporate defendant while the defendant 
                                                                                                     
 41. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
 42. Id. at 202. (citing Int’l Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914); 
Phila. & Reading Ry. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917)). 
 43. See St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218, 226–27 (1913) (“[I]n 
order to render a corporation amenable to service of process in a foreign 
jurisdiction it must appear that the corporation is transacting business in that 
district to such an extent as to subject it to the jurisdiction and laws thereof.”). 
 44. See, e.g., Int’l Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579, 585–86 (1914) 
(“The agents not only solicited such orders in Kentucky, but might there receive 
payment in money, cheeks or drafts . . . [t]his course of conduct of authorized 
agents within the State, in our judgment, constituted a doing of business . . . .”); 
Commercial Mut. Accident Co. v. Davis, 213 U.S. 245, 254 (1909) (“When the 
company sent such an agent into Missouri, by force of the statute he is presumed 
to represent the company for the purpose of service . . . .”); Conn. Mut. Life Ins. 
Co. v. Spratley, 172 U.S. 602, 611 (1899) (“[I]t cannot be said to cease doing 
business therein when it ceases to obtain or ask for new risks or to issue new 
policies, while at the same time its old policies continue in force and the premiums 
thereon are continuously paid by the policyholders to an agent residing in another 
State . . . .”); Pa. Lumberman’s Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Meyer, 197 U.S. 407, 415 
(1899) (“We think it would be somewhat difficult for the defendant to describe 
what it was doing in New York, if it was not doing business therein, when sending 
its agents into that State to perform various acts of adjustment provided for by 
its contracts . . . .”). 
 45. See, e.g., Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. Reynolds, 255 U.S. 565 (1921) (per 
curiam) (affirming costs based on the precedent of St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co. v. 
Alexander); Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915 (N.Y. 1917) (“The 
defendant was doing business within the state of New York within the meaning 
of section 1780, subdivision 4, of the Code of Civil Procedure . . . and the cause of 
action is presumed to have arisen within the state . . . .”).  
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was present in the forum state by virtue of the business conducted 
in the forum state.46 As one well-known treatise described the 
theory: 
The presence doctrine rested on the proposition that a forum 
corporation should be amenable to process absent consent only 
if it conducted enough business within the State to justify the 
inference that it was present there. Although the presence of a 
natural person in a State which would permit internal “tagging” 
to support in personam jurisdiction, could be fleeting at best, 
corporate presence had to be evidenced by continuous dealings 
in the State . . . . If the corporation was found to be present, 
jurisdiction could be sustained on claims unrelated to its local 
business dealings . . . .47 
The problem with using the traditional basis of territorial 
service with respect to corporations, however, was that the 
explanations for what constituted sufficient business done within 
the forum state became increasingly technical and formalistic, 
without regard for any principles upon which the substantive due 
process requirement of contact between the corporate defendant 
and the forum state might be based. This led astute observers like 
Judge Learned Hand to note that “presence” in the form of “doing 
business,” was simply a conclusory term which did “no more than 
put the question to be answered.”48 Nonetheless, it was well-
established that some level of business conducted in the forum 
state was sufficient to establish dispute-blind jurisdiction over 
claims regardless of where the claim arose.49  
In 1945, however, the Supreme Court finally acknowledged 
that it no longer made sense to rest jurisdiction over forum 
corporations on the criterion that they were “doing business” 
within the forum state.50 In International Shoe Co. v. 
                                                                                                     
 46. See Twitchell, supra note 17, at 621–22 (“Some courts . . . held that a 
foreign corporation ‘doing business’ in a state was ‘present’ there.”). 
 47. JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 111 (3d ed. 2009) (footnotes omitted).  
 48. Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930) 
(Hand, J.).  
 49. See Twitchell, supra note 17, at 672 (“The question, then, is what sort of 
local presence gives a nonresident defendant a sufficiently strong relationship 
with the forum to trigger dispute-blind jurisdiction.”). 
 50. See id. at 623–24 (“[I]n 1945, the Court used the opportunity to sweep 
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Washington,51 the court addressed whether the State of 
Washington had personal jurisdiction over a corporation in an 
action filed to collect taxes arising out of the business activity 
conducted within the forum state.52 Instead of focusing on whether 
the corporation was “doing business” in this forum state, the court 
stated: 
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant 
to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the 
territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with 
it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.53 
Chief Justice Stone wrote that the demands of due process can 
be met “by such contacts of the corporation with the state of the 
forum as make it reasonable . . . to require the corporation to 
defend a particular suit which is brought there.”54 The contacts 
that would be an acceptable basis for personal jurisdiction fell into 
two categories.55 First, the plaintiff’s claim could arise out of the 
defendant’s contact with the forum state.56 In those cases the 
forum could assert what came to be known as specific jurisdiction, 
even if the defendant’s contact with the forum state was “some 
single or occasional acts . . . .”57 Conversely, “there have been 
instances in which the continuous corporate operations within a 
state were thought so substantial and of such a nature as to justify 
                                                                                                     
aside the ‘presence’ test as a meaningful determinant of corporate jurisdiction.”). 
 51. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 52. See id. at 311 (questioning “whether, within the limitations of the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, appellant, a Delaware corporation, 
has by its activities in the State of Washington rendered itself amendable to 
proceedings in the courts of that state to recover unpaid contributions to the state 
unemployment compensation fund . . . .”). 
 53. Id. at 316 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 54. Id. at 317. 
 55. See id. at 317–19 (explaining casual contact with the forum state related 
to the claim and “continuous corporate operations” within the forum, even if 
unrelated to the claim may create personal jurisdiction). 
 56. See id. at 317 (“[C]asual presence of the corporate agent or even his 
conduct of single or isolated items of activities in a state in the corporation’s behalf 
are not enough to subject it to suit on causes of action unconnected with activities 
there.”).  
 57. Id. at 318. 
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suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely 
distinct from those activities.”58 Although the Court’s phrasing was 
somewhat ambiguous, the cases cited by the Supreme Court in 
support of its suggestion that “continuous corporate operations 
within a state” could justify personal jurisdiction on claims that 
were “entirely distinct from those activities” support the conclusion 
that the Supreme Court was referring to a category of 
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction that was separate and apart 
from the all purpose jurisdiction in the state where a corporation 
has its place of business or is incorporated.59 As Professor Twitchell 
noted, 
The standard, then, is “continuous” operations within the state 
that are “so substantial and of such a nature” to justify 
dispute-blind jurisdiction. The Court offers no further gloss on 
this vague and open-ended description, but the cases it cites for 
this point involve defendants who were operating an office 
within the forum, staffed with their own employees.60  
For example, in Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co.,61 the Court 
of Appeals of New York State, in an opinion by Judge Cardozo 
upheld jurisdiction over a Pennsylvania Corporation that had its 
principal place of business in Philadelphia with respect to a claim 
that arose on a claim that had no connection with defendant’s 
contacts with the forum state.62 Instead, Judge Cardozo based 
jurisdiction on the facts that defendant had a branch office in New 
York State in which nine employees served as a permanent sales 
force in addition to other support staff.63 Judge Cardozo 
emphasized that the defendant’s New York office “systematically 
                                                                                                     
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Mary Twitchell, Why We Keep Doing Business with Doing-Business 
Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 171, 183 (2001). 
 61. 115 N.E. 915 (N.Y. 1917). 
 62. See id. at 916–17 (“The defendant’s coal yards are in Pennsylvania, and 
from there its shipments are made. They are made in response to orders 
transmitted from customers in New York.”).  
 63. See id. at 917 (“[T]he defendant maintains an office in this state under 
the direction of a sales agent, with eight salesmen, and with clerical assistants, 
and through these agencies systematically and regularly solicits and obtains 
orders which result in continuous shipments from Pennsylvania to New York”). 
CATEGORICAL CONFUSION 671 
 
and regularly solicits and obtains orders which result in 
continuous shipments from Pennsylvania to New York.”64 Judge 
Cardozo’s use of the terms “continuously” and “systematically” is 
significant because those are the terms used by the Supreme Court 
in its subsequent decision in Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated 
Mining Co.,65 to support corporate-activities-based jurisdiction as 
a category distinct from a corporation citizenship or domicile (state 
of incorporation or principal place of business).66 Judge Cardozo 
specifically held that “the defendant corporation is engaged in 
business within this state. We hold, further, that the jurisdiction 
does not fail because the cause of action sued upon has no relation 
in its origin to the business here transacted.”67 
Similarly, in Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railway Co. v. 
Reynolds,68 the Supreme Court of the United States summarily 
affirmed a decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts in which the Court exercised jurisdiction over a 
forum corporation whose principal place of business was outside 
the forum state based on the continuous corporate activities 
conducted by the defendant within Massachusetts.69 The 
Alexander case, involved the issue whether a Texas corporation, 
that had its principal place of business in Texas was subject to 
personal jurisdiction in New York state based on the activities of 
its employees there.70 The Court stated that “in order to render a 
corporation amenable to service of process in a forum jurisdiction 
it must appear that the corporation is transacting business in that 
                                                                                                     
 64. Id. at 917. 
 65. 342 U.S. 437 (1952). 
 66. See id. at 445–46 (“[C]ontinuous and systematic corporate 
activities . . . are enough to make it fair and reasonable to subject that corporation 
to proceedings in personam in that state . . . to enforce causes of action relating to 
those very activities or to other activities of the corporation within the state.”).  
 67. Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915, 918 (N.Y. 1917). 
 68. 255 U.S. 565 (1920). 
 69. See id. at 565 (affirming the decision of the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court “upon the authority St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 
218”). 
 70. See St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218, 228 (1913) 
(explaining how a freight agent in the New York office corresponded with a 
negotiated with the plaintiff and was therefore acting as an authorized agent of 
the company making them subject to service in that state). 
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district to such an extent that it is subject to the jurisdiction and 
laws thereof.”71 
In addition to this contacts requirement, the Court hinted that 
there is also a procedural due process component to the test for 
personal jurisdiction: “an estimate of the inconveniences which 
would result to the corporation from trial away from its home or 
principal place of business is relevant in this connection.”72 The 
Court ultimately expanded this procedural component into a 
five-factor test to determine whether personal jurisdiction over a 
defendant would be reasonable.73 
In the years after International Shoe, courts applying the new 
minimum contacts standard developed two distinct categories of 
contacts-based personal jurisdiction.74 Cases in which the claim 
arose out of the defendant’s contact with the forum state were 
identified as specific jurisdiction cases.75 In those cases, the 
Supreme Court required plaintiffs to establish three elements. 
First, the claim must arise out of the defendant’s contact with the 
forum state.76 The Supreme Court has recently made it clear that 
it is not enough that the claim simply be related to a defendant’s 
contact with the forum state or that the claim should be identical 
to other claims that arose directly from the defendant’s contact 
                                                                                                     
 71. Id. at 226. 
 72. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 73. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) 
(stating factors include: the “burden on the defendant,” a “forum State’s interest 
in adjudicating the dispute,” the plaintiff receiving “convenient and effective 
relief,” “the most efficient resolution of controversies,” and finally “furthering 
fundamental substantive social policies”); see also Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 
U.S. 84, 92 (1978) (“[T]he interests of the forum State and of the plaintiff in 
proceeding with the cause in the plaintiff’s forum of choice are, of course to be 
considered . . . .”). 
 74. See BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1558 (2017) (“[W]e have 
distinguished between specific or case-linked jurisdiction and general or 
all-purpose jurisdiction.”). 
 75. Id. at 1559 (“[T]he business BNSF does in Montana is sufficient to 
subject the railroad to specific personal jurisdiction in that State on claims related 
to the business it does in Montana.”). 
 76. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 
(2017) (“In order for a state court to exercise specific jurisdiction, ‘the suit’ must 
‘aris[e] out of or relat[e] to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.’”).  
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with the forum state.77 Second, the defendant’s contacts with the 
forum state must be in some sense purposeful and not merely 
inadvertent or beyond the defendant’s control.78 These purposeful 
contacts may, in the context of an intentional tort case, be wrongful 
conduct that is directed at individuals in the forum state,79 or the 
intentional receipt of some significant benefit from the defendant’s 
contacts with the forum state.80 Third, the plaintiff must show that 
the lawsuit is procedurally fair by balancing the burden on the 
defendant against the forum state’s interest in the case, the 
interest of the plaintiff in litigating in the forum state, the shared 
interest of the interstate system of justice in adjudicating the case 
in a forum where witnesses and evidence will be easily available, 
and the potential impact on substantive law resulting from the 
court’s assumption of jurisdiction in a particular case.81 
The second line of cases established what the courts 
eventually called general jurisdiction, but which we will refer to as 
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction in order to distinguish it 
from the larger category of all-purpose dispute-blind jurisdiction, 
which, as previously noted, is also frequently referred to as general 
                                                                                                     
 77. See id. at 1780–81 (“The mere fact that other plaintiffs were prescribed, 
obtained, and ingested Plavix in California—and allegedly sustained the same 
injuries as did the nonresidents—does not allow the State to assert specific 
jurisdiction over the nonresidents’ claims.”). 
 78. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (explaining how it is 
required that the defendant “purposefully avails itself” in order to establish 
jurisdiction). 
 79. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 791 (1984) (holding specific 
jurisdiction was allowed over a liable claim against a writer who had no other 
contact with the forum state other than writing an article that the writer knew 
would harm the plaintiff in the forum state). 
 80. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 487 (1985) (holding 
specific jurisdiction was allowed based on benefits received from the forum state 
arising out of a contract that had a significant connection to the forum state). 
 81. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292 (stating the five factors the 
Court considers relevant in determining whether it is “reasonable” for the 
defendant to litigate in that forum); Kulko, 436 U.S. at 92 (“Like any standard 
that requires a determination of ‘reasonableness,’ the ‘minimum contacts’ test of 
International Shoe is not susceptible of mechanical application; rather, the facts 
of each case must be weighed . . . .”). 
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jurisdiction.82 In Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.,83 the 
Supreme Court upheld general jurisdiction over a corporation that 
had its temporary corporate operations in the forum state.84 As 
described by the Supreme Court, the corporation was carrying on 
in Ohio a “continuous and systematic, but limited, part of its 
general business” but “[t]he cause of action sued upon did not arise 
in Ohio and does not relate to the corporation’s activities there.”85 
The court accepted the Ohio Supreme Court’s ruling that the 
defendant was “to be treated as a foreign corporation.”86 Thus, 
none of the traditional bases of jurisdiction, including citizenship 
or domicile, were applicable to the case.87 Instead, the court 
assessed the legitimacy of jurisdiction in Ohio based on the 
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction branch of the International 
Shoe test.88 After discussing the actions taken by the corporation’s 
president within the state of Ohio, the Court stated that the 
president “carried on in Ohio a continuous and systematic 
supervision of the necessarily limited wartime activities of the 
company.”89 These continuous and systematic contacts justified 
Ohio’s assertion of personal jurisdiction with respect to a claim 
that did not arise out of the defendant’s within the forum state.90 
                                                                                                     
 82. See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445 (1952) 
(“The amount and kind of activities which must be carried on by the foreign 
corporation in the state of the forum so as to make it reasonable and just to subject 
the corporation to the jurisdiction of the state are to be determined in each case.”). 
 83. 342 U.S. 437 (1952). 
 84. See id. at 447–49 (explaining that during the occupation of the 
Philippines the president of the company “carried on in Ohio a continuous and 
systematic supervision of the necessarily limited wartime activities of the 
company”).  
 85. Id. at 438.  
 86. Id. at 439. 
 87. See id. at 448 (stating “[t]he company’s mining properties were in the 
Philippine Islands” along with their operations before the Japanese occupation). 
 88. See id. at 445 (“The essence of the issue here, at the constitutional level, 
is a like one of general fairness to the corporation. Appropriate tests for that are 
discussed in International Shoe . . . .”).  
 89. Id. at 448. 
 90. Id. (“While no mining properties in Ohio were owned or operated by the 
company, many of its wartime activities were directed from Ohio and were being 
given the personal attention of its president in that State at the time he was 
served with summons.”).  
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After Perkins, both the lower courts and commentators agreed 
that, in order to establish corporate-activities-based jurisdiction 
over a claim arising outside of the forum state, it was necessary for 
the plaintiff to show that the defendant had continuous and 
systematic contacts with the forum state.91 
The Supreme Court itself described the holding of Perkins in 
several cases before it actually decided another case involving 
continuous corporate contact jurisdiction.92 For example, in Keeton 
v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,93 the court stated that in Perkins, 
“jurisdiction was based solely on the fact that the defendant 
corporation had been carrying on in the forum ‘a continuous and 
systematic, but limited, part of its general business.’”94 Similarly, 
in Calder v. Jones,95 the Supreme Court cited to Perkins and 
described the case as permitting general jurisdiction where 
defendant’s contacts with the forum were “continuous and 
systematic.”96 
The only other Supreme Court case to deal with 
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction prior to the recent decisions 
was Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall.97 In that 
case, the Court decided that a collection of separate contacts with 
the forum state which included the purchase of helicopters, the 
training of pilots, the visit of the defendant’s chief executive officer 
to negotiate a contract, and the receipt of checks for its services 
drawn on a Texas bank were insufficient to constitute the 
continuous and systematic contact required for general 
                                                                                                     
 91. See Twitchell, supra note 17, at 633–34. 
 92. See, e.g., Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 (1984) 
(“Where, as in this case, respondent Hustler Magazine, Inc., has continuously and 
deliberately exploited the New Hampshire market, it must reasonably anticipate 
being haled into court there in libel action based on the contents of its magazine.”); 
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788–89 (1984) (“The allegedly libelous story 
concerned the California activities of a California resident . . . . The article was 
drawn from California sources, and the brunt of the harm, in terms of both of 
respondent’s emotional distress and the injury to her professional reputation, was 
suffered in California.”). 
 93. 465 U.S. 770 (1984). 
 94. Id. at 779 (citing Perkins, 342 U.S. at 437). 
 95. 465 U.S. 783 (1984). 
 96. Id. at 787 (citing Perkins, 342 U.S. at 437). 
 97. 466 U.S. 408 (1984). 
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jurisdiction.98 In Helicopteros, the Court, for the first time referred 
to the term general jurisdiction: “When a State exercises personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit not arising out or related to 
the defendant’s contacts with the forum, the State has been said to 
have be exercising ‘general jurisdiction’ over the defendant.”99 The 
description of general jurisdiction, as well as the specific citations 
to the law review articles by Professor Brilmayer and Professors 
von Mehren and Trautman, suggest some conflation of the 
concepts of dispute-blind jurisdiction, that is, general jurisdiction 
in the large sense, with the corporate-activities-based jurisdiction, 
that is, general jurisdiction in the smaller sense of a branch of 
minimum contacts jurisdiction.100 The Court clearly acknowledged, 
however, that the exercise of corporate-activities-based 
jurisdiction depended on a showing that the defendant had 
continuous and systematic contacts with the forum state, and that 
was the way the case was interpreted for the next 30 years.101  
First, in describing the holding of Perkins, the Court cited to 
the portion of the Perkins opinion which concluded that the 
defendant “had been carrying on in Ohio a continuous and 
systematic, but limited, part of its general business” and the 
exercise of general jurisdiction over the Philippine corporation by 
an Ohio court was “reasonable and just.”102 Later, in describing the 
contacts necessary to establish corporate-activities-based 
jurisdiction, the court stated that the defendant’s contacts must 
“constitute the kind of continuous and systematic general business 
                                                                                                     
 98. See id. at 416–19 (“The Texas Supreme Court focused on the purchases 
and the related training trips in finding contacts sufficient to support an assertion 
of jurisdiction. We do not agree with that assessment . . . .”). 
 99. Id. at 415 n.9. (citing Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process 
Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 SUP. CT. REV. 77, 80–81; von 
Mehren & Trautman, supra note 9, at 1136–44). 
 100. See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 9, at 1136 (“On the other hand, 
American practice for the most part is to exercise power to adjudicate any kind of 
controversy when jurisdiction is based on relationships, direct or indirect, 
between the forum and the person or persons whose legal rights are to be affected. 
This we call general jurisdiction.”). 
 101. See Twitchell, supra note 17, at 641 (describing the issue raised in 
Helicopteros as “whether Helicol’s contacts with the forum were ‘continuous and 
systematic’—the general jurisdiction question”).  
 102. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415 (citing Perkins, 342 U.S. at 438, 445 
(internal edits omitted)). 
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contacts the Court found to exist in Perkins.”103 Then, in describing 
the defendant’s in the case at bar, the Court repeatedly discussed 
whether the defendant’s contacts were sufficiently “continuous and 
systematic.”104 
Given the Court’s statements in Perkins and Helicopteros, it is 
not surprising that both the commentators and lower courts 
concluded both that corporate-activities-based jurisdiction was a 
separate jurisdictional category from the traditional basis of 
domicile or citizenship and that continuous corporate contact 
jurisdiction could be established by showing the defendant’s 
continuous and systematic contacts with the forum state.105  
For example, one leading Civil Procedure treatise noted that 
after International Shoe, the “continuous activity of a defendant 
within the forum may be of such nature as to subject the defendant 
to jurisdiction even upon causes of action unrelated to the forum 
activity . . . .”106 The treatise authors went on to explain that this 
kind of corporate-activities-based jurisdiction, 
[P]rovides that a court may assert jurisdiction over a defendant 
whose continuous activities in the forum are unrelated to the 
cause of action sued upon when the defendant’s contacts are 
sufficiently substantial and of such a nature as to make the 
State’s assertion of jurisdiction reasonable. The Supreme Court 
generally has left to the states the discretion to assert or forego 
jurisdiction in cases in this category.107  
                                                                                                     
 103. Id. at 416. 
 104. Id. (explaining one visit by the CEO to negotiate a contract is not 
“continuous and systematic” and is insufficient to establish jurisdiction). 
 105. See, e.g., Lakin v. Prudential Secs., Inc., 348 F.3d 704, 706, 708 n.7 (8th 
Cir. 2003) (holding that general jurisdiction may be present where the defendant 
maintains 1% of its loan portfolio with citizens of the forum state); Mich. Nat’l 
Bank v. Quality Dinette, Inc., 888 F.2d 462, 465 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding the 
defendant subject to general jurisdiction in Michigan where 3% of its total sales 
were in Michigan); Provident Nat’l Bank v. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 819 F.2d 
434, 436–38 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that loans to Pennsylvania citizens which 
amounted to 0.083% of its total loan portfolio, plus other contacts, was sufficient 
to give rise to general jurisdiction in Pennsylvania); see also Brilmayer, infra note 
166; Borchers, supra note 28. 
 106. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 47, at 111. 
 107. Id. at 124–25. 
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It was generally understood that, as Professor Twitchell stated 
in her influential article on general jurisdiction, the 
post-International Shoe corporate-activities-based jurisdiction was 
a widely available successor to the old theory of corporate presence, 
or “doing business,” a jurisdiction.108 By 1987, when Professor 
Twitchell exhaustively surveyed the field, courts in at least 19 
different states had judicially upheld corporate-activities-based 
jurisdiction.109 Many of these courts rested their findings of 
jurisdiction based on the existence of continuous and systematic 
contacts between the corporate defendant and the forum state.110 
These cases based their assertion of corporate-activities-based 
                                                                                                     
 108. See Twitchell, supra note 17, at 622 (“Gradually, however, specific 
jurisdiction attained independent status. Judges and commentators began to 
embrace the more limited quid pro quo principle emerging from the foreign 
corporation cases: states could exercise jurisdiction over a defendant in a 
particular case because of what the defendant had done in the forum . . . .”). 
 109. See id. at 630 (“Between 1975 and 1987, courts in at least nineteen states 
and the District of Columbia exercised jurisdiction over nonresident individuals 
and corporations under a general jurisdiction theory.”). 
 110. See, e.g., Pedelahore v. Astropark, Inc. 745 F.2d 346, 348–49 (5th Cir. 
1984) (finding “[t]he contacts of Astropark within the State of Louisiana were 
patently continuous and systematic”); Lee v. Wallworth Valve Co., 482 F.2d 297, 
301 (4th Cir. 1973) (“In light of the plaintiff’s relations to South Carolina, the 
interest of that State in the controversy . . . and Walworth’s substantial and 
continuing contacts with South Carolina, we conclude that the District Court 
quite properly denied the motion to quash the service of process on Walworth.”); 
ex parte British Steele Corp., 426 So. 2d 409, 412 (Ala. 1982) (“Our review of the 
facts given above leads us to conclude that BSC’s activities are substantial and 
continuous so as to allow in personam jurisdiction to be asserted against it in 
causes of action which may have arisen outside of Alabama.”); Geelhoed v. Jensen, 
352 A.2d 818, 825 (Md. 1976) (“Appellee’s living and working in the State for a 
period of two years constituted a course of conduct at least as continuous and 
systematic as that of the defendant in Perkins.”); State ex rel. Caine v. Richardson, 
600 S.W.2d 82, 84 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (“Beech has engaged in continuous and 
systematic activity within the state. We find no unreasonable burden placed upon 
Beech in requiring it to defend in this state.”); Litton Indus. Sys., Inc. v. Kennedy 
Van Saun Corp., 283 A.2d 551, 555 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1971) (“This 
indication of the substantiality of defendant’s admitted business activities in this 
State, in the absence of any allegations to the contrary, is sufficient to sustain the 
jurisdiction of this court, even assuming that the contract sued on is in fact 
unrelated to defendant’s business activities here.”); Garfield v. Homowack Lodge, 
Inc., 378 A.2d 351, 354 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977) (“We hold here that the defendant’s 
method of soliciting business in Pennsylvania consisted of such substantial and 
continuous activities in this Commonwealth as to render it amenable to in 
personam jurisdiction.”). 
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jurisdiction on a wide range of contacts other than simply the state 
of incorporation or a corporation’s principal place of business.111 
Although the exact standard for how much contact was required 
for corporate-activities-based jurisdiction varied, there was no 
doubt that the category was firmly, and in the minds of most, 
irrevocably established.112 As Professor Stephen Burbank noted, 
“[i]t is probably too late in the day for an assertion of 
jurisdiction . . . where the defendant conducts substantial business 
systematically and continuously to be held unconstitutional.”113 
III. The Missing Theory for Contacts-Based Substantive Due 
Process Rules 
The Supreme Court has never adequately explained why the 
personal jurisdiction rule should require any contacts between a 
defendant and the forum state.114 Because the requirement is not 
a matter of procedural due process, but rather a substantive due 
process principle, the Court bears a greater-than-usual burden to 
explain why a state court’s jurisdiction should be limited beyond 
that which would be required by procedural due process 
principles.115 The failure to justify the contacts requirement has 
several negative consequences. First, it taints the legitimacy of the 
requirement as a matter of sound constitutional law. If the Court 
cannot explain why due process requires any contact between the 
defendant and the forum state, how can the Court justify such 
                                                                                                     
 111. See cases cited supra note 110 (citing cases in which jurisdiction was 
found on the basis of things other than domicile or place of incorporation). 
 112. See Twitchell, supra note 60, at 172–73 (“This lack of a firm theoretical 
underpinning, couples with the practical problems courts encounter in applying 
the doctrine today, makes its practice today more the product of circumstance and 
compromise than of a principled application of a well-developed theory.”). 
 113. Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: End of the Century or 
Beginning of the Millenium?, 7 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 111, 119 (2000). 
 114. See cases cited infra note 123 (citing cases demonstrating a discussion of 
personal jurisdiction without an explicit reason for the contacts rule). 
 115. See James Weinstein, The Federal Common Law Origins of Judicial 
Jurisdiction: Implications for Modern Doctrine, 90 VA. L. REV. 169, 238 (2004) (“It 
is substantive in that territorial limitations on judicial authority vindicate the 
individual liberty interest in not being subject to the authority of a sovereign with 
which one has no affiliation . . . .”). 
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rules?116 Second, the absence of a theoretical foundation for the 
requirement impairs the ability of the courts to apply the principle 
in difficult factual settings.117 Each of these points will be 
addressed below. 
A. The Contacts Requirement is a Substantive Due Process 
Principle 
The Supreme Court has never discussed whether the contacts 
requirement is a matter of substantive or procedural due 
process.118 Academics who have considered the constitutional 
source of the contacts requirement have come to differing 
conclusions, with the majority favoring substantive due process,119 
                                                                                                     
 116. See infra Part III.B. 
 117. See infra Part III.C. 
 118. See Weinstein, supra note 115, at 237–38 (“It is possible . . . that the 
personal jurisdiction requirement partakes of aspects of both substantive and 
procedural due process.”). 
 119. See, e.g., KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 566–67 (14th ed. 2001); Danielle Keats Citron, Minimum Contacts in a 
Borderless World: Voice over Internet Protocol and the Coming Implosion of 
Personal Jurisdiction Theory, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1481, 1506 (2006) (“The 
Pennoyer Court, in dictum, tied these principles to the Fourteenth Amendment, 
finding that proceedings in court ‘to determine the personal rights and 
obligations’ of parties over whom the court lacks jurisdiction do not ‘constitute 
due process of law.’”); Scott Fruehwald, Judge Weinstein on Personal Jurisdiction 
in Mass Tort Cases: A Critique, 70 TENN. L. REV. 1047, 1087–93 (2003) (“As long 
as a defendant has some purposeful contact or connection with a state 
(substantive due process) and the defendant can mount a proper defense 
(procedural due process), then that state should be able to require an individual 
to appear in its courts.”); Scott Fruehwald, The Boundary of Personal 
Jurisdiction: The “Effects Test” and the Protection of Crazy Horse’s Name, 38 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 381, 422–23 (2004) (“Because substantive due process limits a 
state’s power (sovereignty) to restrict an individual’s liberty, it limits a state’s 
ability to assert personal jurisdiction through its long-arm statute over an 
individual with whom it has either no connection or a tenuous connection.”); 
Stephen Goldstein, Federalism and Substantive Due Process: A Comparative and 
Historical Perspective on International Shoe and Its Progeny, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 965, 966 (1995) (“Unfortunately, in its personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, 
the Supreme Court has employed, at times, a maximalist substantive due process 
approach, apparently without recognizing that such an approach ii no more 
appropriate to personal jurisdiction today than it was to progressive economic 
regulation in the Lochner era.”); Perdue, supra note 6, at 508–10; Linda 
Sandstrom Simard, Hybrid Personal Jurisdiction: It’s Not General Jurisdiction, 
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a few others favoring procedural due process,120 while other 
scholars throw up their hands and call it “jurisdictional due 
process”121 or something beyond either procedural or substantive 
due process.122 Not surprisingly, given the silence of the Supreme 
                                                                                                     
or Specific Jurisdiction, but Is It Constitutional?, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 559, 
588 (1998) (“In essence, the Court seems to be saying that by requiring the 
defendant to have purposeful contacts with the forum state, the minimum 
contacts test protects the defendant's individual liberty interest and, 
consequently, also protects the delicate balance of sovereign power between sister 
states.”); Allen R. Stein, Burnham and the Death of Theory in the Law of Personal 
Jurisdiction, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 597, 599 n.13 (1991) (“Professor Redish has also 
failed to recognize the need to develop a jurisdictional theory for use as a measure 
of due process. He has suggested that personal jurisdiction problems ought to be 
resolved through application of "functional" standards developed in the context of 
procedural due process cases.”); Mary Twitchell, Burnham and Constitutionally 
Permissible Levels of Harm, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 659, 672 (1991) (“As Professor Stein 
has correctly argued, the personal jurisdiction question is a question of 
substantive, not procedural, due process.”); Weinstein, supra note 115, at 231 
n.239 (“Most commentators believe that the personal jurisdiction requirement is 
a species of substantive rather than procedural due process.”). 
 120. See, e.g., 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA ET AL., TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW: SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE § 17.8, at 252 n.10 (3d ed. 1986); Hayward D. 
Reynolds, The Concept of Jurisdiction: Conflicting Legal Ideologies and Persistent 
Formalist Subversion, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 819, 822 (1991) (“The cases 
beginning with Shaffer v. Heitner and Kulko v. Superior Court and ending with 
Burnham, which are presented as the inexorable working out of International 
Shoe standards via the minimum contacts/fairplay doctrine actually subvert 
International Shoe's vision.”); Crawford v. Minutemen Gourmet Foods, Inc., 489 
F. Supp. 181, 182 (M.D. Ala. 1980) (finding that “[the court] may exercise personal 
jurisdiction . . . without exceeding the limits of procedural due process”); Coe & 
Payne Co. v. Wood-Mosaic Corp., 195 S.E.2d 399, 401 (Ga. 1973) (adopting 
Illinois’s interpretation of its similarly worded long-arm statute and noting “that 
the Long Arm Statute [of Illinois] contemplates that jurisdiction shall be 
exercised over non-resident parties to the maximum extent permitted by 
procedural due process”), abrogated by Innovative Clinical & Consulting Servs., 
LLC v. First Nat’l Bank of Ames, 620 S.E.2d 352 (Ga. 2005). But see In re G. 
Weeks Sec., Inc., 5 B.R. 220, 225 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1980) (discussing personal 
jurisdiction under the Fifth Amendment as a matter of substantive due process). 
 121. See Borchers, supra note 28, at 90 (identifying “the analytical rift” 
between “jurisdictional due process” and “due process analysis generally”). 
 122. See Weinstein, supra note 115, at 237  
That personal jurisdiction doctrine cannot be comfortably 
conceptualized as procedural due process, but imposes far more 
rigorous scrutiny than substantive due process jurisprudence 
warrants, supports the thesis that the source of authority for 
limitations on state court jurisdiction is sub silentio something other 
than the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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Court on the issue of substantive versus procedural due process 
with respect to the minimum contacts requirement, many 
academics fail to discuss this issue at all.123  
Not only has the Court failed to develop any coherent theory 
about why the Due Process Clause requires any contacts between 
the defendant and the forum state, it has failed to discuss whether 
the contacts requirement is a matter of substantive due process or 
procedural due process.124 Looking at the Supreme Court’s cases 
on personal jurisdiction, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the 
contacts requirement is, at the very least, not a matter of 
procedural due process. As a result, in the absence of the required 
contacts, the forum state does not have the substantive power to 
adjudicate a claim against the defendant regardless of how 
convenient or procedurally fair it is for the defendant to assert and 
                                                                                                     
 123. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980) 
(stating that the rules regarding personal jurisdiction are “more than a guarantee 
of immunity from inconvenient . . . litigation” (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 
U.S. 235, 251 (1958))); see also Robert Haskell Abrams, Power, Convenience, and 
the Elimination of Personal Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 58 IND. L.J. 1, 
21– 22 (1982) (reviewing Supreme Court jurisprudence on due process attacks on 
state court jurisdiction without discussing whether it is procedural or substantive 
due process); Martin H. Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal 
Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 NW. U. L. REV. 1112, 1137 (1981) 
(suggesting a new due process analysis for personal jurisdiction without 
discussing procedural or substantive due process). But see Kevin M. Clermont, 
Restating Territorial Jurisdiction and Venue for State and Federal Courts, 66 
CORNELL L. REV. 411, 416 (1981) (arguing that the minimum contacts test is a 
guideline for estimating convenience and reasonableness); Harold S. Lewis, Jr., 
The Three Deaths of “State Sovereignty” and the Curse of Abstraction in the 
Jurisprudence of Personal Jurisdiction, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 711–12 
(1983) (same). 
 124. The Supreme Court has obliquely hinted, although it has not stated 
specifically, that the minimum contacts branch of personal jurisdiction is a matter 
of substantive due process. For example, in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, the 
Court stated that “[t]he Due Process Clause protects an individual’s liberty 
interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which he 
has established no meaningful [internal] ‘contacts, ties, or relations.’” 471 U.S. 
462, 471–72 (1985) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 
(1945)). Similarly, in Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie Des Bauxites de 
Guinee, the Court stated that the personal jurisdiction requirement “recognizes 
and protects an individual liberty interest” and that the need for personal 
jurisdiction “must be seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty 
interest preserved by the Due Process Clause.” 456 U.S. 694, 702, 702 n.10 (1982). 
The Court has not, however, been more explicit than this in discussing the nature 
of the personal jurisdiction requirement and its link with the Due Process Clause. 
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defend its own rights in the case.125 This kind of requirement 
sounds precisely like a substantive due process limitation on the 
power of a state to affect the property rights of a person subject to 
their court system. 
If the contacts requirements that have been a part of the 
Court’s personal jurisdiction rules since Pennoyer were about 
procedural fairness, they would be both massively over inclusive 
and massively under inclusive as well. The contacts requirement 
(whether one uses the traditional bases of jurisdiction or the 
minimum contacts test of International Shoe) would not allow 
personal jurisdiction over a New York corporation in a case filed in 
Newark, New Jersey, if the corporation has no connection with 
New Jersey, notwithstanding the fact that it would hardly be 
difficult or procedurally unfair for the corporation to cross the 
Hudson River to defend the case. Additionally, the contacts 
requirements would not prevent an individual who lives in 
Calexico, California, on the Mexican border, from having to defend 
a lawsuit in Crescent City, California, on the Oregon border, 
regardless of how burdensome and inconvenient it would be 
litigate in that forum. The contacts requirements, whether the 
traditional bases under Pennoyer or the minimum contacts after 
International Shoe, are about the absolute power of the state to 
impose a binding judgment on a defendant regardless of how 
convenient it is for the defendant to represent its interests in the 
forum court. Such restrictions on the power of a state sovereign are 
matters of substantive and not procedural due process. 
Given the controversial nature of all substantive due process 
doctrines126 the Court has a particularly strong burden to establish 
                                                                                                     
 125. See Stephen E. Gottlieb, In Search of the Link Between Due Process and 
Jurisdiction, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 1291, 1303–12 (1983) (discussing the role of 
convenience in the jurisprudence); Earl M. Maltz, Reflections on a Landmark: 
Shaffer v. Heitner Viewed from a Distance, 1986 BYU L. REV. 1043, 1058–59 
(same); Perdue, supra note 6, at 509–10 (“[T]he ‘contacts’ requirement of the 
modern approach is intended as something more than some rough test of 
convenience.”); Allan R. Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in 
the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEX. L. REV. 689, 708 (1987) (discussing the 
intersection of minimum contacts and convenience of trial). 
 126. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (declaring laws 
criminalizing abortion to be unconstitutional as a violation of the Due Process 
Clause); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding that laws setting 
maximums for work hours violated the Due Process Clause), overruled by 
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a theoretical basis for any substantive due process doctrine. The 
requirement for contacts between a defendant and the forum state 
is the sole remaining nineteenth century doctrine of substantive 
due process.127 When the Supreme Court has announced new 
applications of substantive due process, such as the right of 
privacy, it has at least explained the theoretical foundations for 
why the substantive due process rights apply to a person’s liberty 
or property interests.128 The Court should explain why due process 
requires any substantive connection between the defendant and 
the forum state. 
B. The Court’s Failed Attempts to Provide Constitutional 
Rationale for the Substantive Due Process Contacts Requirement 
Notwithstanding the significant need for a coherent theory 
explaining the substantive due process contacts requirement, the 
Court has a failed to advance a rationale that withstands analysis. 
As previously noted, Justice Field did not offer any explanation 
why the Due Process Clause required the contacts requirements 
that he outlined in Pennoyer v. Neff.129 In International Shoe, the 
Court explained that the exercise of specific jurisdiction was 
reasonable by suggesting that the benefits enjoyed by a 
corporation’s activities within the forum state gave rise to a 
reciprocal obligation for the corporation to subject itself to the 
personal jurisdiction of the forum’s courts in cases arising out of 
their operations within the state: 
But to the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of 
conducting activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and 
protections of the laws of that state. The exercise of that 
privilege may give rise to obligation; and, so far as those 
obligations arise out of or are connected with the activities 
within the state, a procedure which requires the corporation to 
                                                                                                     
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963). 
 127. See Perdue, supra note 6, at 480 (describing Pennoyer’s enduring 
relevance). 
 128. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (declaring 
unconstitutional a Connecticut law prohibiting the use of contraceptives). 
 129. See supra notes 25–29 and accompanying text (discussing Pennoyer). 
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respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances, 
hardly be said to be undue.130 
The Court did not, however, offer a similar explanation with 
respect to corporate-activities-based jurisdiction. More 
importantly, the Court never explained why the Due Process 
Clause should impose any limits on personal jurisdiction other 
than those designed to protect against litigating in a forum that is 
so inconvenient that it deprives a defendant of procedural due 
process. 
In Hanson v. Denckla,131 the Court was invited to conclude 
that due process required merely procedural fairness and some 
connection between the forum state and the case rather than 
between the defendant and the forum state, similar to the 
restrictions on choice of law imposed by the Due Process Clause.132 
The five-member majority, however, concluded that the limitations 
on personal jurisdiction were more than protections against 
inconvenient litigation: 
Those restrictions are more than a guarantee of immunity from 
inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a consequence of 
territorial limitations on the power of the respective States. 
However minimal the burden of defending in a forum tribunal, 
a defendant may not be called upon to do so unless he has had 
the “minimum contacts” with this State that are a prerequisite 
to its exercise of power over him.133 
The Court said no more on why the Due Process Clause 
imposes any territorial restrictions on state power. 
The Supreme Court made its most ambitious effort to explain 
the substantive due process contacts requirement in World-Wide 
Volkswagen v. Woodson.134 In that case, Justice White explained 
that the due process contacts requirement was a matter of 
interstate federalism, in which the sovereignty of individual states 
                                                                                                     
 130. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945). 
 131. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). 
 132. See id. at 253 (contrasting personal jurisdiction over nonresident 
defendants with choice of law jurisprudence).  
 133. Id. at 251. 
 134. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). 
686 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 655 (2019) 
 
implies limitations on the sovereignty of other states.135 Justice 
White conceded that, since Pennoyer, the procedural burdens on 
litigating in a distant state had eased considerably, but he 
cautioned: 
We have never accepted the proposition that state lines are 
irrelevant for jurisdictional purposes, nor could we, and remain 
faithful to principles of interstate federalism embodied in the 
Constitution. The economic interdependence of the States was 
foreseen and desired by the framers. In the Commerce Clause 
they provided that the Nation was to be a common market, a 
“free trade unit” in which the State’s are debarred from acting 
as separable economic entities. But the Framers also intended 
that the States retain essential attributes of sovereignty, 
including, in particular, the sovereign power to try causes in 
their courts. The sovereignty of each State, in turn, implied a 
limitation on the sovereignty on all of its sister States—a 
limitation express or implicit in both the original scheme of the 
Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment.136 
These limits on state sovereignty constrain state court 
jurisdiction regardless of how convenient the litigation might be 
for the defendant: 
Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience 
from being forced to litigate before the tribunals of another 
State; even if the forum State has a strong interest in applying 
its law to the controversy; even if the forum State is the most 
convenient location for litigation, the Due Process Clause, 
acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may 
sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render a valid 
judgment.137  
After scholars criticized this aspect of the World-Wide 
Volkswagen decision on the ground that a matter of interstate 
federalism could not be an individual right under the Fourteenth 
Amendment that could be waived by defendants,138 the Court 
                                                                                                     
 135. Id. at 292. 
 136. Id. at 293 (internal citations omitted). 
 137. Id. at 294 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251, 254 (1958)).  
 138. See, e.g., Graham C. Lilly, Jurisdiction Over Domestic and Alien 
Defendants, 69 VA. L. REV. 85, 109 (1983) (exploring the logical “fallacy” of the 
Court’s approach); Redish, supra note 123, at 1119–20 (noting the unpersuasive 
discussion of federalism in World-Wide Volkswagen). 
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quickly reversed course. In the very next decision on personal 
jurisdiction, Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites 
de Guinee,139 Justice White himself acknowledged that the 
minimum contacts requirement “represents a restriction on 
judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of 
individual liberty.”140 Justice White conceded that the Due Process 
Clause is the “only source of the personal jurisdiction requirement” 
and the Clause “makes no mention of federalism concerns.”141 
Justice White also conceded that, if the contacts requirement were 
a matter of interstate federalism it would not have been waivable 
by individual defendants.142 Unfortunately, as we will see, this 
theory comes back like a bad penny.143 
World-Wide Volkswagen contains one additional rationale for 
the contacts requirements, although it is no more satisfying than 
the previous one. Plaintiffs in that case argued that the defendants 
could foresee that the allegedly defective automobile that was the 
subject of the case could be driven from New York, its state of 
purchase, to Oklahoma, where the accident giving rise to the claim 
occurred.144 Because an accident in Oklahoma was reasonably 
foreseeable, defendants should be subject to jurisdiction in that 
state. Justice White, however, stated, it “is not the mere likelihood 
that a product will find its way into the forum State. Rather, it is 
that the defendant’s conduct in connection with the forum State 
are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into 
court there.”145 The requirement of minimum contacts with the 
forum state ensures that the defendant has “clear notice that it is 
subject to suit there, and can act to alleviate the risk of 
                                                                                                     
 139. 456 U.S. 694 (1982). 
 140. Id. at 702. 
 141. Id. at 702 n.10. 
 142. Id. 
 143. See infra Part III.D (discussing the elimination of 
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction in Bristol-Myers Squibb Company v. 
Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017)).  
 144. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980) 
(“It is argued, however, that because an automobile is mobile by its very design 
and purpose it was ‘foreseeable’ that the [plaintiffs’] Audi would cause injury in 
Oklahoma.”). 
 145. Id. at 297. 
688 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 655 (2019) 
 
burdensome litigation by procuring insurance, passing the 
expected costs on to customers, or, if the risks are too great, 
severing its connection with the State.”146 
As we will see, this theory that the due process requirement of 
minimum contacts provides essential notice to a defendant is 
dubious on a number of grounds.147 First, the assertion that it 
allows corporations to procure insurance assumes that corporate 
insurance policies are based in any respect on where a corporation 
might be subject to personal jurisdiction. That factual assumption 
is unsupported by any empirical evidence that any corporate 
insurance policies are structured in a way that is connected in any 
respect to the existence of personal jurisdiction in particular 
states.148 Second, the Court’s assertion that the risks of being 
subject to personal jurisdiction in a particular state might cause a 
corporation to sever its connection with the state is yet another 
assumption that is unsupported by any empirical evidence.149 As a 
matter of common sense, corporations are unlikely to forego any 
commercial opportunity simply because it might subject them to 
personal jurisdiction in particular state. Similar arguments are 
often made with respect to the importance of certainty to 
substantive law, such as that it makes sense for a corporation to 
alter its behavior based on the substantive liability standards 
imposed by a particular state. However, there is no basis to assume 
that this kind of argument is transferable to questions involving 
the existence of personal jurisdiction. Moreover, as we will shortly 
see, the due process limitations on a state’s ability to apply its own 
substantive law to a particular case are far less strict than the 
limitations on personal jurisdiction.150 
                                                                                                     
 146. Id. 
 147. See infra notes 162–171 and accompanying text (discussing flaws in the 
Court’s reasoning); infra Part II.D (discussing anomalies between the Court’s 
approach to personal jurisdiction in comparison with other due process concepts).  
 148. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297 (failing to discuss the 
procurement of insurance policies).  
 149. See id. (assuming in passing, without introducing any supporting 
evidence, that a corporation would leave the state).  
 150. See infra notes 186–189 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s 
jurisprudence in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985), and 
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981)).  
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As a practical matter, a standard that focuses on whether a 
defendant “should reasonably anticipate being haled into court” 151 
in the forum state is utterly meaningless. First, the question is 
completely within the Supreme Court’s control; if the Court stated 
that the Due Process Clause allowed defendants to be sued in any 
state where jurisdiction was not unreasonably burdensome, then 
defendants could reasonably anticipate being sued in every state. 
Alternatively, if the Court intends us to focus on the word 
“reasonably,” the statement of the principle does nothing more 
than restate the original question: why should it matter that the 
defendant have any contact with the forum state and what kinds 
of contacts would be sufficient to permit personal jurisdiction? 
In the Court’s recent decision in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. 
v. Nicastro,152 Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion gave some hints 
at the structure and underlying principle of the contacts 
requirement but never enunciated a clear theory for the 
substantive due process requirement. Justice Kennedy stated that 
a person “may submit” to a state’s authority in different ways, 
including expressly consenting to jurisdiction, the defendant’s 
presence in the forum state at the time he is served with process, 
or domicile in the state “or, by analogy, incorporation or principal 
place of business for corporations.”153 
Justice Kennedy argued that “[e]ach of these examples reveals 
circumstances, or a course of conduct, from which it is proper to 
infer an intention to benefit from and thus an intention to submit 
to the laws of the forum State.”154 Justice Kennedy failed to 
explain, however, why the Due Process Clause requires a 
defendant’s intention to “submit” to the jurisdiction of the forum’s 
courts or why these acts are appropriate signs of submission. For 
example, it is hard to justify the notion that an individual’s 
transient presence for one day in the forum state is enough to 
submit to the forum’s jurisdiction, but a corporation’s continuous 
operation of physical facilities within the forum state is not.155 
                                                                                                     
 151. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. 
 152. 564 U.S. 873 (2011). 
 153. Id. at 880 (plurality opinion). 
 154. Id. at 881.  
 155. Compare Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 628 (1990) 
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Justice Kennedy barely hinted at the foundation for the minimum 
contacts requirement. 
Two principles are implicit in the foregoing. First, personal 
jurisdiction requires a forum-by-forum, or 
sovereign-by-sovereign, analysis. The question is whether a 
defendant has followed a course of conduct directed at the 
society or the economy existing within the jurisdiction of a given 
sovereign, so that the sovereign has the power to subject the 
defendant to judgment concerning that conduct. Personal 
jurisdiction, of course, restricts “judicial power not as matter of 
sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty,” for due 
process protects the individual’s right to be subject only to 
lawful power. But whether a judicial judgment is lawful 
depends on whether the sovereign has authority to render it.156 
Although Justice Kennedy explained the need for a “lawful” 
judgment in order for a forum to render a binding judgment, his 
opinion failed to explain why a defendant’s contacts with the forum 
are necessary to make that judgment lawful. On the one hand, one 
is tempted to suggest that the repeated use of the words “submit” 
and “submission” echo the Court’s now abandoned use of the 
doctrine of implied consent in Hess v. Pawloski,157 a reference not 
lost on the dissent in McIntyre, which astutely commented that the 
idea “that consent is the animating concept” in jurisdiction cases 
“draws no support from controlling decisions of this Court. Quite 
the contrary, the Court has explained, a forum can exercise 
jurisdiction when its contacts with the controversy are sufficient; 
invocation of a fictitious consent, the Court has repeatedly said, is 
unnecessary and unhelpful.”158 
Alternatively, Justice Kennedy’s opinion may suggest that, as 
a matter of substantive due process, any sovereign state lacks the 
ability to deprive any person of his property through a judicial 
proceeding in the absence of some benefit received by the 
                                                                                                     
(upholding personal jurisdiction on the basis of a few short visits to the forum 
state), with Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 931 
(2011) (denying jurisdiction when tires made by a corporation systematically 
entered the forum state). 
 156. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 884 (internal citation 
omitted). 
 157. 274 U.S. 352 (1927). 
 158. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd., 564 U.S. at 901 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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defendant from a connection with the forum state that gives rise 
to reciprocal obligations to submit to the jurisdiction of the state’s 
court. As explained by Justice Kennedy, “[b]ecause the United 
States is a distinct sovereign, a defendant may in principle be 
subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States but not 
of any particular State.”159 In elaborating on that point Justice 
Kennedy quoted one of his own decisions in a matter unrelated to 
personal jurisdiction: “Ours is ‘a legal system unprecedented in 
form and design, establishing two orders of government, each with 
its own direct relationship, its own privity, its own set of mutual 
rights and obligations to the people who sustain it and are 
governed by it.’”160 Because the United States and each individual 
state are all separate sovereigns, “a litigant may have the requisite 
relationship with the United States Government” to warrant the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction, but lack the relationship with 
“any individual State.”161 
The most telling proof of the hollowness of the substantive due 
process contacts requirement is the Court’s inability to come up 
with fact patterns that prompt a visceral sense of injustice. 
Virtually every time the Court searches for an example of why it 
would be terribly unfair for a state to exercise jurisdiction without 
adequate contacts between the defendant and the forum state, the 
Court cheats by using a factual scenario in which jurisdiction 
would be procedurally unfair because of the burden on the 
defendant to litigate in a distant forum. For example, in McIntyre, 
Justice Kennedy illustrated the unfairness of personal jurisdiction 
without the adequate contacts by describing a case in which 
owners of a small farm in Florida could be sued throughout the 
country, despite never leaving Florida, if they happen to “sell crops 
to a large nearby distributor . . . who might then distribute them 
to grocers across the country. If foreseeability were the controlling 
criterion, the farmer could be sued in Alaska or any number of 
other States’ courts without ever leaving town.”162  
                                                                                                     
 159. Id. at 884 (plurality opinion). 
 160. Id. (quoting U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 885. 
692 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 655 (2019) 
 
The reason that Justice Kennedy’s hypothetical strikes one as 
unjust is not the absence of contacts between the defendant and 
the forum state but rather the burden on a small farmer in Florida 
in litigating a case in a state as far away and difficult to reach as 
Alaska. That problem, however, is already addressed in the 
fairness component of the Supreme Court’s Due Process analysis, 
which requires a court to balance the burden on the defendant 
against the interest of the forum state in hearing the case and the 
plaintiff’s need to use the forum state’s courts, as well as the 
convenience of the interstate system of justice.163 There is no need 
for a substantive due process requirement because the procedural 
due process requirement is adequate to protect the small farmer 
from distant and inconvenient litigation. 
It is telling that Justice Breyer fell prey to precisely the same 
problem in his concurring opinion in McIntyre. In explaining the 
need for the requisite contacts between the defendant and the 
forum state, Justice Breyer set forth the following hypothetical: 
What might appear fair in the case of a large manufacturer 
which specifically seeks, or expects, an equal-size distributor to 
sell its product in a distant State might seem unfair in the case 
of a small manufacturer (say, an Appalachian potter) who sells 
his product (cups and saucers) exclusively to a large distributor, 
who sells a single item (a coffee mug) to a buyer from a distant 
State (Hawaii).164 
Just as with Justice Kennedy’s hypothetical, any injustice 
inflicted by personal jurisdiction in Justice Breyer’s fact pattern 
would be remedied by the procedural due process balancing test 
without any need for a contacts requirement. 
In fact, it is pretty hard to work up any sense of injustice with 
respect to a hypothetical where there are no contacts with the 
forum state but where litigation would be procedurally fair. 
Imagine, for example, a case in which a resident of McLean, 
Virginia, crosses the Potomac River to have dinner in a restaurant 
owned by a corporation in Bethesda, Maryland, and becomes 
                                                                                                     
 163. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292–95 
(1980) (summarizing the balance between state interests and plaintiff and 
defendant burdens and interests). 
 164. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 891–92 (2011) (Breyer, 
J., concurring). 
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seriously ill from eating tainted food at the restaurant. Assume 
that the corporation owning the restaurant has restaurants in 
Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Delaware, but none in Virginia. 
Would anyone feel outraged if the Virginia courts were to exercise 
jurisdiction over the Maryland corporation? One can imagine 
having a bit of concern if the Virginia court were to apply its own 
law to the controversy, but, as we have already seen, the due 
process restrictions on choice of law are far more lenient than the 
restrictions on personal jurisdiction.165 
The few commentators who have attempted to develop a 
theoretical foundation for a substantive due process contacts 
requirement have reached different conclusions on the rationale 
for such a rule. The theory with the greatest traction, most 
prominently developed by Professor Lea Brilmayer, is that the 
minimum contacts requirement flows from a political theory about 
the nature of governmental power and legitimacy.166 Professor 
Brilmayer suggests that a state’s exercise of power cannot be 
legitimate without some relationship between the defendant and 
the forum state that creates a form of social contract in which the 
state is authorized to act coercively because the defendant 
intentionally acted to affiliate itself with the forum.167 Several 
other academics have relied on some form of social contract theory 
to support a jurisdiction requirement for contacts between the 
defendant and the forum state.168 Professor Roger Trangsrud has 
                                                                                                     
 165. See supra note 132 and accompanying text (comparing the restrictions 
imposed under choice of law against those required for asserting personal 
jurisdiction). 
 166. See Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on 
State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 SUP. CT. REV. 77, 86–87 [hereinafter Brilmayer, 
How Contacts Count] (comparing limits on state jurisdiction with other 
limitations on state sovereignty); Lea Brilmayer, Jurisdictional Due Process and 
Political Theory, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 293, 294 (1987) [hereinafter Brilmayer, 
Jurisdiction] (linking jurisdictional due process issues with those concerning the 
right of a state to assert authority over its citizens); Lea Brilmayer, Shaping and 
Sharing in Democratic Theory: Towards a Political Philosophy of Interstate 
Equality, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 389, 391 (1987) (framing the law of interstate 
relations as a question of political theory). 
 167. See Brilmayer, Jurisdiction, supra note 166, at 294 (“The link with 
political theory lies in the argument that such issues should be analyzed in terms 
of a state’s right to exercise coercive power over the individual or dispute.”). 
 168. See Margaret G. Stewart, A New Litany of Personal Jurisdiction, 60 U. 
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made a similar social contract theory argument in support of his 
suggestion that jurisdictional rules should be implemented as a 
matter of federal common law under the Full Faith Credit Clause 
and not the Due Process Clause.169 
Other academic commentators have provided different 
theoretical rationales for a contacts requirement. Some, 
notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s abandonment of the idea, 
still cling to a theory of interstate federalism as a foundational 
jurisdiction principle.170 Still others have proposed similar 
territorial contacts requirements based not on the Due Process 
Clause but rather the Dormant Commerce Clause.171  
                                                                                                     
COLO. L. REV. 5, 31–38 (1989) (proposing a distinction between conscious and 
intentional affiliation with a forum state); Arthur M. Weisburd, Territorial 
Authority and Personal Jurisdiction, 63 WASH. U. L.Q. 377, 378 (1985) 
(recognizing that personal jurisdiction disputes also implicate the boundaries and 
limits of state sovereignty). 
 169. See Trangsrud, supra note 23, at 884–85 (discussing the benefits of 
grounding jurisdictional law on the theory of sovereign authority as derived from 
the consent of the governed). 
 170. See A. Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Revised Analysis, 
73 U. CHI. L. REV. 617, 619 (2007) (arguing for a new approach to jurisdictional 
doctrine by “reasserting the primary relevance of state sovereignty and interstate 
federalism”); Weinstein, supra note 115, at 198 (arguing for the benefits of 
jurisdictional rules that, among other things, promoted interstate federalism by 
preventing states from overreaching their authority). 
 171. See Paul D. Carrington & James A. Martin, Substantive Interests and the 
Jurisdiction of State Courts, 66 MICH. L. REV. 227, 234 (1967) (“[C]oncern with 
the effects on commerce of too loose a standard of jurisdiction has not abated.”); 
John F. Preis, The Dormant Commerce Clause As a Limit on Personal 
Jurisdiction, 102 IOWA L. REV. 121, 123 (2016) (“Even though the Due Process 
Clause is an essential component of personal jurisdiction law . . . the Dormant 
Commerce Clause . . . should have much to say about personal jurisdiction”). 
Some older Supreme Court cases cited the Dormant Commerce Clause as a reason 
to invalidate expansive assertions of personal jurisdiction. See Mich. Cent. R.R. 
v. Mix, 278 U.S. 492, 494–96 (1929) (agreeing with railroad defendant that 
asserting jurisdiction would unreasonably obstruct interstate commerce); 
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Wells, 265 U.S. 101, 103 (1924) (asserting 
jurisdiction over a railway would unreasonably burden interstate commerce); 
Davis v. Farmers’ Co-op. Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312, 315–16 (1923) (reasoning that 
a statute that required railroads to submit to the state’s jurisdiction as a condition 
of maintaining one agent within the state imposed an undue burden on interstate 
commerce). 
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C. The Consequences of the Court’s Failure to Identify the 
Rationale for the Substantive Due Process Contacts Requirement 
Given the absence of a theoretical foundation for the 
substantive due process contacts requirement, it is not surprising 
that the lower courts have also struggled with personal jurisdiction 
problems and that even the Supreme Court has difficulty in 
providing consistent guidance to the lower courts. One can observe 
these problems in cases involving all of the different substantive 
due process categories of personal jurisdiction.172 We will take a 
look at three of the categories: the traditional basis of service on 
an individual in the forum state, specific jurisdiction over an 
upstream manufacturer whose product was incorporated into 
another product that was eventually sold in the forum state, and 
finally, the widely varying results in lower court cases on 
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction.  
First, in Burnham v. Superior Court,173 the Supreme Court 
addressed the continuing viability of jurisdiction based upon 
service on an individual within the territory of the forum state.174 
Once again, no opinion captured a majority of the Court. Justice 
Scalia announced the judgment of the Court, but only three other 
justices joined his opinion.175 Justice Scalia’s rationale for 
upholding in-state service as a basis for personal jurisdiction 
rested on its acceptance shortly after the adoption of the 
Fourteenth Amendment in Pennoyer v. Neff and its continued 
acceptance by all fifty states, which made it “one of the continuing 
traditions of our legal system that define the due process standard 
of ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”176 
Justice Scalia did not, however, explain how his rather static 
notion of due process allowed for no contraction of the traditional 
bases of jurisdiction, but allowed for substantial expansion beyond 
                                                                                                     
 172. See infra notes 173–185 and accompanying text (expanding on these 
categories).   
 173. 495 U.S. 604 (1990). 
 174. See id. at 619 (identifying the issue before the court as jurisdiction based 
solely on physical presence). 
 175. Id. at 607. 
 176. Id. at 619. 
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them, as clearly happened in International Shoe.177 Moreover, by 
failing to address the source of the connection between due process 
and personal jurisdiction, Justice Scalia failed to consider whether 
changes in technology and American society affected the 
continuing validity of in-state service of process as a basis for 
personal jurisdiction. Just as an example, let’s take one suggested 
theory for requiring a connection between the defendant and forum 
state: the neo-Lockeian notion that a state has no power to assert 
its sovereign authority over an individual unless that individual 
has established a relationship with the state that makes such 
assertion appropriate.178 Even if that principle never changes, the 
ultimate rules that flow from that principle may change over time 
as society and technology change. It may be that, in the nineteenth 
century, because state-to-state travel was relatively difficult and 
required a substantial investment of time and resources, physical 
presence in a state established enough of a relationship between a 
person and the state to warrant the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction. Because modern methods of transportation have 
made it so easy to travel from state to state for brief periods of time, 
physical presence in a state may no longer establish the same kind 
of relationship that it once did, with the result that such presence 
no longer satisfies the requirements of due process. 
It is not enough for Justice Scalia, as a believer in original 
meaning, simply to assert that, if the rule of in-state service was 
acceptable in 1877, then it must be acceptable now. That assertion 
begs the question of what rule the Due Process Clause established. 
One cannot say that the Due Process Clause requires territorial 
presence as a basis of personal jurisdiction without some 
intervening step, which is the elaboration of some principle of due 
process upon which that rule depends. It may be that even an 
                                                                                                     
 177. See id. (failing to discuss the significant impact of International Shoe on 
the Court’s traditional jurisprudence).  
 178. See Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 
1277, 1304–06 (1989) (connecting the Court’s jurisprudence in International Shoe 
with the territorial limits of traditional sovereignty); Lea Brilmayer, Consent, 
Contract, and Territory, 74 MINN. L. REV. 1, 6 (1989) (linking the exercise of 
jurisdiction to “a prior assumption of state territorial sovereignty”); see also 
Brilmayer, How Contacts Count, supra note 166, at 86–87 (arguing that asserting 
jurisdiction without a relationship would be either arbitrary or discriminatory). 
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originalist like Justice Scalia would find that although the basic 
principle established by the Due Process Clause with respect to 
personal jurisdiction remains the same, the rules that flow from 
that principle might change over time as changes in technology 
and society cause the application of the principle to have a different 
effect. Because Justice Scalia never identified the underlying 
principle upon which personal jurisdiction rules are based, 
however, he neglected the most important question to be answered 
in Burnham. 
Justice Brennan’s opinion for himself and three other 
members of the Court is, if anything, even less coherent than 
Justice Scalia’s opinion. Justice Brennan concluded that personal 
jurisdiction based upon in-state service of process, at least under 
the facts presented by Burnham, satisfies the requirements of 
International Shoe.179 Justice Brennan argued that by visiting the 
forum state, “a transient defendant actually ‘avails’ himself of 
significant benefits provided by the State.”180 Justice Brennan 
failed to explain, however, how Mr. Burnham’s three-day visit to 
the forum state provided sufficient benefits to allow California to 
assert what amounted to the equivalent of general jurisdiction over 
Mr. Burnham (i.e. jurisdiction over any claim, regardless of 
whether it arises out of defendant’s contact with a forum state). As 
Justice Scalia aptly noted in his opinion, the benefits received by 
Mr. Burnham’s three-day stay in California do not distinguish him 
from other persons who have enjoyed similar visits but “who were 
fortunate enough not to be served with process while they were 
there and thus are not (simply by reason of that savoring) subject 
to the general jurisdiction of California’s courts.”181 Although it 
should have been obvious to Justice Brennan that his analysis was 
flatly inconsistent with the International Shoe rubric, his 
analytical mistake was abetted by the Court’s previous failures to 
identify the due process foundation for requiring a connection 
                                                                                                     
 179. See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 639 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“For these 
reasons, as a rule the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant based on 
his voluntary presence in the forum will satisfy the requirements of due 
process.”). 
 180. Id. at 637 (internal citation omitted). 
 181. Id. at 624 (majority opinion). 
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between the defendant and the forum state.182 In the absence of 
such a clearly enunciated rationale, it was easier for Justice 
Brennan to manipulate the language from earlier opinions because 
there was no underlying principle against which to test his opinion. 
Finally, the absence of guidance from the Supreme Court on 
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction led to some widely varying 
results in the lower courts. Courts differed substantially on how 
much contact was necessary in order to establish that category of 
dispute-blind jurisdiction.183 In one case a federal district court 
held that Pennsylvania had corporate-activities-based jurisdiction 
over Disneyworld in a case arising out of an accident in Florida, 
even though Disney had no facilities in Pennsylvania.184 On the 
other hand, a federal district court rejected an assertion of 
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction over Walmart in Texas, 
notwithstanding the fact that Walmart had 264 stores and 
thousands of employees in Texas at the time.185 Without a 
                                                                                                     
 182. See supra Part II.B (detailing the Court’s failures to discuss the 
theoretical foundation for its due process analysis). 
 183. Compare Lakin v. Prudential Secs., Inc., 348 F.3d 704, 706, 708 n.7 (8th 
Cir. 2003) (holding that general jurisdiction may be present when the defendant 
maintains one percent of its loan portfolio with citizens of the forum state), Mich. 
Nat’l Bank v. Quality Dinette, Inc., 888 F.2d 462, 465 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding the 
defendant subject to general jurisdiction in Michigan when three percent of its 
total sales were in Michigan), and Provident Nat’l Bank v. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass’n, 819 F.2d 434, 436–38 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that loans to Pennsylvania 
citizens which amounted to less than one percent of its total loan portfolio, plus 
other contacts, were sufficient to give rise to general jurisdiction in Pennsylvania; 
specific jurisdiction not argued), with Nichols v. G.D. Searle & Co., 991 F.2d 1195, 
1198–200 (4th Cir. 1993) (rejecting general jurisdiction when two percent of total 
sales were in forum; rejecting specific jurisdiction because product liability suit 
did not “arise out of the defendant's activities in the forum”), Dalton v. R & W 
Marine, Inc., 897 F.2d 1359, 1362 (5th Cir. 1990) (rejecting general jurisdiction 
when about thirteen percent of total revenues occurred in the forum; specific 
jurisdiction not argued), and Stairmaster Sports/Med. Prods., Inc. v. Pac. Fitness 
Corp., 916 F. Supp. 1049, 1052–53 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (rejecting general 
jurisdiction when three percent of total sales occurred in forum; rejecting specific 
jurisdiction over patent infringement claim when the defendant sent letters into 
the forum threatening litigation for infringement in part because the letters had 
no substantive bearing on the infringement issue), aff’d, 78 F.3d 602 (Fed. Cir. 
1996). 
 184. See Cresswell v. Walt Disney Prods., 677 F. Supp. 284, 287 (M.D. Pa. 
1987) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss). 
 185. See Follette v. Clairol, Inc., 829 F. Supp. 840, 845, 847–48 (W.D. La. 
1993) (denying general jurisdiction in products liability action), aff’d, 998 F.2d 
CATEGORICAL CONFUSION 699 
 
theoretical rationale for any of the substantive due process 
categories of personal jurisdiction, the lower courts were as 
befuddled about how to apply the standard as the commentators 
were in trying to explain it. 
D. The Anomalies Inherent in the Substantive Due Process 
Contacts Requirement 
The failure of the Court to explain the basis for the 
Substantive Due Process contacts requirement is exacerbated by 
comparison to other due process concepts. First, it is strikingly odd 
that there are fewer due process restrictions on a state’s ability to 
apply its own law to a particular defendant than there are with 
respect to a state’s power to adjudicate a claim brought against a 
defendant. Indeed, the Court has imposed only “modest” due 
process restrictions on a state’s application of its own law to a 
defendant.186 For example, in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague,187 
the Court rejected a due process attack on a state court’s decision 
to apply its own law even though the “connection between the 
forum and the controversy [was] much too tenuous to support an 
assertion of judicial jurisdiction.”188 A state’s application of its own 
law imposes the substantive rule by which it will judge a 
defendant’s conduct, which has a much more significant impact on 
a defendant’s substantive rights than the mere assertion of 
personal jurisdiction. Therefore, one would expect that the 
substantive due process limitation on application of a state’s own 
                                                                                                     
1014 (5th Cir. 1993); see also Thomas C. Arthur & Richard D. Freer, Be Careful 
What You Wish For: Goodyear, Daimler, and the Evisceration of General 
Jurisdiction, 64 EMORY L.J. ONLINE 2001, 2004 (2014) (“Not surprisingly, lower 
court decisions were all over the map.”). 
 186. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985) 
(characterizing the limits on jurisdiction imposed by the Due Process and Full 
Faith and Credit clauses as “modest”). 
 187. 449 U.S. 302 (1981). 
 188. Weinstein, supra note 115, at 241; see Phillips Petroleum, 472 U.S. at 
320 (affirming the application of Minnesota law despite tenuous contacts between 
the state and the litigation). 
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law would be significantly more stringent than the substantive due 
process limitation on personal jurisdiction.189 
Second, given the Due Process Clause’s principal focus on 
procedural fairness, one might well ask where procedural due 
process concepts fit in to the personal jurisdiction analysis. The 
Supreme Court did not even hint at the need for a procedural 
fairness analysis until International Shoe,190 and it did not give 
any real substance to it until Kulko v. Superior Court,191 in 1978.192 
Even then, the procedural fairness analysis seemed to be more of 
an afterthought in the Supreme Court’s personal jurisdictional 
opinions. Not until Asahi v. Superior Court,193 did the Supreme 
Court rest a personal jurisdiction decision on procedural fairness 
grounds.194 The Court’s failure to place procedural due process at 
the beginning of any personal jurisdictional analysis put undue 
stress on the substantive due process contacts requirements and, 
at least in part, led to the debacle of the recent 
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction cases to which we now turn. 
                                                                                                     
 189. See EUGENE F. SCHOLES, ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS § 321, at 151 n.7 (4th 
ed. 2004) (“There is much reason to suggest that the test should be stricter for 
choice-of-law purposes than for jurisdiction.” (citations omitted)); James Martin, 
Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 78 MICH. L. REV. 872, 879–80 (1980)  
From the defendant’s perspective, the differing treatment of contacts 
in the jurisdiction and choice-of-law cases turns things on their 
head . . . Thus from the defendant’s perspective, it seems irrational to 
say that due process requires minimum contacts . . . merely to hale 
him into the forum’s court while allowing more tenuous contacts to 
upset the very outcome of the case.  
Indeed, as Professor Silberman has noted, “[t]o believe that a defendant’s contacts 
with the forum state should be stronger under the due process clause for 
jurisdictional purposes than for choice of law is to believe that an accused is more 
concerned with where he will be hanged than whether.” Linda J. Silberman, 
Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 33, 88 (1978). 
 190. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (balancing the 
privileges and obligations of a corporation conducting activities in the forum 
state). 
 191. 436 U.S. 84 (1978). 
 192. See id. at 85 (citing “basic considerations of fairness” as a factor). 
 193. 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
 194. See id. at 116 (“Considering the international context, the heavy burden 
on the alien defendant, and the slight interests of the plaintiff and the forum 
State, the exercise of personal jurisdiction . . . would be unreasonable and 
unfair.”). 
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IV. The Unexpected Disappearance of Corporate-Activities-Based 
Jurisdiction 
The foregoing description of the Supreme Court’s personal 
jurisdiction doctrine lays the foundation for assessing the Court’s 
recent decisions on corporate-activities-based jurisdiction. As of 
2010, there was no doubt that corporate-activities-based 
jurisdiction was a well-established basis of jurisdiction separate 
and apart from citizenship or domicile jurisdiction based upon a 
corporation’s state of incorporation or principal place of business. 
The Supreme Court laid the foundation for 
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction in International Shoe as the 
modern version of “doing business” jurisdiction, which itself was 
simply the corporate equivalent of territorial service on an 
individual defendant.195 Given that the Supreme Court had 
recently upheld the continued viability of territorial service of 
process on individuals,196 there was little reason to suspect that the 
Court would question the continued viability of 
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction as a valid basis for 
all-purpose jurisdiction. The lower courts, both federal and state, 
had long permitted jurisdiction over corporations that were neither 
incorporated nor headquartered in the forum state. The academic 
commentators, including those who favored some restrictions on 
the extent of corporate-activities-based jurisdiction, universally 
acknowledged that, as long as a corporation had continuous and 
systematic contacts with the forum state, the corporation would be 
subject to all-purpose jurisdiction within the forum.197 
                                                                                                     
 195. See supra notes 51–60 and accompanying text (discussing International 
Shoe).  
 196. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 627 (1990) (upholding 
personal jurisdiction on the basis of a few short visits to the forum state). 
 197. See Brilmayer, How Contacts Count, supra note 166, at 112 (concluding 
that jurisdiction is proper when it “involves imposition of burdens on a domiciliary 
or regulation of activities or property ownership within the State”); Burbank, 
supra note 113, at 119 (“It is probably too late in the day for an assertion of 
jurisdiction on this basis in a state where the defendant conducts substantial 
business systematically and continuously to be held unconstitutional.”); 
Twitchell, supra note 60, at 172–73 (“Courts seem to have articulated a fairly 
straightforward standard for doing-business jurisdiction: states have general 
jurisdiction over corporations doing continuous and systematic business in the 
forum.”). 
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Indeed, some of the most visible opponents to broad 
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction had reversed course and 
acknowledged that it was necessary and appropriate to continue to 
recognize corporate-activities-based jurisdiction as a separate 
category apart from a defendant’s state of incorporation and 
principal place of business.198 Moreover, even Professor Twitchell’s 
earlier hard line position on corporate-activities-based jurisdiction 
was contingent upon the Supreme Court recognizing an expanded 
role for specific jurisdiction.199 Professor Twitchell acknowledged 
that she had “advocated cutting back on ‘doing-business’ general 
jurisdiction limiting it to the place of incorporation and the 
defendant’s principal place of business . . . . [because] courts were 
using general jurisdiction theory to reach defendants in cases in 
which such dispute-blind jurisdiction was improper.”200  
So, what led Professor Twitchell to change her mind on the 
scope of corporate-activities-based jurisdiction? She gives several 
reasons:  
First, it is a traditional practice going back to very early cases. 
Second, as long as we use a weak standard, the test is fairly 
easy to administer because courts need assess only a single 
variable, the continuity and systematic nature—and, less 
frequently, the substantiality—of the defendant’s contacts. 
Finally, given the variety of business activities that can occur 
in a forum and our uncertainties about the constitutional 
underpinnings of the doctrine, devising a more definitive 
standard is just too hard.201 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Professor Twitchell 
argues that corporate-activities-based jurisdiction is necessary in 
order “to fill in holes in our jurisdictional scheme. By providing an 
additional forum for the plaintiff, we may be engaging in some 
indirect economic equalization unattainable through more straight 
                                                                                                     
 198. See Twitchell, supra note 60, at 195–96 (acknowledging the benefits of 
doing-business jurisdiction).  
 199. See Twitchell, supra note 17, at 671–80 (arguing “that courts should 
avoid any unnecessary restriction of specific jurisdiction by restoring the 
‘dispute-specific’ meaning to specific jurisdiction and allowing it the broadest 
scope possible consistent with due process”). 
 200. Twitchell, supra note 60, at 171. 
 201. Id. at 194–95. 
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forward means; occasionally, doing-business jurisdiction may 
provide a forum by necessity where multiple plaintiffs are 
involved.”202 As Professor Borchers has noted, 
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction is “necessary to cover for a 
major deficiency in specific jurisdiction.”203 In other words, the use 
of corporate-activities-based jurisdiction makes up for 
inadequacies in the Court’s specific jurisdiction case law in a way 
that benefits plaintiffs and “generally does little harm” to 
defendants.204 Indeed, if the burden on a corporate defendant is too 
significant, or the forum state truly has no legitimate interest in 
the case, then courts “can use the separate ‘reasonableness’ prong 
or forum non conveniens to avoid unjust results.”205 
Perhaps most significantly, the best proof of the 
well-established and entrenched nature of 
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction is found in the fact that 
corporate defendants of any significant size never challenge it.206 
In her earlier article, Professor Twitchell had noted that, in the 
litigated and reported cases, specific jurisdiction cases greatly 
outnumbered cases involving corporate-activities-based 
jurisdiction.207 In her later article, however, Professor Twitchell 
stated: 
                                                                                                     
 202. Id. at 195–96. 
 203. See Patrick J. Borchers, The Problem with General Jurisdiction, 2001 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 119, 130 (explaining that one of specific jurisdiction’s major 
deficiencies is its “inability to provide a single, rational forum”).  
 204. See Twitchell, supra note 60, at 196 (noting that one reason 
doing-business jurisdiction generally does not harm defendants is because most 
defendants are domestic and are likely to have to defend somewhere in the United 
States). 
 205. Id.; see also Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 114 
(1987) (refusing to hear a third-party claim against a foreign defendant at the 
place of injury when the court’s assertion of jurisdiction was unreasonable); 
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476–77 (1985) (noting that the 
“requirements inherent in the concept of ‘fair play and substantial justice’ may 
defeat the reasonableness of jurisdiction even if the defendant has purposefully 
engaged in forum activities”).  
 206. See Twitchell, supra note 60, at 191 n.80 (noting that, of the “thousand 
or so reported opinions mentioning ‘general jurisdiction’ or ‘doing-business’ 
jurisdiction or ‘general personal jurisdiction,’ fewer than twenty opinions a year 
actually held that it existed”).  
 207. See Twitchell, supra note 17, at 630 (“With the emergence of specific 
jurisdiction in the twentieth century, the exercise of general jurisdiction has 
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It is important to recognize that the published case law does not 
reflect the entire picture. General jurisdiction cases often fly 
below the radar, and it is difficult to know how frequently 
because such cases are not reported in the case law. There are 
two reasons for this. First, defendants are unlikely to object to 
general jurisdiction in a forum if they operate directly from a 
physical office there, since this has always been held to be 
sufficient to justify general jurisdiction. Second, because of the 
expense and uncertainty of pursuing personal jurisdictional 
challenges, some defendants may not object at all, or may 
pursue a forum non conveniens challenge instead.208  
Indeed, even in cases that reached the Supreme Court because 
of challenges to jurisdiction by other smaller defendants or 
challenges by a large corporate defendant to issues other than 
personal jurisdiction, large corporations repeatedly failed to assert 
any objection to the Court’s exercise of corporate-activities-based 
jurisdiction.209 For example, in World-Wide Volkswagen, neither 
Audi nor Volkswagen of America challenged Oklahoma’s assertion 
of personal jurisdiction notwithstanding the objections of the car 
dealer and local distributor.210 Similarly, in Phillips Petroleum Co. 
v. Shutts,211 the defendant never asserted a challenge to the forum 
state’s assertion of corporate-activities-based jurisdiction even 
though it asserted an objection to the Court’s jurisdiction over 
non-resident members of the plaintiff class in a class action case.212 
Defendant had an incentive to assert a due process objection; that 
it failed to do so could only be the result of its assumption that such 
an objection had no chance of prevailing.213 
                                                                                                     
become rare.”).  
 208. Twitchell, supra note 60, at 193–94.  
 209. See id. at 195–96 (arguing that doing business jurisdiction is rarely 
challenged by large corporate defendants because “[m]ost defendants are 
domestic and will have to defend somewhere in the United States anyway”).  
 210. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 288–91 
(1980) (noting that one reason Audi did not object to the Court’s jurisdiction was 
because it may have felt it had no legitimate jurisdictional defense). 
 211. 472 U.S. 797 (1985). 
 212. See id. at 802–03 (describing petitioner’s two claims as follows: first, that 
the Kansas trial court did not possess personal jurisdiction over absent plaintiff 
class members, and second, that Kansas law could not be applied to plaintiffs 
having no connection with Kansas).  
 213. See id. at 812–13 (holding that Kansas’s procedure of sending fully 
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Regardless of how well-established corporate-activities-based 
jurisdiction was at the turn of the century, predicting the future of 
any personal jurisdiction doctrine is a dangerous business because 
of the absence of clearly defined Supreme Court precedents and 
the lack of a judicially recognized theoretical foundation for the 
substantive due process limitations on personal jurisdiction.214 The 
Supreme Court demonstrated exactly how volatile the doctrine 
was, beginning with a case in 2011. 
A. The Goodyear Case: The Hint of a New Standard 
In Goodyear, the Court addressed personal jurisdiction issues 
involved in a lawsuit brought in North Carolina by the parents of 
two thirteen-year-old boys who were killed in a bus accident in 
France.215 The plaintiffs alleged that the bus accident resulted 
from a defective tire manufactured in Turkey by a foreign 
subsidiary of the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company (Goodyear 
USA).216 The complaint named as defendants Goodyear USA and 
three of its subsidiaries organized and separately incorporated in 
Turkey, France, and Luxemburg.217 Goodyear USA operates 
manufacturing plants in North Carolina but is incorporated and 
has its headquarters in the state of Ohio.218 Goodyear USA did not 
                                                                                                     
descriptive notices explaining the right to “opt-out” to each class member satisfied 
due process).  
 214. See Twitchell, supra note 60, at 173 (explaining that the “lack of a firm 
theoretical underpinning, coupled with the practical problems courts encounter 
in applying the [doing-business jurisdiction] doctrine today, makes its practice 
today more the product of circumstance and compromise than of a principled 
application of a well-developed theory”). 
 215. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 918 
(2011) (“A bus accident outside Paris that took the lives of two 13-year-old boys 
from North Carolina gave rise to the litigation we here consider.”).  
 216. See id. (“Attributing the accident to a defective tire manufactured in 
Turkey at the plant of a foreign subsidiary of The Goodyear Tire and Rubber 
Company . . . the boys’ parents commenced an action for damages in a North 
Carolina state court . . . .”).  
 217. See id. (“[T]hey named as defendants Goodyear USA, an Ohio 
corporation, and three of its subsidiaries, organized and operating, respectively, 
in Turkey, France, and Luxembourg.”).  
 218. See id. (explaining that Goodyear is an Ohio corporation that “had plants 
in North Carolina and regularly engaged in commercial activity there”).  
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contest personal jurisdiction in the North Carolina courts, but the 
foreign corporate defendants moved to dismiss the case against 
them for lack of personal jurisdiction.219 Here is how the Court, in 
an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, described the foreign defendants’ 
contacts with the forum State: 
[P]etitioners are not registered to do business in North 
Carolina. They have no place of business, employees, or bank 
accounts in North Carolina. They do not design, manufacture, 
or advertise their products in North Carolina. And they do not 
solicit business in North Carolina or themselves sell or ship 
tires to North Carolina customers. Even so, a small percentage 
of petitioners’ tires (tens of thousands out of tens of millions 
manufactured between 2004 and 2007) were distributed in 
North Carolina by other Goodyear USA affiliates. These tires 
were typically custom ordered to equip specialized vehicles such 
as cement mixers, waste haulers, and boat and horse trailers. 
Petitioners state, and respondents do not here deny, that the 
type of tire involved in the accident, a Goodyear Regional RHS 
tire manufactured by Goodyear Turkey, was never distributed 
in North Carolina.220 
Because the plaintiffs’ claims arose in France and had no 
connection with the state of North Carolina, the North Carolina 
courts relied on the theory of corporate-activities-based 
jurisdiction to justify personal jurisdiction in North Carolina.221 In 
addition, in order to establish the continuous and systematic 
contacts that plaintiffs acknowledged were necessary for such 
jurisdiction, the North Carolina courts relied solely on the sales in 
North Carolina of the tires manufactured by the foreign 
defendants because the defendants had no physical presence 
within that state.222 Indeed, because the foreign defendants 
themselves did not sell any of their tires in North Carolina, the 
                                                                                                     
 219. See id. (“Goodyear USA’s foreign subsidiaries . . . maintained that North 
Carolina lacked adjudicatory authority over them.”).  
 220. Id.  
 221. See id. at 921–22 (describing the lower court’s decision to confine its 
analysis to “‘general rather than specific jurisdiction,’ which the court recognized 
required a ‘higher threshold’ showing: A defendant must have ‘continuous and 
systematic contacts’ with the forum”). 
 222. See id. at 922 (noting the lower courts’ emphasis on the foreign 
defendants’ failure to make any attempt to keep their tires from reaching the 
North Carolina market).  
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lower courts relied on a stream-of-commerce theory to establish a 
connection between the defendants and the forum state.223 
Justice Ginsburg began her discussion of the relevant legal 
standard by noting that cases after International Shoe 
distinguished between “general or all-purpose jurisdiction, and 
specific or case-linked jurisdiction.”224 This very broad description 
of general and specific jurisdiction is the first suggestion that 
Justice Ginsburg may be describing these categories, and in 
particular general jurisdiction, in the larger sense of any kind of 
all-purpose jurisdiction, rather than the more limited sense of 
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction.225 
Justice Ginsburg then followed with a curious, but later very 
important, description of the test for general jurisdiction: “a court 
may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or 
foreign-country) corporations to hear any and all claims against 
them when their affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and 
systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum 
State.”226 Of course, the key phrase in this description of the law is 
not “continuous and systematic,” which was the generally accepted 
test at the time, but rather the newly minted phrase “as to render 
them essentially at home in the forum State.”227  
The “essentially at home” criterion, at least when applied to 
corporate-activities-based cases, was entirely unprecedented.228 
The only case Justice Ginsburg cited for this proposition was 
                                                                                                     
 223. See id. (according to the lower courts, the higher threshold was crossed 
“when petitioners placed their tires ‘in the stream of interstate commerce without 
any limitation on the extent to which those tires could be sold in North Carolina’”).  
 224. Id. at 919. 
 225. See Twitchell, supra note 17, at 610 (describing general jurisdiction as 
“dispute-blind” and without regard to the nature of the dispute, and specific 
jurisdiction as “dispute-specific” and based only on affiliations between the forum 
and the controversy).  
 226. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 
(2011). 
 227. See Twitchell, supra note 17, at 623–24 (explaining that the 
International Shoe Court used the opportunity to sweep aside the “presence” test 
in favor of a new means of determining corporate jurisdiction).  
 228. See Todd David Peterson, The Timing of Minimum Contacts After 
Goodyear and McIntyre, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 202, 236 (2011) (explaining that 
prior to Goodyear, “the Supreme Court had given no indication of where to draw 
the line between . . . cases at either end of the general jurisdiction spectrum”).  
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International Shoe.229 There are two references to “home” on the 
cited page of the Court’s International Shoe opinion, but neither of 
them suggests that the corporate-activities-based jurisdiction 
discussed in that opinion was available only in states where a 
corporation was essentially at home.230 The first reference is found 
in the one sentence in the opinion that later provided a foundation 
for the Court’s procedural due process component to the minimum 
contacts tests: “An ‘estimate of the inconveniences’ which would 
result to the corporation from a trial away from its ‘home’ or 
principal place of business is relevant in this connection.”231 This 
sentence does not refer to the contacts, or substantive due process, 
part of the test for personal jurisdiction.232 Rather, the context of 
the sentence makes it clear that the Court is stating that, in 
addition to the contacts requirement, the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction by a state must not be so inconvenient to a defendant 
as to render it procedurally unfair.233 
The second mention of the term “home” is similarly irrelevant 
to the requirement for corporate-activities-based jurisdiction: 
Conversely it has been generally recognized that the casual 
presence of the corporate agent or even his conduct of single or 
isolated items of activities in a state [on] the corporation’s 
                                                                                                     
 229. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919; see also Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 
310, 317 (1945)  
‘Presence’ in the state in this sense has never been doubted when the 
activities of the corporation there have not only 
been continuous and systematic, but also give rise to the liabilities 
sued on, even though no consent to be sued or authorization to an agent 
to accept service of process has been given.  
 230. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317. 
 231. Id.  
 232. Id.  
 233. Earlier in the same paragraph, Justice Stone discussed the “presence” 
requirement as applied to corporations. See id. at 316–17 
For the terms ‘present’ or ‘presence’ are used merely to symbolize those 
activities of the corporation's agent within the state which courts will 
deem to be sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process. Those 
demands may be met by such contacts of the corporation with the state 
of the forum as make it reasonable, in the context of our federal system 
of government, to require the corporation to defend the particular suit 
which is brought there.  
(citing Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 140–41 (2d Cir. 1930)). 
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behalf are not enough to subject it to suit on causes of action 
unconnected with the activities there . . . To require the 
corporation in such circumstances to defend the suit away from 
its home or other jurisdiction where it carries on more 
substantial activities has been thought to lay too great and 
unreasonable a burden on the corporation to comport with due 
process.234 
This excerpt not only fails to support Justice Ginsburg’s 
addition of the phrase “at home” as an additional qualifier to the 
continuous and systematic contacts test,235 it supports precisely 
the opposite conclusion. Here, the Court is simply stating that 
isolated contacts are not sufficient to require a corporation to 
defend away from its “home.”236 Moreover, by adding the phrase 
“or other jurisdiction where it carries on more substantial 
activities,”237 the Court seems clearly to be suggesting that some 
form of dispute-blind all-purpose jurisdiction is available in states 
where it carries on “more substantial activities” other than where 
a corporation is “at home.”238 
Justice Ginsburg then noted that, because the claim arose out 
of an accident in France, the North Carolina courts lacked specific 
jurisdiction.239 Instead, the state court found that there was 
general jurisdiction because the delivery of some of the foreign 
defendants’ tires through “the stream of commerce” to North 
                                                                                                     
 234. Id. (citations omitted).  
 235. See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919 (“A court may assert general jurisdiction 
over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country) corporations to hear any and all 
claims against them when their affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and 
systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.” (citing Int’l 
Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317)).  
 236. See id. (noting that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the foreign 
defendants had “affiliations with the State [that were] so ‘continuous and 
systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum State” (citing Int’l 
Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317)).  
 237. Id.  
 238. See id. at 928–29 (noting that “continuous and systematic general 
business contacts” may be sufficient to establish general jurisdiction (quoting 
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984))).   
 239. See id. at 919 (“Because the episode-in-suit, the bus accident, occurred in 
France, and the tire alleged to have caused the accident was manufactured and 
sold abroad, North Carolina courts lacked specific jurisdiction to adjudicate the 
controversy. The North Carolina Court of Appeals so acknowledged.”).  
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Carolina provided the North Carolina courts with general 
jurisdiction over the foreign defendants.240 In Justice Ginsburg’s 
view, that conclusion was “confusing or blending general and 
specific jurisdictional inquiries . . . .”241 A connection as tenuous as 
that could not “establish the ‘continuous and systematic’ affiliation 
necessary to empower North Carolina courts to entertain claims 
unrelated to the forum corporation’s contacts with the State.”242 
After describing the jurisdictional facts in detail in order to lay 
the foundation for the Court’s opinion, Justice Ginsburg set forth 
her understanding of the law. Justice Ginsburg first discussed the 
International Shoe opinion and distinguished between assertions 
of specific jurisdiction and general jurisdiction.243 In discussing 
general jurisdiction, Justice Ginsburg made a critical error: “For 
an individual, the paradigm form for the exercise of general 
jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile; for a corporation, it is an 
equivalent place, one in which the corporation is fairly regarded as 
at ‘home.’”244 The problem with this statement, however, is that 
plaintiff’s jurisdictional argument rested on general jurisdiction in 
the narrow sense of corporate-activities-based jurisdiction,245 while 
Justice Ginsburg’s identification of domicile, place of 
incorporation, and principal place of business as “paradigm bases 
for general jurisdiction” referred to general jurisdiction in its 
larger sense of all-purpose jurisdiction.246 Citizenship or domicile 
                                                                                                     
 240. See id. (“Some of the tires made abroad by Goodyear’s foreign 
subsidiaries, the North Carolina Court of Appeals stressed, had reached North 
Carolina through ‘the stream of commerce’; that connection, the Court of Appeals 
believed, gave North Carolina courts the handle needed for the exercise of general 
jurisdiction over the foreign corporations.”).  
 241. Id.  
 242. Id. at 920.  
 243. See id. at 923–25 (explaining that adjudicatory authority is “specific” 
when the suit arises out of or relates to the defendant's contacts with the forum, 
and that it is “general” when the continuous corporate operations within a state 
justify suit against the corporation on an unrelated cause of action (citing 
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 nn.8–9 
(1984))). 
 244. Id. at 924. 
 245. See id. at 930 (explaining that plaintiff asserted a “single enterprise” 
theory and asked the Court to consolidate foreign defendants’ ties to North 
Carolina with those of Goodyear USA and other Goodyear entities).  
 246. According to Justice Ginsburg, for a corporation, the paradigmatic forum 
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of corporations and individuals has always been a valid traditional 
basis of jurisdiction separate and apart from 
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction, which developed from the 
separate traditional basis of service on a defendant in the forum 
state.247 This distinction is made entirely clear by Justice 
Ginsburg’s citation to Professor Lea Brilmayer’s article on general 
jurisdiction, which, at the page cited by Justice Ginsburg, clearly 
refers to general jurisdiction in the larger sense of all-purpose 
jurisdiction, not corporate-activities-based jurisdiction.248 
Justice Ginsburg’s mistake is the perfect example of why the 
ambiguity of jurisdictional terminology gets the courts into 
trouble. The term general jurisdiction can mean two entirely 
different things. The plaintiffs in Goodyear were arguing for 
general jurisdiction in the sense described by International Shoe, 
Perkins, and Helicopteros, as corporate-activities-based 
jurisdiction.249 Justice Ginsburg, on the other hand, is discussing 
an entirely different subset of all-purpose jurisdiction, 
citizenship/domicile, which, although it may be the paradigmatic 
form of all-purpose general jurisdiction, is an entirely separate 
                                                                                                     
for the exercise of general jurisdiction is one in which the corporation is fairly 
regarded as “at home.” Id. at 924. Justice Ginsburg cited Lea Brilmayer for 
additional, paradigmatic bases for general jurisdiction, including domicile, place 
of incorporation, and principal place of business. Id. (citing Lea Brilmayer et al., 
A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV. 723, 728 (1988)).  
 247. See Lea Brilmayer, et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. 
L. REV. 723, 725 (1988) [hereinafter Brilmayer, A General Look] (explaining that 
historically, “courts commonly predicated jurisdiction upon the defendant’s 
general affiliation with the forum, and not the defendant’s activities in the forum 
that were related to the litigation”).  
 248. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 
(2011) (discussing the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction over 
a corporation (citing Brilmayer, A General Look, supra note 247, at 728)).  
 249. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 
(1984) (holding that Texas could not exercise general jurisdiction over Helicol 
because Helicol’s contacts with Texas were not sufficiently continuous and 
systematic); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 438 (1952) 
(holding that Ohio could exercise general jurisdiction over a Philippines-based 
corporation because the corporation’s president had been carrying on a 
continuous and systematic part of its general business in Ohio); Int’l Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945) (holding that Washington’s exercise of 
general jurisdiction over International Shoe was proper because its activities in 
Washington were systematic and continuous).  
712 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 655 (2019) 
 
category from corporate-activities-based jurisdiction.250 Thus, 
although state of incorporation and principal place of business 
might be the measure of the traditional basis of citizenship or 
domicile jurisdiction, they were never (at least until this case) 
deemed to be the test for corporate-activities-based jurisdiction.251 
Justice Ginsburg then went on to describe the Court’s specific 
jurisdiction cases.252 She concluded with a citation to Professor 
Twitchell’s Myth of General Jurisdiction article in which Professor 
Twitchell stated that, in the aftermath of International Shoe, 
“specific jurisdiction has become the centerpiece of modern 
jurisdiction theory, while general jurisdiction plays a reduced 
role.”253 In that article, of course, Professor Twitchell focused solely 
on litigated cases, which, as previously discussed, tilt strongly 
towards specific jurisdiction analyses.254 But, as Professor 
Twitchell herself acknowledged, the importance of general 
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction cannot be gauged by 
reported opinions because most substantial corporate defendants 
never challenge the existence of corporate-activities-based 
jurisdiction.255 This issue is critically important because, as we 
shall see, Justice Ginsburg assumes that plaintiffs have no 
significant need for corporate-activities-based jurisdiction, a claim 
that is empirically questionable at best. 
                                                                                                     
 250. See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924 (“For an individual, the paradigm forum 
for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile; for a 
corporation, it is an equivalent place, one in which the corporation is fairly 
regarded as at home.”).  
 251. See Brilmayer, A General Look, supra note 247, at 731–32 (explaining 
that, since International Shoe, the traditional basis for jurisdiction had been 
“physical power”).  
 252. See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924–25 (discussing specific jurisdiction cases 
that post-date International Shoe (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court 
of Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987))); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 
(1985); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Hanson 
v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958)).  
 253. Id. at 925 (citing Twitchell, supra note 17, at 628). 
 254. See supra text accompanying notes 247–248 (discussing the general 
acknowledgement that it is necessary to recognize corporate-activities-based 
jurisdiction as separate from a defendant’s state of incorporation and principal 
place of business).  
 255. See supra text accompanying notes 207–208 (discussing how and why 
general jurisdiction cases usually fly under the radar). 
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Justice’s Ginsburg’s opinion then turned to plaintiffs’ 
assertion that corporate-activities-based jurisdiction could be 
justified based on a stream-of-commerce theory.256 Justice 
Ginsburg noted that the lower courts use of the 
“stream-of-commerce analysis elided the essential difference 
between case-specific and all-purpose (general) 
jurisdiction . . . . But ties serving to bolster the exercise of specific 
jurisdiction do not warrant a determination that, based on those 
ties, the forum has general jurisdiction over a defendant.”257 If 
anything, Justice Ginsburg understated the problem with 
plaintiffs’ argument. The stream-of-commerce theory has never 
been accepted by a majority of the Court, even in the context of a 
specific jurisdiction case.258 The plaintiffs’ argument is so clearly 
beyond any Supreme Court precedent that Justice Ginsburg could 
easily have stopped there. Given the weakness of plaintiffs’ 
argument, it is not surprising that no member of the Court 
supported plaintiffs’ case for jurisdiction. 
Justice Ginsburg proceeded, however, to a lengthy discussion 
of the facts of both Perkins and Helicopteros, which made it clear 
that “North Carolina is not a forum in which it would be 
permissible to subject petitioners to general jurisdiction.”259 These 
contacts fell “far short of the ‘continuous and systematic general 
business contacts’ necessary to empower North Carolina to 
entertain suit against them on claims unrelated to anything that 
                                                                                                     
 256. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 927.  
 257. Id.  
 258. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 887 (2011) 
(explaining that the stream of commerce metaphor cannot supersede either the 
mandate of the Due Process Clause or the limits on judicial authority that it 
ensures); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 112 
(1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that a defendant’s awareness that the 
stream of commerce may sweep a product to the forum state is not an act 
purposefully directed toward the forum state); id. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring)  
[A]rguing that a defendant’s placement of a product into the stream of 
commerce is an act in which the defendant purposefully avails itself of 
the forum state because “[a]s long as a participant . . . is aware that 
the final product is being marketed in the forum State, the possibility 
of a lawsuit there cannot come as a surprise.  
 259. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 917 
(2011).  
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connects them to the State.”260 Justice Ginsburg concluded her 
analysis by stating: “Measured against Helicopteros and Perkins, 
North Carolina is not a forum in which it would be permissible to 
subject petitioners to general jurisdiction. Unlike the defendant in 
Perkins, whose sole wartime business activity was conducted in 
Ohio, petitioners are in no sense at home in North Carolina.”261  
This last statement by Justice Ginsburg is profoundly 
ambiguous and confusing. On the one hand, one might infer that 
the reference to the petitioners being “in no sense at home in North 
Carolina” was intended to define the standard for corporate-
activities-based jurisdiction and limit such cases to instances 
where a defendant is essentially at home in the forum state. On 
the other hand, Justice Ginsburg’s subsequent reference to 
“continuous and systematic general business contacts” suggested 
continuity with Helicopteros and the many lower court cases 
involving corporate-activities-based jurisdiction.262 
Following Goodyear, the courts and commentators disagreed 
on whether the Court had changed the well-accepted tests for 
general jurisdiction. Some argued that the Court’s use of the 
phrase “essentially at home” implied that the Court was imposing 
significant new restrictions on the cases that would qualify for 
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction.263 Others, however, 
concluded that the Court could not have intended such a 
                                                                                                     
 260. Id. at 929 (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 
U.S. 408, 416 (1984)).  
 261. Id. (emphasis added).  
 262. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 
(1984) (“The one trip to Houston by Helicol’s chief executive officer for the purpose 
of negotiating the transportation-services contract with Consorcio/WSH cannot 
be described or regarded as a contact of a ‘continuous and systematic’ 
nature . . . .”); see, e.g., Pervasive Software, Inc. v. Lexware GmbH & Co., 688 F.3d 
214, 231 (5th Cir. 2012) (“Lexware’s attenuated connections to the state fall far 
short of the ‘the continuous and systematic general business contacts’ necessary 
to make Lexware ‘at home’ in the forum.”).  
 263. See, e.g., Lou Mulligan, Clarifying Personal Jurisdiction . . . or Not, 
PRAWFSBLAWG (June 28, 2011, 4:05 P.M.), 
https://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/06/clarifying-personal-
jurisdiction-or-not.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2019) (“The opinion signals to lower 
courts that simply doing a lot [of] continuous business in a state is not sufficient 
for general jurisdiction.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
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significant restriction and that the test would remain the same as 
it had ever since Perkins.264 
The strongest argument in favor of giving significant doctrinal 
substance to Justice Ginsburg’s use of the phrase “at home” came 
not from the opinion in Goodyear, but rather from the Court’s 
decision in McIntyre, a specific jurisdiction case decided the same 
year as Goodyear.265 In discussing the possible bases of jurisdiction 
over the defendant in her dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsburg 
stated: “First, all agree, McIntyre UK surely is not subject to 
general (all-purpose) jurisdiction in New Jersey courts, for that 
foreign-country corporation is hardly ‘at home’ in New Jersey.”266 
That sentence certainly suggests that Justice Ginsburg regarded 
the test for corporate-activities-based jurisdiction to be whether a 
defendant is at home in the forum state. Of course, even if one had 
accepted “at home” as the basis for corporate-activities-based 
jurisdiction, Justice Ginsburg had not given that phrase much 
content or explanation.267 
The arguments in favor of a much more limited interpretation 
of Goodyear were two-fold. First, there was no support in the 
Supreme Court’s prior precedents for the imposition of an “at 
home” standard for corporate-activities-based jurisdiction.268 As 
previously noted, the two references to “home” in International 
Shoe did not relate to the quantum of contacts necessary to permit 
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction, but instead related to 
fairness considerations involving burden and inconvenience to the 
                                                                                                     
 264. See, e.g., Peterson, supra note 228, at 215 (arguing that such a restrictive 
interpretation ignores “Justice Ginsburg’s use of the term ‘paradigm,’ meaning 
‘an outstandingly clear or typical example or archetype’”); Patrick J. Borchers, J. 
McIntyre Machinery, Goodyear, and the Incoherence of the Minimum Contacts 
Test, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1245, 1267 (2011) (arguing that the nature of 
Goodyear USA’s contacts suggested “that some sort of permanent commercial 
presence, often manifested in physical locations, is the hallmark of general 
jurisdiction”).  
 265. J. McIntyre Machinery, 564 U.S. at 899 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 266. Id.  
 267. See id. (using the phrase “at home” only once, in the following sentence: 
“First, all agree, McIntyre UK surely is not subject to general (all-purpose) 
jurisdiction in New Jersey courts, for that foreign-country corporation is hardly 
‘at home’ in New Jersey”).  
 268. See supra notes 230–238 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s 
two references to “home” in the International Shoe opinion).  
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defendant.269 In Perkins, the Court made no mention of the phrase 
“at home” nor did it suggest that the test for 
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction was restricted to the state of 
incorporation and a corporation’s principal place of business, 
factors that were relevant to the traditional basis of citizenship, 
and not to corporate-activities-based jurisdiction.270 Finally, in 
Helicopteros, if the Court had thought that 
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction had been limited to where a 
corporation was “at home” or solely its state of incorporation or 
principal place of business, the Court could have made much 
shorter work of the case. Nowhere in that decision did the Court 
suggest that corporate-activities-based jurisdiction was available 
only where a corporation was “at home.”271 
Second, it was hard to believe that Justice Ginsburg would 
make such a significant change in the standard for 
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction, which would overrule sixty 
years of lower court precedent, without discussing that precedent 
or even mentioning that such cases existed. Surely Justice 
Ginsburg must have been aware of this lower court precedent and, 
just as surely, Justice Ginsburg would have been aware that a 
significant restriction on corporate-activities-based jurisdiction 
would significantly tip the balance in favor of corporate defendants 
who had long assumed they were subject to 
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction in virtually every state, to 
the detriment of individual plaintiffs who might now be forced to 
travel far from their own homes in order to sue well-funded 
corporations who could afford to defend effectively in any state. 
Even if Justice Ginsburg intended that result, she certainly would 
not write an opinion without discussing that issue and the impact 
on so many years of well-entrenched precedent. Thus, it is not 
surprising that one widely used case book on civil procedure added 
a note after the Goodyear decision stating that it was a “wise 
choice” for Goodyear USA to have conceded general jurisdiction in 
                                                                                                     
 269. See supra notes 230–238 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s 
two references to “home” in the International Shoe opinion). 
 270. The phrase “at home” is never used in the Perkins opinion. See generally 
Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).  
 271. The phrase “at home” is never used in the Helicopteros opinion. See 
generally Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984). 
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North Carolina “given the extent of their contacts with North 
Carolina . . . .”272 
Third, it would have been particularly surprising for Justice 
Ginsburg to make such a sweeping change in the law of personal 
jurisdiction in such an easy case. Goodyear could have been 
decided based on the existing understanding of the differences 
between corporate-activities-based jurisdiction and specific 
jurisdiction. Justice Ginsburg needed to say only that, given the 
uncertain validity of the stream-of-commerce theory in the context 
of specific jurisdiction, the use by the North Carolina courts of that 
theory to justify corporate-activities-based jurisdiction was 
unquestionably overreaching.273 One would never have expected a 
justice as highly regarded as Justice Ginsburg to make so sweeping 
and unnecessary a pronouncement in a case where none of the 
parties had briefed the issue, none of the briefs contained any 
discussion of the many corporate-activities-based cases in the 
lower courts, and none of the other justices joining in the 
unanimous decision would be likely to perceive the sweeping 
impact of such a decision. 
A final reason not to regard Goodyear as a sea change in the 
law of corporate-activities-based jurisdiction was that corporate 
defendants continued to concede corporate-acts-based jurisdiction. 
For example, in the preliminary stages of the Supreme Court’s 
next big case on that subject, Daimler AG v. Bauman,274 the Ninth 
Circuit upheld an assertion of corporate-activities-based 
jurisdiction over Daimler with respect to a law suit challenging the 
activities of its wholly owned subsidiary in Argentina based upon 
the continuous and systematic contacts with the state of California 
by its American subsidiary, Mercedes-Benz USA (MBUSA).275 
                                                                                                     
 272. See STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 138 (8th ed. 2012) (discussing 
what difference, if any, Goodyear’s failure to challenge personal jurisdiction 
would have made in the outcome of the case); see also Borchers, supra note 264, 
at 1267 (stating that there was probably corporate-activities-based jurisdiction 
over Goodyear USA).  
 273. See supra note 258 and accompanying text (noting that 
stream-of-commerce theory has never been accepted by a majority of the Supreme 
Court).  
 274. 571 U.S. 117 (2014). 
 275. Id. at 120–21. 
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Daimler contested the existence of personal jurisdiction in 
California and had an interest in making every argument it could 
to defeat such jurisdiction.276 Notwithstanding this clear 
incentive to make every possible jurisdictional argument, Daimler 
conceded that California would have corporate-activities-based 
jurisdiction over MBUSA, even though it was incorporated in 
Delaware with its principal place of business in New Jersey.277 
Daimler would not have conceded that jurisdiction unless it 
believed that Goodyear had limited corporate-activities-based 
jurisdiction to MBUSA’s states of incorporation and principal place 
of business.  
One final indication that Goodyear made no significant change 
in corporate-activities-based jurisdiction is contained in an amicus 
brief filed in the Daimler case by Professor Lea Brilmayer, the very 
scholar on whom Justice Ginsburg had so prominently relied in 
Goodyear and a well-known opponent of broad 
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction.278 In her brief, the sole 
ground on which Professor Brilmayer argued for the reversal of the 
Ninth Circuit’s assertion of personal jurisdiction over Daimler was 
the argument that the Ninth Circuit improperly attributed the 
contacts of MBUSA to Daimler, which was an entirely separate 
corporation.279 Brilmayer made no argument based on the 
standard for general corporate-activities-based jurisdiction. 
Indeed, Brilmayer described the standard for such jurisdiction in 
a manner that suggested Goodyear had imposed no changes on 
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction whatsoever: 
This Court has repeatedly held that the Due Process Clause 
requires a holding of “continuous and systematic” contacts 
                                                                                                     
 276. See id. at 134–35 (arguing that a subsidiary’s jurisdictional contacts can 
be imputed to its parent only when the former is so dominated by the latter as to 
be its “alter ego”).  
 277. Id. at 121. 
 278. See Brief for Daimler AG as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1, 
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014) (No. 11-965), 2013 WL 3377320 
(describing Professor Brilmayer as one of America’s most widely cited scholars 
writing on personal jurisdiction).  
 279. See id. at 8 (“The Ninth Circuit’s test left the actual 
defendant unaccounted for. It was not MBUSA, but Daimler, that the plaintiffs 
wanted to sue. This deficiency should be fatal, because this Court mandates that 
contacts be shown for every defendant over whom jurisdiction is sought.”).  
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between the defendant and the forum. The “continuous and 
systematic” test for assertion of general jurisdiction is generally 
ascribed to Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. 
Although formulated six decades ago, the Perkins standard 
remains authoritative.280 
Nevertheless, when the Supreme Court ultimately decided 
Daimler, Justice Ginsburg had a surprise in store for all those who 
expected that Goodyear had not made a significant change in the 
law. 
B. Daimler: The Hint of a New Standard Converted to a Holding, 
but with a Possible Exception 
The next Supreme Court case to address 
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction after Goodyear was Daimler 
AG v. Bauman.281 Daimler involved a complaint filed in the 
Northern District of California by twenty-two Argentine residents 
against the German manufacturer of Mercedes-Benz vehicles.282 
The complaint alleged that during Argentina’s “Dirty War,” 
Daimler’s Argentine subsidiary “collaborated with state security 
forces to kidnap, detain, torture, and kill certain MB Argentina 
workers, among them, plaintiffs or persons closely related to 
plaintiffs.”283 Plaintiffs asserted that the State of California had 
personal jurisdiction over Daimler based on the California contacts 
of Daimler’s American subsidiary, Mercedes-Benz USA (MBUSA) 
which was separately incorporated in Delaware with its principal 
place of business in New Jersey.284 
In response to defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of 
personal jurisdiction, plaintiffs argued that MBUSA “should be 
                                                                                                     
 280. Id. at 11 (discussing the Perkins standard as applied by the Court in 
Helicopteros (citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 
915, 929–29 (2011))); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 
408, 416 (1984) (concluding that Helicol’s contacts with Texas did not constitute 
the kind of continuous and systematic general business contacts the Court found 
to exist in Perkins).  
 281. 571 U.S. 117 (2014). 
 282. Id. at 120–21. 
 283. Id. at 121.  
 284. Id. 
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treated as Daimler’s agent for jurisdictional purposes.”285 As the 
Supreme Court noted, “[a]t times relevant to this suit, MBUSA 
was wholly owned by DaimlerChrysler North America Holding 
Corporation, a Daimler subsidiary.”286 MBUSA had substantial 
contacts with the State of California, including “multiple 
California-based facilities, including a regional office in Costa 
Mesa, a Vehicle Preparation Center in Carson, and a Classic 
Center in Irvine.”287 In addition, MBUSA was “the largest supplier 
of luxury vehicles to the California market,” and over ten percent 
of MBUSA’s sales occurred in California, which accounted for 2.4 
percent of Daimler’s world-wide sales.288 
As previously noted, Daimler did not contest plaintiff’s 
allegation that California would have corporate-activities-based 
jurisdiction over MBUSA.289 Instead, Daimler argued that, 
because MBUSA was a separate and distinct corporate entity, the 
Court should not attribute MBUSA’s contacts with California to 
Daimler.290 The district court agreed that MBUSA’s contacts 
should not be attributed to Daimler and dismissed the plaintiff’s 
complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction.291 On appeal, the Ninth 
Circuit initially affirmed the district court’s judgment.292 On 
rehearing, however, the panel reversed course and upheld personal 
                                                                                                     
 285. Id. at 123 
 286. Id. at 123 n.3. Thus, Daimler was twice removed from the separate 
corporate entity on whose contacts with California the plaintiffs relied.  
 287. Id. at 123.  
 288. Id.  
 289. See supra note 277 and accompanying text (explaining Daimler’s 
concession that California would have corporate-activities-based jurisdiction over 
MBUSA, even though it was incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of 
business in New Jersey).  
 290. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 134–35 (2014) (“Daimler 
argues, and several Courts of Appeals have held, that a subsidiary’s jurisdictional 
contacts can be imputed to its parent only when the former is so dominated by 
the latter as to be its alter ego.”).  
 291. See id. at 124 (granting Daimler’s motion to dismiss because Daimler’s 
own affiliations with California were insufficient to support the exercise of 
all-purpose jurisdiction and because plaintiffs failed to demonstrate MBUSA 
acted as Daimler’s agent).  
 292. See Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 579 F.3d 1088, 1098 (9th Cir. 
2009) (affirming the District Court’s order because the District Court did not have 
personal jurisdiction over DaimlerChrysler).  
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jurisdiction over Daimler in California based upon the contacts of 
its subsidiary MBUSA.293 Daimler petitioned for a rehearing en 
banc, but that petition was denied over a dissent written by Judge 
O’Scannlain, on behalf of himself and seven other Ninth Circuit 
judges.294 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and Justice Ginsburg 
wrote the majority opinion on behalf of herself and seven other 
members of the Court.295 Justice Ginsburg did not take long to 
indicate the direction in which the Court was going. Before even 
getting to her recitation of the facts, Justice Ginsburg established 
two key points. First, she observed the “absence of any California 
connection to the atrocities, perpetrators, or victims” in the case 
and noted that plaintiffs were arguing that Daimler could “be sued 
on any and all claims against it, wherever in the world the claims 
may arise.”296 Then Justice Ginsburg revealed the precise ground 
for her concern: 
For example, as plaintiffs’ counsel affirmed, under the proffered 
jurisdictional theory, if a Daimler-manufactured vehicle 
overturned in Poland, injuring a Polish driver and passenger, 
the injured parties could maintain a design defect suit in 
California. Exercises of personal jurisdiction so exorbitant, we 
hold, are barred by due process constraints on the assertion of 
adjudicatory authority.297 
This statement contains a number of hints about the nature of 
Justice Ginsburg’s concerns. First, the hypothetical itself suggests 
that her concern was the assertion of jurisdiction over a case that 
arose outside of the United States and in which the forum state 
has no interest. Such far-reaching assertions of personal 
jurisdiction are disfavored under generally accepted international 
                                                                                                     
 293. See Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(holding that DaimlerChrysler was subject to personal jurisdiction in California 
through the contacts of its subsidiary MBUSA and that MBUSA was acting as 
DaimlerChrysler’s agent).  
 294. See Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 676 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(arguing that the petition for rehearing en banc should have been granted because 
the holding was at odds with the dictates of the Supreme Court and is inconsistent 
with the law of six other circuits) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting).   
 295. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 120.  
 296. Id. at 121.  
 297. Id. at 121–22 (citations omitted).  
722 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 655 (2019) 
 
law standards, a fact of which Justice Ginsburg was aware by 
virtue of her use of the term “exorbitant” to describe the exercise 
of jurisdiction in this case.298 The word “exorbitant” is a term of art 
in international comparative law that is used to describe excessive 
assertions of personal jurisdiction by a country over defendants 
from a foreign country, and Justice Ginsburg had used the term in 
just that sense in her own academic writing as a law professor.299 
The second early hint was contained in the opinion’s next 
paragraph, which notes that the Court in Goodyear “addressed the 
distinction between general or all-purpose jurisdiction, and specific 
or conduct-linked jurisdiction.”300 Then, Justice Ginsburg made a 
surprisingly broad leap: 
As to the former, we held that a court may assert jurisdiction 
over a foreign corporation “to hear any and all claims against 
[it]” only when the corporation’s affiliations with the State in 
which suit is brought are so constant and pervasive “as to 
render [it] essentially at home in the forum State. Instructed by 
Goodyear, we conclude Daimler is not “at home” in California, 
and cannot be sued there for injuries plaintiffs attribute to MB 
Argentina’s conduct in Argentina.301  
In one sentence, Justice Ginsburg converted the seemingly 
casual references in Goodyear to where a corporation is “at home” 
into a holding that swept vastly further than necessary to resolve 
the issues in Daimler, and that virtually eliminated 
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction as a separate category of 
personal jurisdiction. As will be discussed in detail below,302 the 
                                                                                                     
 298. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Civil 
Judgments: A Summary Review of the Situation in the United States, 4 INT’L L. 
720, 725–26 (1970) (noting that jurisdictional bases appropriate in domestic law 
are largely unacceptable in the international sphere).  
 299. See id. (“Unacceptable or ‘exorbitant’ bases (principally nationality, 
domicile or residence of the plaintiff, presence of any assets of a non-resident 
defendant, and—the common law contribution to the list—defendant’s transitory 
presence) generally are not expected even by the rendition forum to elicit 
recognition outside.”).  
 300. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 122. 
 301. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).  
 302. See infra note 339 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme 
Court’s power to impose restraints on personal jurisdiction over foreign persons 
that are not otherwise required by the Due Process Clause).  
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Court did not need to utilize the mysterious “at home” standard to 
prevent courts from assuming jurisdiction over cases like Justice 
Ginsburg’s Polish hypothetical. Instead, by stretching for the 
broadest impact, Justice Ginsburg converted an ambiguous 
statement in the Goodyear opinion into a binding holding that 
would govern future cases.303 
After reciting the facts of the case, Justice Ginsburg began her 
discussion of the applicable law by stating that Pennoyer had held 
“that a tribunal’s jurisdiction over a person reaches no farther than 
the geographic bounds of the forum.”304 Curiously, however, the 
Pennoyer reference does not really match the statement made by 
Justice Ginsburg.305 Justice Ginsburg then explained the 
differences between specific and general jurisdiction, with a 
citation to International Shoe and the following quotation from 
Goodyear: “a court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign 
(sister-state or a foreign-country) corporations to hear any and all 
claims against them when their affiliations with the State are so 
‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home 
in the forum State.”306 In Goodyear, that sentence had been 
                                                                                                     
 303. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 
1776 (2017) (expounding the proposition that “for general jurisdiction, the 
‘paradigm forum’ is an ‘individual’s domicile,’ or, for corporations, ‘an equivalent 
place, one in which the corporation is fairly regarded as at home’” (citing Goodyear 
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011))).  
 304. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 125 (2014) (citing Pennoyer v. 
Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877)). 
 305. The exact quotation cited by Justice Ginsburg is “[t]he authority of every 
tribunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the State in which it 
is established.” Id. (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877)). That 
statement is not the equivalent of the description made by Justice Ginsburg, 
which suggests that states could not exercise jurisdictional authority over any one 
who was not found or served with process within the forum state. To the contrary, 
the Pennoyer Court recognized that a state could exercise jurisdiction over its 
citizens, individual or corporate, even if they were not present within the forum 
state. To say that a state’s authority is restricted by its territorial limits is not the 
same as saying its jurisdiction over a person reaches no farther than the 
geographic bounds of the forum. This distinction is not simply a semantic quibble. 
The key problem with Justice Ginsburg’s test for dispute-blind jurisdiction is that 
she fails to distinguish between the categories of citizenship or domicile 
jurisdiction and presence/doing business jurisdiction, which later became 
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction. 
 306. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 127 (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919). 
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followed by a citation to International Shoe, which, as we have 
already seen, does not remotely support the inclusion of the 
“essentially at home in the forum State” qualification.307 After 
repeating that statement in Daimler, Justice Ginsburg included a 
citation to Helicopteros which also supplied no support for the 
“essentially at home” standard.308 Then, in a footnote, Justice 
Ginsburg doubled down on her reference to the Polish automobile 
accident hypothetical that involved no person with any connection 
to the State of California.309  
It is striking that Justice Ginsburg, for the second time in the 
opinion, paired the description of the corporate-activities-based 
jurisdiction standard as “essentially at home” with the Polish 
hypothetical.310 The implicit suggestion is that the new, and 
unprecedented, standard was necessary to prevent exorbitant 
assertions of jurisdiction over cases like the Polish automobile 
accident.311 But the Polish automobile accident, just as was true 
                                                                                                     
 307. See supra notes 229–238 and accompanying text (discussing the two 
references to “home” in the International Shoe opinion).  
 308. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 127. The cited portion of Helicopteros reads: “When 
a State exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit not arising out 
of or related to the defendant’s contacts with the forum, the State has been said 
to be exercising ‘general jurisdiction’ over the defendant.” Helicopteros Nacionales 
de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.9 (1984) (citations omitted).  
 309. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 127 n.5  
Colloquy at oral argument illustrated the respective provinces of 
general and specific jurisdiction over persons. Two hypothetical 
scenarios were posed: First, if a California plaintiff, injured in a 
California accident involving a Daimler-manufactured vehicle, sued 
Daimler in California court alleging that the vehicle was defectively 
designed, that court’s adjudicatory authority would be premised on 
specific jurisdiction. Second, if a similar accident took place 
in Poland and injured Polish plaintiffs sued Daimler in California 
court, the question would be one of general jurisdiction.  
(citations omitted). 
 310. Footnote 5, in which Justice Ginsburg makes her second reference to the 
Polish hypothetical, is immediately preceded by the following sentence: “As we 
have since explained, ‘[a] court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign 
(sister-state or foreign-country) corporations to hear any and all claims against 
them when their affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as 
to render them essentially at home in the forum State.’” Id. at 127 (emphasis 
added) (citations omitted).  
 311. See id. at 121–22 (“Exercises of personal jurisdiction so exorbitant, we 
hold, are barred by due process constraints on the assertion of adjudicatory 
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with respect to the Daimler case itself, could easily be excluded 
from jurisdiction in California by a corporate-activities-based 
standard that is vastly less restrictive than the one suggested by 
Justice Ginsburg. 
To assuage concerns that such a restrictive standard for 
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction would disadvantage 
American plaintiffs, Justice Ginsburg repeated the assertion in 
Goodyear that “specific jurisdiction has become the centerpiece of 
modern jurisdiction theory, while general jurisdiction [has played] 
a reduced role.”312 Citing von Mehern and Trautman’s seminal 
article, Justice Ginsburg claimed that the Court’s “subsequent 
decisions have continued to bear out the prediction that ‘specific 
jurisdiction will come into sharper relief and form a considerably 
more significant part of the scene.’”313 Justice Ginsburg further 
emphasized this point by later suggesting: 
As is evident from Perkins, Helicopteros, and Goodyear, general 
and specific jurisdiction have followed markedly different 
trajectories post-International Shoe. Specific jurisdiction has 
been cut loose from Pennoyer’s sway, but we have declined to 
stretch general jurisdiction beyond limits traditionally 
recognized. As the Court has increasingly trained on the 
“relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the 
litigation,” i.e., specific jurisdiction, general jurisdiction has 
come to occupy a less dominant place in the contemporary 
scene.314 
Once again, Justice Ginsburg failed to mention of the 
multitude of general jurisdiction cases decided by the lower courts. 
The relative infrequency of general jurisdiction cases in the 
Supreme Court is no indication of the importance of corporate-
activities-based jurisdiction as an aid for a plaintiff seeking easy 
resolution of its claims. Indeed, many regarded the failure of the 
Court to grant certiorari in any of the lower court cases involving 
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction as an indication that the 
                                                                                                     
authority.”).  
 312. Id. at 128 (quoting Twitchell, supra note 17, at 628).  
 313. Id. (citing von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 9, at 1164).  
 314. Id. at 132–33 (citations omitted). 
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Court was willing to give states wide latitude in asserting that type 
of all-purpose jurisdiction.315  
If Justice Ginsburg intended only to suggest that the Supreme 
Court had issued many more decisions concerning specific 
jurisdiction than general jurisdiction, the point is unquestionably 
true. If, however, Justice Ginsburg meant to suggest that general 
jurisdiction was no longer important to plaintiffs, Justice Ginsburg 
was plainly incorrect. Corporate defendants never raised 
jurisdictional challenges in such cases because they assumed that 
courts had general jurisdiction over major corporations in virtually 
every state. That group included Daimler itself because it conceded 
the existence of general corporate-activities-based jurisdiction over 
MBUSA, notwithstanding the fact that MBUSA was not “at home” 
in California.316 
Justice Ginsburg then addressed the jurisdictional issues that 
had been the focus of all the litigation in the lower courts, including 
the petition for rehearing en banc before the Ninth Circuit.317 
Daimler had argued that the in-state contacts of Daimler’s 
MBUSA subsidiary could not be attributed to the separate and 
independent Daimler corporate entity.318 As previously noted, 
Professor Lea Brilmayer’s amica brief to the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                     
 315. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 47, at 106. 
 316. After discussing the facts of Perkins, Helicopteros, and Goodyear, Justice 
Ginsburg reaffirmed her conversion of her hint of a new standard in Goodyear to 
the clear holding of the Court. “Because Goodyear’s foreign subsidiaries were ‘in 
no sense at home in North Carolina,’ we held, those subsidiaries could not be 
required to submit to the general jurisdiction of that State’s courts.” Daimler AG 
v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 132 (2014). Then, as if to underscore the point, Justice 
Ginsburg repeated in a footnote, “as the Court made plain in Goodyear and 
repeats here, general jurisdiction requires affiliations ‘so “continuous and 
systematic” as to render [the forum corporation] essentially at home in the forum 
State.’” Id. at 133 n.11. Repeating the phrase multiple times, however, does not 
obscure the fact that it appeared seemingly from out of nowhere in Goodyear 
without any precedent in prior court cases and without any explanation for why 
that should be the standard for corporate-activities-based jurisdiction. 
 317. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 134, 140 (assessing “whether a foreign 
corporation may be subjected to a court’s general jurisdiction based on the 
contacts of its in-state subsidiary” and analyzing general jurisdiction within the 
transnational context of this particular case). 
 318.  See id. at 134–35 (“Daimler argues, and several Courts of Appeals have 
held, that a subsidiary’s jurisdictional contacts can be imputed to its parent only 
when the former is so dominated by the latter as to its alter ego.”). 
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vigorously and persuasively argued that it was improper to pierce 
the corporate veil, by attributing the actions of an entirely distinct 
corporate entity to the parent corporation.319 Justice Ginsburg, 
however, did not accept the narrow ground to resolve this case on 
its easy facts. Instead, she reached out to state a much broader 
holding concerning the scope of corporate-activities-based 
jurisdiction. Although Justice Ginsburg seemingly accepted 
Daimler’s arguments on the agency theory, she reached out for the 
vastly broader question: 
Even if we were to assume that MBUSA is at home in 
California, and further to assume MBUSA’s contacts are 
imputable to Daimler, there would still be no basis to subject 
Daimler to general jurisdiction in California, for Daimler’s slim 
contacts with the State hardly render it at home there.320  
Justice Ginsburg’s long reach allowed her to address the 
question raised by those who believed that the “essentially at 
home” imposed a new and more restrictive standard for the 
assertion of corporate-activities-based jurisdiction: What does the 
phrase essentially at home mean? To answer this question Justice 
Ginsburg once again turned to Professor Brilmayer’s article on 
general jurisdiction.321 Citing both the state of incorporation and 
principal place of business as “paradigm bases for general 
jurisdiction,” Justice Ginsburg added,  
Those affiliations have the virtue of being unique—that is, each 
ordinarily indicates only one place—as well as easily 
ascertainable. cf. Hertz Corp. v. Friend322 . . . . These bases 
afford plaintiffs recourse to at least one clear and certain forum 
in which a corporate defendant may be sued on any and all 
claims. 323 
This statement raises so many issues that it is hard to know 
where to begin. The first problem is Justice Ginsburg’s 
assumption, based on her citation to the Hertz case, that principal 
                                                                                                     
 319. See Brief, supra note 278. 
 320. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 136.  
 321.  Id. at 137 (citing Brilmayer, supra note 247, at 728). 
 322. 559 U.S. 77 (2010). 
 323. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014) (citing Brilmayer, 
supra note 247, at 728).  
728 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 655 (2019) 
 
place of business would be determined based on the same rules 
used in determining subject-matter jurisdiction.324 This 
assumption violates the principle that one should not assume that 
a term defined in one way for a particular purpose should 
necessarily be defined in the same way for an entirely different 
purpose.325 Indeed, the purpose for which the Supreme Court 
selected corporate headquarters as the definition for diversity 
purposes (ease of administration and certainty of application) 
might well be different than the purpose in the personal 
jurisdiction context and yield different definition. In the latter, the 
Court is interpreting the requirements of due process and not a 
congressional statute.326 In that context, the appropriate location 
might be where a corporation has most of its operations or 
employees, which would be closer to identifying the place with the 
greatest contacts.  
Second, it is incorrect to conclude that the plaintiffs would 
have recourse to at least one clear and certain forum, unless 
Justice Ginsburg meant to include forums that are not located 
within the United States. For example, an American injured in a 
rental Mercedes-Benz on a European vacation would be forced to 
sue Daimler in Germany and would have no access to any court 
within the United States, hardly a comforting thought for an 
American plaintiff seeking a convenient forum. 
Justice Ginsburg went on to acknowledge: 
Goodyear did not hold that a corporation may be subject to 
general jurisdiction only in a forum where it is incorporated or 
has its principal place of business; it simply typed those places 
paradigm all-purpose forums. Plaintiffs would have us look 
beyond the exemplar bases Goodyear identified and approve the 
exercise of general jurisdiction in every State in which a 
corporation “engages in a substantial, continuous, and 
                                                                                                     
 324. Id. (citing Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010)). 
 325. See Guarantee Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 101–02 (1945) (noting that 
statutes of limitations may be procedural for the purposes of state-to-state choice 
of law, but substantive for the purposes of federal-to-state choice of law). 
 326. See 1 JURISDICTION IN CIVIL ACTIONS § 4.02 (2018) (indicating the overlap 
between personal jurisdiction and the requirements of due process). 
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systematic course of business.” That formulation, we hold, is 
unacceptably grasping.327  
Even though state of incorporation and principal place of 
business might not be the only states in which a corporation is 
“essentially at home,” the Court made it clear that it would be a 
rare case in which other bases would be allowed: “We do not 
foreclose the possibility that in an exceptional case, . . . a 
corporation’s operations in a forum other than its formal place of 
incorporation or principal place of business may be so substantial 
and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home in that 
state.”328  
Justice Ginsburg concluded this part of the Daimler opinion 
by stating: 
Here, neither Daimler nor MBUSA is incorporated in California 
nor does either entity have its principal place of business there. 
If Daimler’s California activities sufficed to allow adjudication 
of this Argentina-rooted case in California, the same global 
reach would presumably be available in every other State in 
which MBUSA’s sales are sizeable. Such exorbitant exercises of 
all-purpose jurisdiction would scarcely permit out-of-state 
defendants “to structure their primary conduct with some 
minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not 
render them liable to suit.”329  
This conclusion is notable for a number of reasons. First, it 
appears to limit all-purpose jurisdiction over corporations to the 
states where a corporation is incorporated or has its principal place 
of business. Second, the Court repeated its reference to the 
international law term of “exorbitant” jurisdiction, a statement 
that has significance in the comparative civil procedure field but is 
not used in the domestic context.330 Third, the Court did not need 
                                                                                                     
 327. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137–38. 
 328. Id. at 139 n.19. 
 329. Id. at 139. 
 330. See Judy M. Cornett & Michael H. Hoffheimer, Good-bye Significant 
Contacts: General Personal Jurisdiction After Daimler AG v. Bauman, 76 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 101, 121 (“‘[E]xorbitant jurisdiction’ is a term of art in international law 
for disfavored forms of jurisdiction, and by the concluding paragraphs of the 
opinion, where she marshals considerations of ‘international rapport’ as 
additional reasons to reject jurisdiction in the case.”). 
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a substantive due process rule to prevent jurisdiction over this 
case; a procedural due process analysis would have sufficed 
because of California’s lack of any interest in the case. 
Finally, Justice Ginsburg repeated the well-worn, but 
empirically unsupported, statement that corporate defendants 
need to know where they could be subject to personal jurisdiction 
in order to “structure their primary conduct.”331 Not only is that 
statement factually suspect, it also fails to support the rule 
proffered by Justice Ginsburg. A corporation would be on just as 
clear notice of where it would be subject all-purpose jurisdiction if 
the Supreme Court established a rule that such jurisdiction existed 
in any state where a corporation had a branch office, or even in any 
state where a corporation was registered to do business.332 
In the final part of her opinion, Justice Ginsburg focused on 
the “transnational context” of the Daimler litigation.333 Justice 
Ginsburg expressed concern that “[t]he Ninth Circuit, moreover, 
paid little heed to the risks to international comity its expansive 
view of general jurisdiction posed.”334 In particular, Justice 
Ginsburg was sensitive to the amicus brief filed by the Solicitor 
General which expressed concern that “foreign governments’ 
objections to some domestic courts’ expansive views of general 
jurisdiction have in the past impeded negotiations of international 
agreements on the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of 
judgments.”335 Therefore, considerations of “international rapport 
thus reinforce our determination that subjecting Daimler to the 
general jurisdiction of courts in California would not accord with 
the ‘fair play and substantial justice’ due process demands.”336 
Of course, Justice Ginsburg’s concern about international 
comity could easily have been accommodated by a far less 
restrictive standard than the elimination of all 
                                                                                                     
 331. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139.  
 332. See infra Part IV.B. 
 333. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 140 (“Finally, the transnational context of this 
dispute bears attention.”). 
 334. Id. at 141. 
 335. Id. (citing Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner, Daimler Chrysler, AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014) (No. 11-965), 
2013 WL 3377321).  
 336. Id. 
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corporate-activities-based jurisdiction in favor of state of 
incorporation and principal place of business as the sole bases for 
corporate all-purpose jurisdiction.337 Neither international comity 
nor the proposed agreement on recognition and enforcement of 
judgments required a rule as strict as Justice Ginsburg created.338 
The Supreme Court has the power, as a matter of federal common 
law, to impose restraints on personal jurisdiction over foreign 
persons that are not otherwise required by the Due Process Clause 
for jurisdiction over a United States citizen.339 The Supreme Court 
does not need to establish a rule that limits jurisdiction in cases 
involving American plaintiffs against domestic corporations and 
prevents such plaintiffs from suing in the most convenient forum 
when that forum would not impose a significant burden on the 
defendant. 
Interestingly, Justice Ginsburg stated in a footnote that, at 
least in cases involving her very limited conception of all-purpose 
dispute-blind jurisdiction, there was no need to assess the 
procedural fairness of jurisdiction in the forum state. Justice 
Ginsburg called the procedural fairness analysis a “second step,” 
and she concluded that “[w]hen a corporation is genuinely at home 
in the forum State, however, any second-step inquiry would be 
superfluous.”340 Justice Ginsburg reached this conclusion even 
though none of the parties had briefed this issue, and even though 
every circuit court that had addressed the issue had applied the 
procedural due process fairness test in the context of 
corporate-activities-based cases as well as specific jurisdiction 
cases.341  
                                                                                                     
 337. See id. at 156 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (stating that there are other 
judicial doctrines available to mitigate the majority’s concern with International 
Shoe’s modern-day effects on large corporations). 
 338. See Arthur & Freer, supra note 185, at 2002 (suggesting that the Court’s 
limits on general jurisdiction articulated in Daimler are strict, “a radical 
limitation on general jurisdiction” and that it “is surprising to see Justice 
Ginsburg . . . so willing to limit general jurisdiction”). 
 339. See, e.g., Trangsrud, supra note 23, at 883–94 (discussing several 
instances in which the Court utilized the federal common law to impose 
restrictions on personal jurisdiction over foreign persons, including the territorial 
rules and consent rules of jurisdiction). 
 340. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139 n.20, 
 341. See id. at 144 n.1 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting that the “Courts of 
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Justice Sotomayor concurred in the judgment of the case and 
agreed that “the Due Process Clause prohibits the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction over Daimler in light of the unique 
circumstances of this case.”342 Rather than focusing on the contacts 
requirements necessary for corporate-activities-based jurisdiction, 
however, Justice Sotomayor found no jurisdiction based on the 
procedural fairness test that Justice Ginsburg had declared to be 
superfluous. 343 Although the courts of appeals had “uniformly held 
that the reasonableness prong does in fact apply in the general 
jurisdiction context,”344 Justice Sotomayor sardonically noted, 
“without the benefit of a single page of briefing on the issue, the 
majority casually adds of these cases to the mounting list of 
decisions jettisoned as a consequence today’s ruling.”345 
Justice Sotomayor persuasively differed with the majority on 
the proper interpretation of the Supreme Court’s prior case law on 
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction: 
I accept at face value the majority’s declaration that general 
jurisdiction is not limited to a corporation’s place of 
incorporation and principal place of business because “a 
corporation’s operation in a forum other than its formal place of 
incorporation or principal place of business may be so 
substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at 
                                                                                                     
Appeal have uniformly held that the reasonableness prong does in fact apply in 
the general jurisdiction context”). 
 342. Id. at 142. 
 343. See id. at 143–44 
The Court can and should decide this case on the far simpler ground 
that, no matter how extensive Daimler’s contacts with California, that 
State’s exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable given that the 
case involves foreign plaintiffs suing a foreign defendant based on 
foreign conduct, and given that a more appropriate forum is available. 
Because I would reverse the judgment below on this ground, I concur 
in the judgment only. 
 344. Id. at 144 n.1; see, e.g., Lukin v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 348 F.3d 704, 713 
(3d Cir. 2003); Base Metal Trading, Ltd. v. OISC Novokuznetsky Aluminum 
Factory, 283 F.3d 208, 213–14 (4th Cir. 2002); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 573 (2d Cir. 1996); Trierweiler v. Croxton & 
Trench Holding Corp., 98 F.3d 1523, 1533 (10th Cir. 1996); Amoco Egypt Oil Co. 
v. Leonis Navigation Co., 1 F.3d 843, 851 n.2. (9th Cir. 1993); Donatelli v. Nat’l 
Hockey League, 893 F.2d 459, 465 (1st Cir. 1990); Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 
818 F.2d 370, 377 (5th Cir. 1987). 
 345. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 144 n.1 (2014). 
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home in the state.” Were that not so, our analysis of the 
defendant’s in-state contacts in Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated 
Mining Co., . . . Helicopteros Nacionales des Columbia, SA v. 
Hall, . . . and Goodyear would have been irrelevant, as none of 
the defendants in these cases was sued in its place of 
incorporation or principal place of business.346  
So, where are we left after the Court’s decision in Daimler? 
First, Justice Ginsburg again failed to recognize that Professor 
Brilmayer’s discussion of the “paradigm” forums of general 
jurisdiction was a reference to the larger meaning of general 
jurisdiction as all-purpose jurisdiction, and not to general 
jurisdiction in the sense of corporate-activities-based jurisdiction, 
which, after International Shoe, was the successor to corporate 
presence or doing business in the forum state.347 Second, by 
limiting jurisdiction to what is essentially the traditional basis of 
citizenship in the forum state, Justice Ginsburg essentially 
entirely eliminated the category of corporate-activities-based 
jurisdiction as a separate basis of all-purpose, dispute-blind 
jurisdiction.348 Third, the elimination of corporate-activities-based 
jurisdiction is entirely inconsistent with the Court’s previous 
decisions in International Shoe, Perkins, and Helicopteros.349 Each 
of these points will be discussed in detail below. 
Justice Ginsburg fell prey to the ambiguous meaning of the 
term general jurisdiction. Justice Ginsburg cited Professor 
Brilmayer’s article on general jurisdiction, in which Professor 
Brilmayer noted that “[d]omicile, place of incorporation and 
                                                                                                     
 346. Id. at 154 n.9 (internal citations omitted). 
 347. See id. at 137 (asserting that Goodyear made clear that the paradigm 
forums of all-purpose jurisdiction where corporations could be subject to general 
jurisdiction were the forum in which the corporation is incorporated or where it 
has its principal place of business). 
 348. See id. at 140 n.20 (reinforcing that where a corporation operates in 
many places, it can hardly be deemed at home in one particular state and 
asserting that merely because a large quantum of corporate activity takes place 
in a state does not mean that that state should have authority over said 
corporation). 
 349. See Arthur & Freer, supra note 185, at 2002 (reviewing the approach in 
Goodyear and Daimler in light of International Shoe, Perkins, and Helicopteros 
and opining that although “the Court purported to apply the principles of 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington and its progeny, including the Court’s two 
prior decisions on general jurisdiction, this simply is not so”). 
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principal place of business are paradigms of bases for general 
jurisdiction.”350 The context in which Professor Brilmayer 
discussed state of incorporation and principal place of business as 
bases for personal jurisdiction makes it absolutely clear that she is 
discussing general jurisdiction in the large sense of an all-purpose 
jurisdiction that is dispute-blind and not the kind of 
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction that was established by 
International Shoe as the successor to jurisdiction based on 
corporate presence or doing business in the forum state.351 In fact, 
after the section headed “unique affiliations” in which Professor 
Brilmayer discussed state of incorporation and principal place of 
business as part of the traditional basis of domicile jurisdiction, 
Professor Brilmayer began a separate section on jurisdiction based 
on a corporation’s “activities.”352 There, she stated that a 
“defendant’s activities in the forum can be the basis for either 
general or specific jurisdiction.”353 In that section Professor 
Brilmayer, speaking of general jurisdiction in the narrow sense of 
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction based on the activities of a 
defendant in a forum state, wrote that “general jurisdiction 
requires proof of continuous and systematic activities.”354  
Justice Ginsburg, however, ignored this part of Professor 
Brilmayer’s article. Instead, she cited to Professor Twitchell’s 2001 
article to the effect that “International Shoe ‘is clearly not saying 
that dispute-blind jurisdiction exists whenever ‘continuous and 
systematic’ contacts are found.”355 In Professor Twitchell’s article, 
however, she italicized the word “whenever” in order to emphasize 
the need for “something more substantial for a state’s authority to 
adjudicate any and all claims against a defendant.”356 She never 
suggested anything remotely as restrictive as Justice Ginsburg’s 
                                                                                                     
 350. Brilmayer, supra note 247, at 735. 
 351. See id. at 733 (“The law treats corporations like legal persons, and the 
place of incorporation and the principal place of business are both analogous to 
domicile. In some respects, the decision to incorporate in a particular state 
provides a more powerful basis for adjudicatory jurisdiction than does domicile.”). 
 352. Id. at 735.  
 353. Id. 
 354. Id. at 735–36. 
 355. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 138 (citing Twitchell, supra note 60, at 184). 
 356. Twitchell, supra note 60, at 184. 
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“at home” standard. Moreover, Professor Twitchell described 
Perkins as holding that a State could exercise jurisdiction over a 
forum corporation on a cause of action unrelated to the 
corporation’s forum activities if “the corporation had been carrying 
on ‘a continuous and systematic, but limited part of its general 
business’ in the forum state.”357 Professor Twitchell stated that 
forum state activities that are “something more substantial” are 
not limited to state of incorporation and principal place of 
business.358 As the title of the article itself indicates, Professor 
Twitchell was speaking about activities-based jurisdiction flowing 
from a corporation’s “doing business” in the forum state, and not 
citizenship or domicile-based jurisdiction, which is traditionally 
limited to state of incorporation and principal place of business.359 
Indeed, although Professor Twitchell had previously advocated 
limiting corporate-activities-based jurisdiction (although, 
importantly, along with a significant expansion of specific 
jurisdiction), Professor Twitchell’s article discusses “a change of 
heart I have had concerning general jurisdiction.”360 Thus, even the 
most well-known academic critic of corporate-activities-based 
jurisdiction considerably softened her opposition and recognized 
the benefits of such jurisdiction, in part “to fill in holes in our 
jurisdictional scheme.”361 
Second, the standard enunciated by Justice Ginsburg 
effectively eliminated the previously well-established category of 
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction.362 After Pennoyer, 
                                                                                                     
 357. See Twitchell, supra note 17, at 626. 
 358. See Twitchell, supra note 60, at 184 (stating that the Court’s language in 
International Shoe indicated that something more than systematic and 
continuous contacts was required “for a state’s authority to extend to any and all 
claims against a defendant”). 
 359. See id. at 171 (indicating that the article discusses a proposed test for 
“modifying the reach of doing-business jurisdiction”). 
 360. Id.  
 361. Id. at 195. 
 362. Compare Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 139 (2014) (stating that 
the inquiry is “whether that corporation’s affiliations with the state are so 
continuous and systematic as to render it essentially at home in the forum state”), 
with Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (articulating that in 
order to subject a defendant to in personam jurisdiction, defendant must have 
certain minimum contacts with the forum state). 
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corporations could be subject to all-purpose jurisdiction based 
either upon their citizenship or domicile in the forum (principal 
place of business and state of incorporation), or based on their 
presence in the forum at the time of service of process.363 This 
second category of corporate presence was eventually modified to 
be wherever a corporation was doing business and then, in 
International Shoe, it became a jurisdiction based on a company’s 
corporate-activities-based-contacts with the forum state.364 Justice 
Ginsburg’s test restricted the latter category of 
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction to the same criteria as 
citizenship/domicile jurisdiction, which effectively eliminated the 
strand of jurisdiction based on a corporation’s presence/doing 
business in the forum state. 
Third, the effective elimination of corporate-activities-based 
jurisdiction was plainly inconsistent with International Shoe, 
Perkins, and Helicopteros. International Shoe clearly approved of 
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction, at the very least to the 
extent that it was based, on the location of a branch office in the 
forum state, which was the case in the previous precedents cited 
by the International Shoe Court in support of its description of 
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction.365 Justice Ginsburg 
dismissed these earlier cases, which were also cited by the 
Supreme Court in Perkins, on the ground that the Court’s 
“unadorned citations to these cases, both decided in the era 
dominated by Pennoyer’s territorial thinking, . . . should not 
attract heavy reliance today.”366 The point of these cases, however, 
is not that they stand on their own as valid precedents for 
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction, but rather that the 
                                                                                                     
 363. See generally Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 714–36 (1877) (determining 
that a court can exert personal jurisdiction over a party if that party is served 
with process while physically present within the state). 
 364. See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (noting that due process requires only that 
a defendant has certain minimum contacts with the forum state in order to 
subject him to in personam jurisdiction, and that “maintenance of the suit does 
not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’”). 
 365. See id. at 318 (“[T]here have been instances in which the continuous 
corporate operations within a state were thought so substantial and of such a 
nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings 
entirely distinct from those activities.”). 
 366. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 138 n.18 (internal citations omitted).  
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International Shoe Court cited them as examples of the kind of 
“continuous corporate operations within a state so substantial and 
of such a nature as to justify suit . . . on causes of action arising 
from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.”367 If the 
Supreme Court had thought that International Shoe had ended 
doing-business jurisdiction, it would have been easy for the Court 
to come right out and say that and limit all-purpose jurisdiction 
over corporations to a defendant’s state of incorporation and 
principal place of business. The Court did not, however, take that 
approach, and instead, clearly recognized that some form of 
continuous corporate activity in the forum state could provide a 
basis of all-purpose jurisdiction beyond that which was already 
allowed by citizenship/domicile jurisdiction. 
C. The BNSF Case: The New Standard, But Now with No 
Meaningful Exception 
In 2017, the Court again addressed personal jurisdiction in 
cases where, prior to Goodyear, the lower courts would not have 
doubted that the forum state had corporate-activities-based 
jurisdiction. In BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell,368 the Court 
addressed the railroad’s motions to dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction in two cases, one brought by an employee for injuries 
suffered on the job and the other by the widow of an employee who 
died as the result of exposure to toxic chemicals on the job.369 
Neither plaintiff resided in the forum state (Montana), nor did the 
events giving rise to the claim take place in that state.370 The 
defendant railroad was incorporated in Delaware with its principal 
place of business in Texas.371 The Court described the defendant’s 
contacts with the forum state as follows: 
                                                                                                     
 367. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318. 
 368. 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017). 
 369. See id. (consolidating two cases arising under the Federal Employer’s 
Liability Act and deciding issues of personal jurisdiction). 
 370. See id. at 1554 (identifying that one plaintiff resided in North Dakota, 
the other in South Dakota, and that the activities giving rise to suit did not occur 
in Montana). 
 371. Id. 
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BNSF has 2,061 miles of rail track in Montana (about 6%of its 
total track mileage of 32,500), employs some 2100 workers there 
(less than 5% of its total workforce of 43,000), generates less 
than 10% of its total revenue in the State, and maintains only 
one of its 24 automotive facilities in Montana (4%).372 
The Court first dealt with the plaintiffs’ contention that the 
Federal Employer’s Liability Act (FELA)373 (which makes railroads 
liable for damages to their employees for on-the-job injuries) 
granted personal jurisdiction over a railroad defendant in any 
district “in which the defendant shall be doing business at the time 
commencing such action.”374 The Court ruled that the FELA 
provision was not intended to grant personal jurisdiction, but 
simply to establish where venue was proper and affirm that subject 
matter jurisdiction rested concurrently with the federal and state 
court systems.375 
The Court next assessed plaintiffs’ argument that the state of 
Montana had general jurisdiction over the railroad defendant by 
virtue of its continuous presence in the forum state. The Court 
cited Daimler, Goodyear, and Helicopteros, with respect to the 
general distinction between specific and general jurisdiction.376 
But with respect to the standard to be applied in general 
jurisdiction cases, the Court referred only to Goodyear and Daimler 
and limited all-purpose jurisdiction to states where the defendant’s 
affiliations with the state are so “continuous and systematic” as to 
render them essentially at home in the forum state.377 Once again, 
the Court identified the “paradigm” forums in which a corporate 
defendant is “at home” as the state of incorporation and principal 
place of business.378 Only in an “exceptional case” may a corporate 
defendant’s contacts with another state be sufficient to render it at 
                                                                                                     
 372. Id. 
 373. 35 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51–60 (2012). 
 374. BNSF Ry., 137 S. Ct. at 1553. 
 375.  See id. at 1556 (relying on the historic regard of such clause as 
concerning venue and analyzing jurisdiction as a separate matter). 
 376. See generally id. (referencing each case to support a discussion of the 
distinction between specific and general jurisdiction). 
 377. See id. at 1558 (citing Daimler, 571 U.S. at 127 (quoting Goodyear, 564 
U.S. at 919)). 
 378. BNSF Ry. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1558 (2017). 
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home.379 Because the forum state was neither the defendant 
railroad’s state of incorporation nor principal place of business, the 
Court had to determine whether the defendant’s contacts made it 
an exceptional case.380 
The Court discussed this issue by referring to a principle 
mentioned only briefly in Daimler:  
But, as we observed in Daimler, the general jurisdiction inquiry 
does not focus solely on the magnitude of the defendant’s in-
state contacts. Rather, the inquiry calls for an appraisal of a 
corporation’s activities in their entirety; a corporation that 
operates in many places can scarcely be deemed to be at home 
in all of them.381  
After an analysis that was surprisingly truncated, given the 
extensive nature of the defendant’s contacts with the forum state, 
Justice Ginsburg concluded that “in-state business, we clarified in 
Daimler and Goodyear, does not suffice to permit the assertion of 
general jurisdiction over claims . . . that are unrelated to any 
activity occurring in Montana.”382 The use of the term “clarified” 
was somewhat of an understatement, given that the Court was 
overruling a doctrine established in three prior Supreme Court 
cases along with hundreds of lower court cases. 
Justice Sotomayor continued “to disagree with the path the 
Court struck in Daimler, which limits general jurisdiction over a 
corporate defendant only to those states where it is essentially at 
home.”383 Moreover, Justice Sotomayor argued, even accepting the 
majority’s standard, the Court should have remanded the case to 
the Montana Supreme Court “for it to conduct what should be a 
fact-intensive analysis under the proper legal framework.”384 
Justice Sotomayor reprised her argument in Daimler that 
International Shoe did not warrant the “restrictive ‘at home’ test 
set out in Daimler—a test that, as I have explained, has no home 
                                                                                                     
 379. Id. (citing Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139 n.19).  
 380. See id. at 1559 (analyzing BNSF’s contacts and activities within the state 
of Montana). 
 381. Id. at 1559 (internal citations omitted). 
 382. Id. 
 383. Id. at 1560 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
 384. Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
740 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 655 (2019) 
 
in our precedents and cerates serious inequities.”385 Indeed, Justice 
Sotomayor argued,  
The majority’s approach grants a jurisdictional windfall to large 
multi-state or multi-national corporations that operate across 
many jurisdictions. Under its reasoning, it is virtually 
inconceivable that such corporations will ever be subject to 
general jurisdiction in any location other than their principal 
places of business or of incorporation. Foreign businesses with 
principal places of business outside the United States may 
never be subject to general jurisdiction in this country even 
though they have continuous and systematic contacts within 
the United States.386  
Justice Sotomayor once again acknowledged the lower court 
cases that Justice Ginsburg had repeatedly ignored: “[L]ower 
courts had adhered to the continuous-and-systematic standards 
for decades before Daimler, and its predecessor Goodyear, wrought 
the present sea change.”387  
In particular, Justice Sotomayor continued to take issue with 
the majority’s attention to the size of defendant’s contacts in the 
forum state relative to its contacts with other states. As Justice 
Sotomayor noted, neither Perkins nor Helicopteros applied a 
comparative analysis that analyzed defendant’s contacts with the 
forum state against its contacts with other states.388  
                                                                                                     
 385. Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 386. Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 387. Id. at 1560 n.1 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted); 
see generally, e.g., Judy M. Cornett & Michael H. Hoffheimer, Goodbye Significant 
Contacts: General Personal Jurisdiction after Daimler AG v. Bauman, 76 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 101 (2015) (examining the state of the law related to personal jurisdiction 
and arguing that the Court has limited traditional power of states to too great an 
extent); John T. Parry, Rethinking Personal Jurisdiction After Bauman and 
Walden, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 607, 616 (2015) (discussing how the Court has 
approached analysis of contacts with the state for general jurisdiction); Donald L. 
Doernberg, Resoling International Shoe, 2 TEX. A&M L. Rev. 247, 278,(2014) 
(asserting that while the Court tried to limit general jurisdiction, it rather opened 
the door to more jurisdiction related litigation); Meir Feder, Goodyear, “Home,” 
and the Uncertain Future of Doing Business Jurisdiction, 73 S.C. L. REV. 671, 672 
(2012) (noting that the stated essentially at home standard articulated in 
Goodyear “casts doubt on a large body of lower court case law”). 
 388. See BNSF Ry. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1561 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting) (stating that no comparative analysis was applied). 
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Finally, Justice Sotomayor cut to the core meaning of Justice 
Ginsburg’s analysis in the case: 
The majority does even Daimler itself a disservice, paying only 
lip service to the question the Court purported to reserve 
there— the possibility of an “exceptional case” in which general 
jurisdiction would be proper in a forum State that is neither a 
corporation defendant’s place of incorporation nor its principal 
place of business. Its opinion here could be understood to limit the 
exception to the exact facts of Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated 
Mining Co. . . . . That reading is so narrow as to read the exception 
out of existence entirely; certainly a defendant with significant 
contacts with more than one State falls outside its 
ambit. . . . Despite having reserved the possibility of an 
“exceptional case” in Daimler, the majority here has rejected that 
possibility out of hand.389 
That summary seems to have captured the essence of the 
BNSF case. The Court proceeded from the hint of a new and more 
restrictive standard in Goodyear to a clear enunciation of that 
more restrictive standard in Daimler but with the possibility of 
exceptions to that standard, to BNSF, in which the Court limited 
the possibility of an exception to the facts of Perkins, which makes 
it all but impossible to establish all-purpose dispute-blind 
jurisdiction over any corporation outside of the state where it is 
incorporated or has its principal place of business. Few, other than 
von Mehren and Trautman, had advocated for such a strict 
standard, and even those who had advocated for a somewhat 
stricter standard for corporate-activities-based jurisdiction before 
Goodyear had conditioned such support upon a much broader 
interpretation of specific jurisdiction.390 The Supreme Court, 
however, dashed any hopes for such expansion of specific 
jurisdiction less than a month after the BNSF decision was issued. 
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 390. See von Mehren & Trautaman, supra note 9 (proposing a new system of 
terminology to address jurisdictional issues). 
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D. Bristol-Myers Squibb: Corporate-Activities-Based Jurisdiction 
Eliminated, with No Expansion of Specific Jurisdiction 
In Bristol-Myers Squibb Company v. Superior Court,391 the 
Supreme Court reviewed a California Supreme Court decision 
denying the corporate defendant’s motion to dismiss, on personal 
jurisdiction grounds, products liability suits against the defendant 
in connection with its sale of the blood thinning drug, Plavix.392 
Five hundred and ninety-two residents of states outside of 
California had joined eighty-six California residents in eight 
separate suits in California Superior Court.393 Defendant BMS 
moved to dismiss the nonresidents’ claims on the ground that 
California did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant 
with respect to those claims.394  
The trial court initially denied defendant’s motion on the 
ground that the California courts had general jurisdiction over the 
defendant because it “engages in extensive activities in 
California.”395 The California intermediate appellate court denied 
defendant’s writ of mandamus, but after the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Daimler, the California Supreme Court ordered the 
intermediate appellate court “to vacate its order denying the 
mandate.”396 At that point, the intermediate appellate court held 
that there was no general jurisdiction after the Supreme Court’s 
Daimler decision but that the California courts had specific 
jurisdiction over all of the claims.397  
The California Supreme Court upheld jurisdiction based upon 
a “sliding scale approach to specific jurisdiction” that blended the 
                                                                                                     
 391. 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). 
 392. Id. at 1777–78. 
 393. See id. at 1778 (describing how plaintiffs gathered and asserted a variety 
of state-law claims in California Superior Court based on alleged injuries from 
the drug produced by Bristol-Myers Squibb). 
 394. See id. (“Asserting lack of personal jurisdiction, BMS moved to quash 
service of summons on the nonresidents’ claims . . . .”).  
 395. Id.  
 396. Id. 
 397. See id. (“Under Daimler, it held, general jurisdiction was clearly lacking, 
but it went on to find that the California courts had specific jurisdiction over the 
nonresidents’ claims against [Bristol-Myers Squibb].”). 
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minimum contacts categories.398 Using a flexible approach 
advocated by commentators who favored broader specific 
jurisdiction, the California Supreme Court ruled that “the more 
wide-ranging the defendant’s forum contacts the more readily is 
shown a connection between the forum contacts and the claim.”399 
Because BMS had extensive contacts with the forum state, specific 
jurisdiction was permissible even though the connection between 
the non-residents’ claims in California was more attenuated than 
might otherwise be required for specific jurisdiction.400 
Interestingly, the California court did not even address the 
question of whether there was general jurisdiction over BMS in 
California. Prior to Goodyear, it is doubtful that a corporation as 
large as BMS would have even challenged the assertion of 
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction in California. The company 
maintained five of its research and laboratory facilities in 
California with a total 160 employees.401 In addition, BMS 
employed “250 sales representatives in California and 
maintain[ed] a small state-government advocacy office in 
Sacramento.”402 Between 2006 and 2012 it sold almost 187 million 
Plavix pills in the state of California and took in more than 
$900,000,000 from those sales, which amounted to “a little over one 
percent of the company’s nation-wide sales revenue.”403 This was 
precisely the kind of continuous and systematic contacts with the 
forum state that, prior to Goodyear, lower courts typically found 
more than adequate for the assertion of general jurisdiction. 
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Alito, 
acknowledged that the “primary concern” in determining whether 
there is personal jurisdiction is “the burden on the defendant,” and 
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 400. See id. at 1779 (“[T]he majority concluded that ‘BMS’s extensive contacts 
with California’ permitted the exercise of specific jurisdiction ‘based on a less 
direct connection between BMS’s forum activities and plaintiffs’ claims than 
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 401. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1778 
(2017) (describing the facilities that Bristol-Myers Squibb maintained in 
California). 
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that assessing the burden “obviously requires a court to consider 
the practical problems resulting from litigating in the 
forum . . . .”404 In addition, however, the limitations on personal 
jurisdiction also “encompasses the more abstract matter of 
submitting to the coercive power of a State that may have little 
legitimate interest in the claims in question.”405 The contacts 
requirements are, as the Court stated in Hanson v. Denckla, “a 
consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the 
respective states.”406 
The question remained, however, why should the territorial 
boundaries of states require any particular contacts between the 
defendant and the forum state rather than simply some minimum 
level of state interest in the particular controversy? To answer that 
question, the majority opinion surprisingly returned to the 
discredited and repudiated language of World-Wide Volkswagen: 
The states retain many essential attributes of sovereignty, 
including, in particular, the sovereign power to try causes in 
their courts. The sovereignty of each state . . . . implies a 
limitation on the sovereignty of all its sister states. And at times 
this federalism interest may be decisive. As we explained in 
World-Wide Volkswagen, “[e]ven if the defendant would suffer 
minimal or no inconvenience from being forced to litigate before 
the tribunals of another state; even if the forum State has a 
strong interest in applying its law to the controversy, even if the 
forum State is the most convenient location for litigation, the 
Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate 
federalism, may sometimes act to divest the State of its power 
to render a valid judgment.”407 
That statement, however, was wrong when the Court made it 
in World-Wide Volkswagen, and the Court correctly repudiated it 
in the Insurance Company of Ireland case.408 Recall that, in that 
case, Justice White acknowledged that the minimum contacts 
requirement “is a restriction on judicial power not as a matter of 
                                                                                                     
 404. Id. at 1780. 
 405. Id. 
 406. Id. (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958)). 
 407. Id. at 1780–81 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 
U.S. 286, 294 (1980)) (internal citations omitted) (alterations in original). 
 408. Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites De Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 
n.10 (1982). 
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sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty.”409 Justice White 
had to back down on his earlier statements in the World-Wide 
Volkswagen case because the Due Process Clause is the “only 
source of the personal jurisdiction requirement” and “the clause 
makes no mention of federalism concerns.”410 As Justice White 
further noted, this conclusion was further reinforced by the fact 
that personal jurisdiction may be waived by individual defendants, 
which would not be allowed if the requirement involved issues of 
structural federalism beyond the rights of individual 
defendants.411 
The Court’s ill-advised return to the discredited theory of 
World-Wide Volkswagen suggests that the Court at least 
recognizes there is some need to provide a theoretical justification 
for the contacts-based limitations on state court jurisdiction. The 
fact that the Court would return to the discredited theory of 
interstate federalism suggests how difficult it is to come up with a 
theoretical reason to justify these substantive due process 
restrictions that have been a part of the Court’s personal 
jurisdiction doctrine ever since Pennoyer. Clearly the Court 
recognizes that some theoretical grounding is necessary: it simply 
flounders, however, when it comes to linking the test to any theory 
of individual due process rights. As discussed below, it may be that 
interstate federalism is the best theoretical foundation for rules 
regarding personal jurisdiction within the United States, but, if 
that is so, the proper source for such restrictions is not the Due 
Process Clause but rather federal common law rules created under 
the authority of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 
With respect to the requirements for specific jurisdiction, the 
Court refused to budge from the rigid requirement that there must 
be “an affiliation between the forum and the underlying 
controversy, principally, [an] activity or an occurrence that takes 
place in the forum State and is therefore subject to the state’s 
regulation.”412 Therefore, “specific jurisdiction is confined to 
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adjudication of issues deriving from, or connected with, the very 
controversy that establishes jurisdiction.”413 “When there is no 
such connection, specific jurisdiction is lacking regardless of the 
extent of a defendant’s unconnected activities in the State.”414 
Thus, the Court tolerated no departure from a strict 
categorical analysis of contacts jurisdiction as compensation for 
the new restrictive standard for all-purpose dispute-blind 
jurisdiction. Specific jurisdiction requires that each plaintiff have 
a claim that arises out of the defendant’s contact with the forum 
state, without regard to any other contacts that the defendant 
might have with the forum. California’s proposed “sliding scale 
approach” could not satisfy the Supreme Court’s strict 
guidelines.415 The Court stood fast on prior cases, which “provide 
no support for this approach, which resembles a loose and spurious 
form of general jurisdiction. For specific jurisdiction, a defendant’s 
general connections with the forum are not enough.”416  
Most distressingly for potential plaintiffs, the Court ruled that 
even BMS’s contract with a California company (McKesson) to 
distribute Plavix nationally did not provide a sufficient basis for 
specific jurisdiction.417 That conclusion is particularly problematic 
because the Court in McIntyre held that a foreign corporation’s use 
of an Ohio distributor to sell its machines in the United States did 
not allow specific jurisdiction over a product liability claim in New 
Jersey, where the machine was ultimately sold and where the 
machine injured the plaintiff.418 Commentators after McIntyre 
speculated that, even though there was no general jurisdiction over 
the defendant in the United States and even though there was no 
specific jurisdiction over the defendant in New Jersey, there might 
be specific jurisdiction in Ohio where the distributor was located. 
The decision in BMS at least hints that jurisdiction in the state of 
                                                                                                     
 413. Id. (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 
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the distributor would be unavailing even if a plaintiff could not sue 
the manufacturer in the state in which the plaintiff was injured.  
Justice Sotomayor once again dissented in the case. First, 
Justice Sotomayor accepted the plaintiff’s concession that there 
was no general jurisdiction over the defendant even though she 
continued to “believe the restrictions the Court imposed on general 
jurisdiction in Daimler were ill advised.”419 She also found that 
there was “nothing unfair about subjecting a massive corporation 
to suit in a State for a nationwide course of conduct that injures 
both forum residents and non-residents alike.”420 Justice 
Sotomayor pointed to the specific jurisdiction requirement that a 
plaintiff’s claim must “‘arise out of or relate to’ the defendant’s 
forum conduct.”421 Justice Sotomayor argued that a claim relates 
to a defendant’s forum conduct if it has a connection with that 
conduct and that, in the BMS case, the out-of-state plaintiffs’ 
claims “concern conduct materially identical to acts the company 
took in California: its marketing and distribution of Plavix, which 
it undertook on a nationwide basis in all 50 states.”422 
Most importantly for our discussion here, Justice Sotomayor 
worried about how the Court’s decision would affect the practical 
ability of plaintiffs to seek efficient redress for their claims. “Such 
a rule hands one more tool to corporate defendants determined to 
prevent the aggregation of individual claims, and forces injured 
plaintiffs to bear the burden of bringing suit in what will often be 
far flung jurisdictions.”423 In addition, she noted, some cases find 
no domestic forum at all, notwithstanding the majority opinion’s 
assertion that plaintiffs would be protected by the ability to sue in 
at least the jurisdiction where a corporation was incorporated or 
had its principal place of business. Justice Sotomayor worried that 
“a defendant not headquartered or incorporated in the United 
States . . . is not ‘at home’ in any state . . . . Especially in a world 
in which defendants are subject to general jurisdiction in only a 
                                                                                                     
 419. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1785 n.2 (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting). 
 420. Id. at 1784 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 421. Id. at 1786 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de 
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984)). 
 422. Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 423. Id. at 1789 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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handful of States, the effect of today’s opinion will be to 
curtail— and in some cases eliminate—plaintiff’s ability to hold 
corporations fully accountable for their nationwide conduct.”424  
The significance of Bristol-Meyers Squibb is two-fold. First, 
major national corporations, whose continuous and systematic 
contacts with virtually every state in the United States would 
previously have resulted in unquestioned 
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction in those states, now may be 
sued only in their principal place of business or the state in which 
they are incorporated. The Court protected these corporations 
notwithstanding the absence of any explanation from the Court as 
to why it violates the due process rights of such a large corporation 
to be sued in a state with which it has continuous and systematic 
connections. Second, the Court not only has virtually eliminated 
continuous-corporate-activities jurisdiction—it has also failed to 
ameliorate the contraction by allowing more generous assertions 
of specific jurisdiction. As previously noted, the principal advocates 
for a narrower reading of corporate-activities-based jurisdiction 
(who, in any event, did not propose restricting it as much the Court 
now has) conditioned their recommendation on the understanding 
that the Court would fill the gap by expanding the scope of specific 
jurisdiction.425 As a result, the Court has made life considerably 
more difficult for individual plaintiffs and considerably easier for 
corporate defendants. 
V. The Theoretical and Practical Problems with the Court’s 
Current Personal Jurisdiction Standards 
After the Supreme Court’s recent personal jurisdiction cases, 
we are left with an even bigger theoretical, doctrinal, and practical 
mess. First, the Court has enunciated no theoretical basis for 
implying a substantive due process standard that requires 
contacts of any sort between the defendant and the forum state, 
and even if we can hypothesize some theoretical foundation, it 
would not require the elimination of jurisdiction based on a 
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corporation’s corporate-activities-based with the forum state. 
Second, the Court’s recent evisceration of 
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction is an unwarranted and 
doctrinally unsound departure from prior Supreme Court 
precedent. Third, the Court’s elimination of 
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction, coupled with the addition of 
significant new constraints on specific jurisdiction, create many 
practical problems for individual plaintiffs, while at the same time 
giving a huge tactical advantage to corporate defendants. Finally, 
given these problems caused by the Court’s recent cases, one must 
ask why the Court would take this approach and why, of all the 
Justice’s, Justice Ginsburg would lead the Court in that direction. 
A. The Court’s Current Substantive Due Process Contacts 
Requirements Are Theoretically Threadbare 
Before the Court imposes significant new substantive due 
process limitations on personal jurisdiction, it should satisfy the 
high burden necessary to support substantive constraints on state 
authority pursuant to a clause that speaks clearly only to 
procedure. The contacts requirements that originated in Pennoyer 
are the sole remaining relic of the Supreme Court’s 19th century 
substantive due process cases. Based upon this heritage alone, the 
contacts requirement is suspect. As Erwin Chermerinsky has 
noted, “the very idea of substantive due process has been 
contested. The argument is that due process denotes procedures 
and that it is incorrect to use the due process clause as the place 
for protecting substantive rights.”426 Indeed, the points made by 
Chief Justice Hughes in overruling Lochner and the concept of 
economic substantive due process might just as well apply to 
jurisdictional substantive due process: “The Constitution does not 
speak of freedom of contract. It speaks of liberty and prohibits the 
deprivation of liberty without due process of law . . . . [R]egulation 
which is reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in the 
interest of the community is due process.”427  
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750 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 655 (2019) 
 
The considerable constraints on the procedural fairness of a 
state court’s adjudication are more than sufficient to protect the 
rights of defendants. In general, procedural due process in the 
context of civil litigation requires a balancing of the state’s interest 
in allowing for speedy and expeditious resolution of legal disputes 
against the impact on a defendant’s ability to present and argue 
his case before being deprived of his property.428 In the context of 
a state’s assertion of personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the 
Supreme Court has established a multi-part analysis that requires 
a court to balance the burden on a defendant of litigating a case in 
the forum state against the interest of the forum in adjudicating 
the claim at issue, the need of the plaintiff for that particular 
forum, the convenience of the interest of the interstate system of 
justice in resolving the dispute in a convenient and expeditious 
fashion, and any potential impact on substantive law.429 
It is easy to justify this procedural due process standard, 
which is more than adequate to prevent jurisdictional 
overreaching by state courts. For example, the Daimler case could 
have reached the same result based simply upon this procedural 
due process standard. In that case the burden on even a large 
corporation like Daimler was significant because it would have 
been forced to defend in California state court a claim dealing with 
facts and witnesses from Argentina. This significant burden was 
counterbalanced by no interest in the case on the part of the state 
of California or its court system. Similarly, plaintiffs had no 
compelling need to utilize the California courts, other than simply 
to obtain a more beneficial substantive legal standard than would 
have been available to them elsewhere. Finally, the witnesses and 
evidence could not be conveniently marshaled in a California trial 
court. The Daimler case would have been as easy to dismiss on 
procedural due process grounds as was the Asahi case, in which 
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the Court utilized a similar procedural due process analysis to 
deny California jurisdiction over a claim that had little connection 
to the forum state and in which California had no significant 
interest.430 
Once a defendant is protected by this robust procedural due 
process standard, there is little reason to see why a defendant 
would need any substantive due process contacts standard to 
prevent unjust state action. It is difficult to conjure any theoretical 
foundation for the claim that the due process rights of a 
corporation as large as BMS are violated if it must defend in 
California state court the claims of out-of-state defendants 
alongside those of in-state defendants.  
The Supreme Court’s recent decisions are striking proof of the 
theoretical barrenness of the contacts requirement. On the rare 
occasion that the court attempts to offer some theoretical 
explanation, it repeatedly turns to concepts of interstate 
federalism that would be at home in an analysis under the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause, but which have no place in the analysis 
of a constitutional provision that is an individual right waivable by 
the defendant. The academic critics of expansive 
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction (none of whom advocated for 
a standard as strict as Justice Ginsburg’s) seem to assume that the 
burden is on a state to show why such a form of all-purpose 
dispute-blind jurisdiction is acceptable. Although such a question 
might be appropriate in considering what forms of jurisdiction to 
authorize as a legislative and policy matter, in the context of 
substantive due process restrictions on state power, it flips the 
appropriate burden on its head to assume that some form of 
substantive due process contact standard is necessary unless a 
state can articulate a persuasive theory about why such 
jurisdiction is reasonable.431 The critics never state, however, why 
the Due Process Clause requires states to establish a basis for 
requiring any particular types of contact between a defendant and 
the forum state. This is not to say, however, that the Due Process 
Clause requires no theoretical foundation at all for a state’s 
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assertion of jurisdictional power. Instead, it is to state simply that 
the justification is contained in the procedural due process test, 
which requires the state to establish a sufficient interest in the 
subject matter of the litigation to warrant the burden of subjecting 
the defendant to the jurisdiction of the forum state’s courts.  
The preeminence of substantive due process factors stems 
from Justice Field’s bald assertion, that due process required 
particular types of contacts with the forum state in order to permit 
the assertion of personal jurisdiction, which placed the sole focus 
of jurisdictional decision-making on contacts rather than on 
procedural fairness. That focus did not begin to include procedural 
considerations until after International Shoe,432 and it wasn’t until 
Kulko v. Superior Court433 that the Supreme Court laid out the 
procedural due process requirements in any detail. Thus, it is not 
surprising that Justice Field led everyone to focus on the 
substantive due process context requirement rather than 
procedural fairness. If we flip that preference for the contacts 
requirement over the procedural fairness requirement, the 
theoretical justification for a state’s assertion of jurisdictional 
power rests on whatever interest is sufficient to satisfy the 
procedural due process test. Then the question is why any 
additional contacts requirement is necessary in order to justify a 
state’s assertion of its right to hear a particular case. 
Moreover, even if one accepts the notion that there needs to be 
some contacts requirement in order to satisfy the Due Process 
Clause, the contacts part of the due process analysis should not 
come first. Many of the substantive due process concerns posited 
by jurisdictional theorists disappear if one assumes that a state 
would have to satisfy the procedural due process test before 
proceeding to analyze the contacts requirement. The only reason 
that courts and commentators analyze the contacts requirement 
first is because of the historical accident (one might say mistake) 
that the Pennoyer Court created a jurisdictional test based on 
contacts alone and not procedural fairness. Because the Court 
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added procedural fairness as a separate requirement, decades 
after the Pennoyer opinion, the courts and commentators continue 
to treat that aspect of personal jurisdiction as an afterthought. If, 
however, one begins with the procedural due process test as a 
threshold, many of the theoretical questions about all-purpose 
jurisdiction disappear. 
Take a look at Professor Twitchell’s statement of the problem 
as an example:  
The principle of doing-business jurisdiction seems simple on the 
surface: the defendant business has such strong ties with the 
state that it may be sued there on any cause of action. What is 
particularly troubling about the doctrine is the notion that a 
forum can hear any claim asserted against a defendant having 
regular and consistent commercial activities in the forum, no 
matter how removed the facts of the claim are from those 
activities. Why do we give a forum this power?434 
The question raised by Professor Twitchell is only a problem if 
we begin with a contacts analysis and assume no procedural due 
process analysis is a part of the test. If one begins with the 
procedural due process analysis, then it is clear that, even under a 
doing-business form of all-purpose, dispute-blind jurisdiction, a 
forum will not be able to hear any claim asserted against a 
defendant. If the state has no legitimate interest in the litigation, 
then the burden on the defendant of litigating away from its 
principal place of business will not be justified. Therefore, any 
substantive due process theory about whether “doing-business” is 
sufficient should consider only those forums where the litigation 
would be fair as a matter of procedural due process. This 
eliminates the concern, frequently expressed by proponents of a 
more rigid substantive due process contacts standard, that 
expansive doing-business jurisdiction permits plaintiffs to forum 
shop in every state without regard to the issue of whether the state 
has a legitimate interest in the case. 
The reason that the procedural due process case so rarely 
determines the outcome of modern personal jurisdiction litigation 
is not that the theory is unable to do the hard work of filtering 
cases where a state has no legitimate interests in adjudicating a 
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claim, but rather that the substantive due process contacts 
requirement is always addressed first and is so restrictive that the 
procedural due process analysis is almost always an 
afterthought.435 If the personal jurisdiction analysis were flipped, 
and the procedural due process test were seriously addressed first, 
the substantive due process contacts requirements would have 
relatively less work to do in the personal jurisdiction analysis. 
Academic advocates of a restrictive (though not nearly as 
restrictive as Justice Ginsburg’s) approach to 
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction fail to justify the need for 
significant due process restrictions. For example, Lea Brilmayer’s 
“insider” analysis posits that general doing-business jurisdiction is 
warranted only when a corporation “is enough of an ‘insider’ that 
he may safely be relegated to the state’s political processes.”436 
Professor Brilmayer expanded on this theory in a later article: 
To the extent that defending in one’s domicile is convenient, 
litigating where one carries on continuous and systematic 
activities is also likely to be convenient. Similarly, allowing suit 
where the defendant is so engaged serves the plaintiff’s 
convenience by providing a more definite forum; indeed, a test 
that focuses on continuous and systematic activities eliminates 
the uncertainty of proving which of several places is the 
defendant’s principal place of business. More importantly, the 
reciprocal benefits rationale obtains when the defendant carries 
out substantial activities which implicate the police powers and 
public facilities of the state.437 
The “benefits” rationale makes sense, even standing on its own 
without the additional theoretical notion that it is important for a 
corporation to be an “insider.” Whether a corporation has enough 
contacts with a state to be considered an “insider” seems relevant 
to the question of whether a state is warranted in applying its own 
substantive law to that corporation. A corporation would clearly 
care about the substantive standards that govern its actions and 
would have an incentive to lobby the legislature on such an issue. 
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It seems much less clear, however, how insider status affects the 
question of personal jurisdiction. It is not at all clear that an 
insider would have either influence or an advantage over a 
non-insider with respect to its ability to litigate contested cases 
effectively. As a practical matter, choice-of-law questions involving 
the applicability of substantive legal standards are far more likely 
to have an impact on corporate defendants than jurisdictional 
questions, but as noted earlier, the substantive due process 
constraints on choice of law are far less than the constraints on 
personal jurisdiction. 
Professor Twitchell has criticized the reciprocal benefits 
rationale on the ground that, although it works well for specific 
jurisdiction because of the proportionality of the risks of litigation 
and benefit to the defendant, there is “no equivalent 
proportionality for an activities-based general jurisdiction. 
Regular and continuous activity in the forum may benefit the 
defendant in many regards, but this alone does not justify the 
burden of unlimited jurisdictional exposure in that forum.”438 Once 
again, however, this assertion makes sense only if one applies the 
substantive due process contacts test first, without regard to the 
procedural due process analysis. If one applies the procedural due 
process analysis first, then the potential imposition on a corporate 
defendant is much less because the state would only be able to 
assert jurisdiction in cases where it had enough of an interest to 
outweigh the burden on the defendant. The ongoing continuous 
benefit of operating within the forum state is more than enough to 
justify this more limited expectation. 
Other academic commentators have somewhat stricter 
theoretical grounds for doing-business jurisdiction. For example, 
Allan Stein has argued that the proper standard for doing-business 
jurisdiction is whether the defendant has “adopted” the state as its 
sovereign.439 This would warrant a standard requiring “pervasive 
and systematic contacts” to determine whether the defendant has 
indeed “adopted the forum as its sovereign. Has it, for most other 
purposes, treated the forum as its home, notwithstanding its 
                                                                                                     
 438. Twitchell, supra note 60, at 175–76. 
 439. See Allan Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law 
of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEX. L. REV. 689, 758 (1987). 
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domicile elsewhere?”440 In a similar vein, Sarah Cebik has 
suggested that the theoretical question is whether a state has an 
interest in the defendant that would be recognized by other states 
if they all agreed on a standard for general jurisdiction: 
If [a state] claims to have an interest in the defendant . . . that 
interest must somehow be related to its function as the 
determiner of rights and duties. Thus, “interest” in the 
defendant [that is sufficient for corporate-activities-based 
jurisdiction] is legitimate if the state would have a reason to be 
concerned about the rights and duties of the defendant under 
any circumstances . . . . The point at which a state will be 
concerned with the rights and duties of a defendant under any 
and all circumstances is not immediately obvious.441 
These theoretical arguments seem much too close to concerns 
about the rights of one state versus another state rather than the 
individual rights that are guaranteed by the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. These concerns about how one 
state would regard the jurisdictional claims of another state seem 
much more relevant to questions involving the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause rather than the Due Process Clause. Such questions 
might be relevant with respect to the formulation of a common law 
standard for enforcement of judgments or a national venue rule, 
which could be established by Congress pursuant to its authority 
under the Full Faith Credit Clause. They seem out of place, 
however, in a discussion about a defendant’s due process rights, 
particularly if one assumes that a court could not allow a state to 
exercise corporate-activities-based jurisdiction in the absence of an 
interest that justifies the imposition of the burden on the corporate 
defendant. 
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B. How the Categorical Ambiguity of the Term “General 
Jurisdiction” Led to the Demise of Corporate-Activities-Based 
Jurisdiction 
Any discussion of how the Court created a doctrine of 
all-purpose dispute-blind jurisdiction that essentially eliminates 
the formerly well-established category of 
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction must begin with a 
discussion of the law review article in which the terms general and 
specific jurisdiction originated.442 Professors von Mehren and 
Trautman approached the question of personal jurisdiction as 
comparative law scholars. Their article was “an expanded version 
of a paper entitled ‘Determination Of The Competent Court In 
Private International Law: The American Approach,’ prepared for 
the Seventh International Congress of Comparative Law, to be 
held under the auspices of the International Academy of 
Comparative Law at Uppsala, Sweden in August 1966.”443 The 
authors analyzed the issues of personal jurisdiction using the 
generally accepted comparative law term, “adjudicatory 
jurisdiction.”444 The article analyzed jurisdictional questions not 
just in terms of constitutional due process limitations, but also in 
terms of the policy considerations that should underlie assertions 
of jurisdiction.445 It is important to understand the authors’ 
comparative law perspective in order to appreciate the goals they 
were trying to accomplish. Their goal in writing the paper was to 
explain why the terms that traditionally had categorized personal 
jurisdiction (like in personam, in rem and quasi in rem) served no 
purpose in the modern analytical context.446 After criticizing the 
use of these traditional terms, von Mehren and Trautman stated: 
A further difficulty with current terminology is its failure to 
distinguish between the kinds of controversies appropriately 
adjudicated on the basis of a particular ground of jurisdiction. 
In American thinking, affiliations between the forum and the 
                                                                                                     
 442. See generally von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 9. 
 443. Id. at 1121 n.d1. 
 444. See id. at 1125. 
 445. Id. at 1121. 
 446. See id. at 1135–36. 
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underlying controversy normally support the power to 
adjudicate with respect to issues deriving from, or connected 
with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction to 
adjudicate. This we call specific jurisdiction. On the other hand, 
American practice for the most part is to exercise power to 
adjudicate any kind of controversy when jurisdiction is based on 
relationships, direct or indirect between the forum and the 
person or persons whose legal rights are to be affected. This we 
call general jurisdiction.447  
In using the term general jurisdiction, von Mehren and 
Trautman were referring to that term in the larger sense of all 
dispute-blind jurisdiction and not to corporate doing-business 
jurisdiction, which, after International Shoe, became 
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction (and which was confusingly 
termed general jurisdiction by most cases and commentators). 
This point is reinforced by von Mehren and Trautman’s 
subsequent discussion of the different categories of general 
jurisdiction, which included domicile, presence, and consent.448 In 
discussing the special problems in applying these categories to 
corporations, the authors first noted that the easiest form of 
general jurisdiction to justify in the corporate context was the 
corporate equivalent of domicile: 
From the beginning in American practice, general adjudicatory 
jurisdiction over corporations and other legal persons could be 
exercised by the community with which the legal person had its 
closest and most continuing and factual connections. The 
community that chartered the corporation and in which it has 
its head office occupies a position somewhat analogous to that 
of the community of a natural person’s domicile and habitual 
residence.449  
Under von Mehren’s and Trautman’s analysis, the term 
general jurisdiction described the large category that included all 
exercises of dispute-blind jurisdiction. The classic or “paradigm” 
form of this larger concept of general jurisdiction was the corporate 
equivalent of citizenship, i.e., a corporation’s state of incorporation 
and principal place of business. 
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Von Mehren and Trautman, however, also recognized a 
separate category of all-purpose dispute-blind general jurisdiction, 
which they described as “jurisdiction only with respect to activities 
connected with the forum community.”450 The authors recognized 
that there were decisions, including International Shoe, in which 
the “Supreme Court seems to have permitted the exercise of 
jurisdiction with respect to activities largely though perhaps not 
totally unconnected with the forum community.”451 The authors 
also recognized that the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, 
relying on the Supreme Court’s Perkins decision, concluded that a 
state could exercise judicial jurisdiction over a corporation that 
does business within its borders as to causes of action unrelated to 
that business if the corporation’s activities in the state are 
sufficiently continuous and substantial to make the exercise of 
such jurisdiction reasonable. Thus, general jurisdiction may be 
based upon a corporation’s “doing business” in the forum state the 
separate category based upon state of incorporation principal place 
of business.452 
Significantly, however, von Mehren and Trautman were not 
happy about that result. They strongly preferred and advocated for 
jurisdictional rules that depended more on specific jurisdiction 
than on any form of general jurisdiction. They expressed their hope 
this way:  
Against the background of increasingly refined thinking about 
specific jurisdiction to adjudicate and despite the Ohio court’s 
language on remand, the Perkins case should be regarded as a 
decision on its exceptional facts, not as a significant 
reaffirmation of obsolescing notions of general jurisdiction.453 
Von Mehren and Trautman clearly preferred a jurisdictional 
future in which the doing-business and “presence-based” forms of 
general jurisdiction would diminish in significance or disappear, 
but also where the scope of specific jurisdiction would be greatly 
expanded. Thus, the authors stated: 
                                                                                                     
 450. Id. at 1142. 
 451. Id. at 1143. 
 452. Id. at 1144 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 85, 
Reporter’s Note (Tent. Draft no. 3, 1956)). 
 453. von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 9, at 1144. 
760 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 655 (2019) 
 
The landscape that we have surveyed will gradually change; in 
particular, specific jurisdiction will come into sharper relief and 
form a considerably more significant part of the scene. At the 
same time, the contours of present forms of specific jurisdiction 
will be modified substantially and entirely new forms may 
emerge. And if such a development does occur, there should be 
repercussions elsewhere; some of the principal bases of 
jurisdiction of the past may become exceptional and occasional 
devices. Thus, limited general jurisdiction should erode and 
perhaps ultimately disappear, as should such doubtful bases of 
general jurisdiction as the defendant’s presence.454  
Thus, while von Mehren and Trautman hoped that 
doing-business jurisdiction, as a form of jurisdiction based on 
defendant’s presence in the forum state, would diminish, they also 
had very ambitious expectations for the expansion of specific 
jurisdiction. 
When the plaintiff’s activities are highly localized in New York, 
and when litigation convenience so requires, we believe that the 
plaintiff should be able to call the defendant to New York even 
though the defendant has engaged in no activity in New York 
and had not anticipated that his multi-state activity might 
produce consequences in New York. It is enough in assessing 
the relative fairness to plaintiff and defendant that the plaintiff 
whose affairs are essentially local has been injured by the 
activity of a defendant who has involved himself in multi-state 
activity.455  
Needless to say, specific jurisdiction not only has failed to 
move in the direction hoped by Professors von Mehren and 
Trautman, it has retreated in the opposite direction. 
When Lea Brilmayer took her “general look at general 
jurisdiction,” she followed largely in the footsteps of Professors von 
Mehren and Trautman. Like her predecessors, Professor 
Brilmayer discussed general jurisdiction in the broad sense of all 
dispute-blind personal jurisdiction.456 Also like her predecessors, 
Brilmayer found all-purpose jurisdiction based on a corporation’s 
state of incorporation and principal place of business to be the 
corporate equivalent of the domicile subcategory of general 
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 455. Id. at 1172. 
 456. See Brilmayer, supra note 247, at 721. 
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jurisdiction in the larger sense.457 So, when Professor Brilmayer 
wrote that the state of incorporation and principal place of 
business were the “paradigm bases for general jurisdiction,” she 
was not referring to the kind of general jurisdiction being discussed 
in cases like Helicopteros, which is a separate subcategory of the 
larger category of all-purpose jurisdiction based on a corporation’s 
continuous and substantial contacts with the forum state.458  
Unlike Justice Ginsburg, however, Professor Brilmayer 
recognized that a separate category of general all-purpose 
dispute-blind jurisdiction existed based on the activities of a 
corporation within the forum state.459 Such activities-based 
general jurisdiction “requires proof of continuous and systematic 
activities.”460 For that point, Professor Brilmayer cited 
“Helicopteros, holding that continuous and systematic activities 
between the defendant and forum were necessary to establish 
jurisdiction over a claim unrelated to those activities.”461 
Significantly, Professor Brilmayer concluded that courts “should 
not treat defendants as less amenable to suit merely because they 
carry on more substantial business in other states . . . The amount 
of activity elsewhere seems virtually irrelevant to any of the 
convenience or fairness policies underlying the imposition of 
general jurisdiction over a defendant . . . . [F]or purposes of 
general jurisdiction, the relevant issue is the absolute amount of 
activity, not the activity relative to what the defendant does 
outside the state.”462 
Justice Ginsburg, however, misapplied the description of the 
paradigm forms of the larger meaning of general jurisdiction as 
all-purpose dispute-blind jurisdiction to cases involving an entirely 
distinct subset of the larger category of dispute-blind general 
jurisdiction. By eventually limiting the subcategory of 
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction to cases involving the 
separate category of citizenship or domicile jurisdiction, Justice 
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762 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 655 (2019) 
 
Ginsburg effectively eliminated corporate-activities-based 
jurisdiction as a separate subset of the larger general jurisdiction, 
erasing the type of jurisdiction clearly discussed by the Supreme 
Court in Helicopteros and utilized by scores of lower court decisions 
over the course of 70 years. 
C. The Practical Problems Created by the Elimination of 
Corporate-Activities-Based Jurisdiction 
There is little doubt that the elimination of 
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction is a significant hindrance to 
plaintiffs and a huge boon to corporate defendants. Any plaintiff 
who is injured outside of his or her home state is now unable to sue 
in that home state even if the defendant has massive operations 
there, as long as the operations do not include the corporate 
headquarters. It is cold comfort to a California plaintiff to say that 
he or she may travel across the country to sue a corporate 
defendant in New York, where its headquarters are located or 
Delaware, where it is incorporated. Moreover, it is clearly in a 
corporate defendant’s interest to force a plaintiff to travel from the 
plaintiff’s home state. The greater the plaintiff’s burden and 
expense, the lower will be the settlement value of the case. A 
rational plaintiff will always accept a lower settlement if the 
burden to litigate is higher in a distant state. This advantage for 
corporate defendants is not merely theoretical. Many corporate 
defendants are taking advantage of BNSF to get cases dismissed 
on jurisdictional grounds. As one review of lower-court cases after 
BNSF concluded: “The practical implications of BNSF Railway are 
difficult to overstate. . . . [D]ozens of courts across the country have 
relied on BNSF Railway to dismiss lawsuits under factual 
circumstances that, in the past, would almost certainly have 
sufficed for the exercise of general jurisdiction.”463 
                                                                                                     
 463. Andrew E. Shipley & Matthew F. Ferraro, Not at Home: Reining in 
General Personal Jurisdiction After BNSF Railway v. Tyrrell, MONDAQ, 
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A review of a few of the cases will illustrate this point. In 
Grabowski v. Northrop Grumman Systems Corp.,464 a federal 
district court in Maryland dismissed a case against a major defense 
contract that employed over 11,000 persons in the state and 
headquartered on of its three business units there.465 The district 
court ruled that the jurisdictional analysis after BNSF did not 
“focus solely on the magnitude of the defendant’s in-state contacts” 
but rather required the court to assess the defendant’s “activities 
in their entirety, nationwide and world.”466 Because the defendant 
employed 65,000 persons worldwide and had 467 offices 
throughout the world, “Maintaining a sector headquarters with 
11,000 employees is not ‘so substantial and of such a nature’ as to 
render Northrop Grumman at home in Maryland.”467 
In Plumbers’ Local Union No. 690 Health Plan v. Apotex 
Corp.,468 plaintiff health insurance plan sued companies selling 
generic prescription drugs.469 The court rejected plaintiff’s 
assertion of corporate-activities-based jurisdiction even though it 
found that defendants had “continuous and systematic contacts 
with Pennsylvania” by virtue of significant sales in the state.470 
These contacts did not create “an exceptional case in 
which . . . operations in Pennsylvania are so substantial and 
important as to render them at home on Pennsylvania.”471 
In Guaranteed Rate, Inc. v. Conn,472 plaintiff GRI sued the 
defendant on a claim of conspiracy to breach fiduciary duties.473 
The plaintiff argued that the defendant was subject to 
continuous-corporate-activities jurisdiction because it was 
registered to do business in Illinois, held an Illinois residential 
                                                                                                     
 464. Grabowski v. Northrop Grumman Sys. Corp., No. GLR-16-3492, 2017 
WL 3190647 (D. Md. June 30, 2017). 
 465. Id. at *3. 
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 467. Id. (quoting BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1558 (2017)). 
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mortgage license, originated over $215 million in loans in Illinois 
during 2016, operated thirteen branch offices in Illinois, and 
employed dozens of Illinois residents in those branch offices.474 
Echoing the words of Justice Ginsburg in Daimler, the court held 
that plaintiff’s argument was “unacceptably grasping.”475 The 
court stated, “[i]f the maintenance of 2,000 miles of railroad track 
and employment of more than 2,000 workers in the forum state 
cannot establish general jurisdiction as the Supreme Court held in 
BNSF Railway, then the business allegedly conducted by [the 
defendant] in Illinois in this case cannot either.”476  
In Buckles v. Continental Resources, Inc.,477 the Montana 
Supreme Court dismissed a case brought by the in-state estate of 
a worker who had died in a North Dakota oilfield accident.478 The 
decedent worked for a defendant that was authorized to do 
business in Montana, maintained two field offices in the state, and 
owned and operated hundreds of oil and gas wells and motor 
vehicles in the state.479 The court found that because the defendant 
was incorporated and had its principal place of business in 
Oklahoma, the contacts with the forum were insufficient to render 
the defendant “at home” in Montana.480  
These cases, and numerous others make it clear that corporate 
defendants will aggressively pursue motions to dismiss for lack of 
personal jurisdiction in cases in which, prior to the Court’s recent 
case law, defendants could not have hoped to succeed on such a 
motion.481 Those motions give corporate defendants a decided 
tactical edge by forcing plaintiffs away from their home states into 
                                                                                                     
 474. Id. at 915–16. 
 475. Id. at 916 (quoting Daimler v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 138 (2014)). 
 476. Id.  
 477. 402 P.3d 1213 (Mont. 2017). 
 478. See id. at 1221 (reversing and remanding to the district court to 
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 479. See id. at 1215 (listing the defendant’s various business contacts with 
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purposes of general jurisdiction). 
 481. See Shipley & Ferrarro, supra note 463, at 1295 (explaining how BNSF 
Railway Co. v. Tyrell changed the personal jurisdiction jurisprudence). 
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less convenient forums.482 Moreover, in these cases it is hard to 
imagine why asking a corporate defendant to litigate in the 
plaintiff’s chosen forum deprives the defendant of its Fourteenth 
Amendment due process rights, particularly given that the 
transitory presence of an individual defendant in the forum state 
can give rise to all-purpose jurisdiction over claims that arose 
outside the forum state.483 In each of the cases discussed above, the 
forum state had an interest in the case and defendant had 
sufficient continuous and systematic contacts with the forum state 
to warrant personal jurisdiction, even though the claims arose in a 
different state.484 
D. Final Questions Raised by the Elimination of 
Corporate-Activities-Based Jurisdiction 
The obliteration of so many cases without even an 
acknowledgement of the damage to such a substantial body of 
precedent raises two interesting questions. First, how could 
Justice Ginsburg have accomplished such doctrinal destruction 
without significant opposition from other members of the Court? 
Second, why would Justice Ginsburg wish to eliminate an entire 
category of all-purpose dispute-blind jurisdiction, an action that 
could only favor corporate defendants? 
1. How Did the Elimination of Corporate-Activities-Based 
Jurisdiction Occur So Easily? 
A number of factors coalesced to enable the elimination of 
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction. First, both Goodyear and 
Daimler were such easy cases that, when the justices met to vote 
                                                                                                     
 482. See id. at 1293 (discussing how lower courts have begun to follow “the 
Supreme Court’s narrowed view of general jurisdiction”).  
 483. See id. (explaining how “corporate defendants now have an effective 
shield against forum-shopping plaintiffs who seek to enmesh corporate 
defendants in jurisdictions with no connection to the subject matter of the 
litigation”). 
 484. See Buckles, 402 P.3d at 1215 (discussing the extensive contacts the 
defendant had with Montana). 
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on the resolution of the cases, no justice disagreed that the forum 
state lacked personal jurisdiction, nor should they have 
disagreed.485 In Goodyear, the plaintiff’s theory of jurisdiction was 
so far-fetched, that neither the parties nor the Court was focused 
on the massive number of corporate-activities-based jurisdiction 
cases based on much more significant contacts with the forum 
state.486 In Daimler, the sole focus of the arguments before the 
Court was whether MBUSA’s actions could be attributed to 
Daimler.487 Indeed, that question was the only issue certified by 
the Court when it granted certiorari in the case.488 As a result, 
none of the briefs focused on the substantial case law allowing 
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction.489 
In addition, the elimination of corporate-activities-based 
jurisdiction was not clearly and forthrightly announced with an 
explanation about why so many decades of case law were being 
eliminated. In Goodyear, the suggestion (mistaken though it may 
have been) was only that the two places where a corporation was 
“at home” were the paradigm forms of corporate-activities-based 
jurisdiction.490 In Daimler, that paradigm form became the rule 
rather than just the example, but with the possible exception that 
there could be cases where corporate activities would still suffice 
to create all-purpose dispute-blind jurisdiction.491 Only when the 
                                                                                                     
 485. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 927, 
929 (2011) (declining to exercise jurisdiction over a foreign defendant); Daimler 
v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 121–22 (2014) (same).  
 486. See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 920 (“A connection so limited between the 
forum and foreign corporation, we hold, is an inadequate basis for the exercise of 
general jurisdiction.”).  
 487. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 125 (stating Daimler is not at home in 
California and cannot be sued there for injuries attributed to MBUSA’s conduct). 
 488. See id. at 121 (“The question presented is whether the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment precludes the District Court from 
exercising jurisdiction over Daimler in this case . . . .”).  
 489. See id. (“[W]e conclude Daimler is not ‘at home’ in California, and cannot 
be sued there for injuries plaintiffs attribute to MB Argentina’s conduct in 
Argentina.”).  
 490. See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 923–24 (explaining the current jurisprudence 
of specific and general jurisdiction). 
 491. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 140 (“Neither Daimler nor MBUSA is 
incorporated in California, nor does either entity have its principal place of 
business there.”).  
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Court rendered its opinion in BNSF did it become clear that the 
exception was essentially limited to the facts of the Perkins case 
and would be extended no further.492 
2. Why Would Justice Ginsburg Reshape Personal Jurisdiction 
Doctrine in a Manner that So Clearly Favors Corporate 
Defendants? 
There is little doubt that the elimination of 
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction is a massive gift to corporate 
defendants.493 Corporations that once assumed they had no other 
choice than to accept a plaintiff’s choice of forum now routinely file 
motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and force 
plaintiffs to litigate in a less convenient forum.494 The less 
convenient the forum is for plaintiff and the greater expense 
incurred in prosecuting a case, the lower the settlement value for 
a defendant.495 It is not unreasonable to be surprised that the 
Justice who is generally regarded as the most liberal on the 
Supreme Court should be responsible for that turn of events.  
Although only Justice Ginsburg could definitively answer that 
question, I will offer a tentative hypothesis to explain the result. 
Although Justice Ginsburg was best known as an academic for her 
work on gender equality,496 she began her academic life as a 
comparative civil procedure scholar. Her first legal job after a 
                                                                                                     
 492. See BSNF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1559 (2017) (declining to 
exercise personal jurisdiction over a railroad in Montana when the railroad only 
did some business in the state).  
 493. See Twitchell, supra note 17, at 635 (discussing general jurisdiction).  
 494. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 903 (2011) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“I would hold McIntyre UK answerable in New Jersey 
for the harm Nicastro suffered at his workplace in that State using McIntyre UK’s 
shearing machine.”).  
 495. See Shipley & Ferrarro, supra note 463, at 1293 (explaining that BNSF 
Railway curtailed a plaintiff’s ability to sue corporate defendants in foreign 
states). 
 496. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Equal Rights Amendment Is the Way, 1 
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 19, 21 (1978) (arguing that the Equal Rights Amendment will 
only prohibit the government from discriminating on the basis of sex); Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, Sex Equality and the Constitution, 52 TUL. L. REV. 451, 451 (1978) 
(discussing the history of sex equality and the Constitution).  
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judicial clerkship was as Associate Director of the Columbia 
University Project on International Procedure.497 Professor 
Ginsburg’s first book was on Civil Procedure in Sweden,498 and she 
wrote one of her first law review articles on recognition and 
enforcement of foreign civil judgments.499 In that article, she noted,  
Commentators, both here and abroad, have contrasted 
jurisdictional bases appropriate for international recognition 
purposes with bases found in domestic law, but unacceptable in 
the international sphere. Unacceptable or “exorbitant” 
bases, . . . [including the] defendant’s transitory presence[,] 
generally are not expected even by the rendition forum to elicit 
recognition outside.500 
Not surprisingly, Professor Ginsburg cited von Mehren’s and 
Trautman’s article Jurisdiction to Adjudicate501 throughout her 
article.502 It is not hard to understand why Justice Ginsburg would 
retain the skepticism that Professor Ginsburg, as a comparative 
civil procedure scholar, had with respect to forms of 
activities-based jurisdiction that were not internationally 
recognized.503 Professors von Mehren and Trautman were teaching 
at Harvard Law School when Justice Ginsburg was a student, and 
Professor Ginsburg’s first year civil procedure professor was 
Benjamin Kaplan, a man, Justice Ginsburg later noted, “whose 
teaching and writing continue to inspire me.”504 Professor Kaplan 
himself had written on comparative civil procedure issues with 
Professor von Mehren.505 Given the views of Professor Ginsburg’s 
                                                                                                     
 497. See generally RUTH BADER GINSBURG & ANDERS BRUZELIUS, CIVIL 
PROCEDURE IN SWEDEN (1965).  
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mentors and her own work in comparative civil procedure at such 
an early stage of her career, it is understandable that, even in her 
later role as Justice of the Supreme Court, she was skeptical of 
forms of activities-based jurisdiction that were greatly disfavored 
in the international nation-to-nation context of jurisdiction and 
recognition of judgments, even though corporate-activities-based 
jurisdiction was so well established in the United States.506 
There are, however, a number of problems with Justice 
Ginsburg’s comparativist perspective, even beyond the lack of 
doctrinal consistency with the decades-long history of 
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction in the United States. First, 
even if one accepts the proposition that, at the international level, 
the country’s rules for international jurisdiction and enforcement 
of judgments should be harmonized with those of its trading 
partners, that does not mean that the same rules should be 
utilized, as a matter of due process, to govern state-to-state 
recognition of judgments in the domestic setting, where the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause provides an enforcement mechanism that 
does not exists at the international level.507 The Court could easily 
adopt more generous jurisdictional rules under the Due Process 
Clause for state-to-state jurisdictional issues and then, if it wishes, 
apply a stricter jurisdictional standard as a matter of federal 
common law under the authority of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause with respect to international defendants.508 
Moreover, applying the restrictive international standard to 
American corporate defendants in the domestic state-to-state 
jurisdictional context leaves a major gap in the jurisdictions that 
are available to American plaintiffs.509 The comparative law 
                                                                                                     
German civil procedure in the country’s higher courts).  
 506. See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 9, at 1144 (discussing 
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction).  
 507. See Trangsrud, supra note 23, at 887 (“The Full Faith and Credit Clause 
directs that states shall give effect to the judgments of other states; it gives 
Congress power to define what effect a state must give to the judgment of a sister 
state.”).  
 508. See id. (“If Congress later passed legislation allowing states to adjudicate 
the rights of noncitizens, then the rights of noncitizens could be adjudicated in 
state court.”). 
 509. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 903 (2011) 
(declining to exercise jurisdiction in New Jersey over a foreign company when the 
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scholars admired by Justice Ginsburg all advocated for much 
broader standards of specific jurisdiction to make up for the loss of 
available forums resulting from a more restrictive 
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction.510 Justice Ginsburg may 
herself favor broader specific jurisdiction standards, but she has 
not brought along a majority of her colleagues on the Court to that 
jurisdictional perspective.511 
This jurisdictional gap is a perfect example of the second kind 
of categories problem in the Court’s personal jurisdiction 
jurisprudence. By considering only one category of personal 
jurisdiction in isolation from all the others, the Court has created 
an incoherent personal jurisdiction doctrine that is theoretically 
inconsistent from category to category and leaves damaging gaps 
in the jurisdictions available to plaintiffs.512 
VI. Where Do We Go from Here? 
Advocating for significant changes in Supreme Court case law 
is always somewhat of an exercise in wishful thinking. 
Nevertheless, one can hope that adding additional voice to the 
chorus of those calling for a rationalization of personal jurisdiction 
doctrine will hasten the day when the Supreme Court begins to 
address the many problems that continue to plague the field of 
personal jurisdiction. I offer three specific suggestions below.513 
                                                                                                     
company’s product caused an injury in the state).  
 510. See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 9, at 1144–47 (discussing 
specific jurisdiction). 
 511. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd., 564 U.S. at 903 (Ginsburg J. dissenting) 
(arguing that McIntyre should be subject to specific jurisdiction in the place where 
its products caused injury).  
 512. See Shipley & Ferraro, supra note 463, at 1293 (discussing how the 
Supreme Court recently restricted where corporate defendants can be hauled into 
court).  
 513. Supra Part V.A–C.  
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A. The Court Should Place Procedural Due Process 
Considerations First and then Explain the Theoretical Foundation 
for Whatever Substantive Due Process Requirements the Court 
Believes to Be Necessary After That 
The secondary status of the procedural due process analysis in 
questions of personal jurisdiction is the result of a historical quirk 
that the Supreme Court can now remedy.514 In considering the 
power of a state court to deprive a defendant of his property, the 
first question should always be whether the state’s interest in 
hearing the case outweighs the burden on the defendant of 
litigating in the forum. As the Court has recognized, the state’s 
interests may involve many factors, including an interest in the 
subject matter of the plaintiff’s claim because it arose within the 
state, the desire to provide an in-state forum in which a plaintiff 
may conveniently resolve a claim, and the convenience of litigating 
in the forum because of the availability of witnesses or other forms 
of evidence.515 Because these issues are closest to the core meaning 
of the Due Process Clause and are the least controversial bases to 
limit the power of a state court system, this analysis should be the 
first and the primary restriction on a state’s ability to hear a 
particular case. If the Court still concludes that, after application 
of a rigorous procedural due process analysis, some doctrine of 
substantive due process requires that a forum have, in addition, 
certain contacts with the defendant in order to warrant the 
exercise of judicial power, the Court should explain the theoretical 
basis for such a substantive due process requirement and then 
limit the scope of the requirement to the least restrictive element 
necessary to accomplish the theoretical goal. 
                                                                                                     
 514. The Court did not decide a personal jurisdiction case based upon a 
procedural due process analysis until 1987. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. 
Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).  
 515. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 482–83 (1985) 
(discussing Florida’s interest in holding the defendant answerable in the state 
based on contacts he established in the state). 
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B. The Court Should Correct the Mistake It Made in the 
Categorization of Dispute-Blind Jurisdiction 
First, the Court should acknowledge that a corporation’s state 
of incorporation and principal place of business are the paradigm 
forms of the larger category of all-purpose jurisdiction and not 
exemplars of corporate-activities-based jurisdiction. Second, the 
Court should recognize that corporate-activities-based jurisdiction 
is a category created by International Shoe that is distinct from the 
citizenship category, which encompasses a defendant’s state of 
incorporation and principal place of business. International Shoe, 
Perkins, and Helicopteros all anticipated that some level of 
continuous corporate activity (less than incorporation and 
corporate headquarters) would be sufficient to establish 
all-purpose dispute-blind jurisdiction.516 
The Court should establish clear standards for when plaintiffs 
may assert corporate-activities-based jurisdiction. At the very 
least, a corporation that has a branch office with employees in the 
forum state should be subject to this type of jurisdiction. 
International Shoe explicitly approved of cases asserting 
corporate-activities-based jurisdiction with respect to those types 
of contacts with a forum state, and there is no reason now to regard 
them as jurisdictionally insufficient.517 Indeed, in cases where the 
state’s assertion of jurisdictional authority is procedurally 
reasonable, meaning the state’s interest in the litigation outweighs 
any burden on the defendant, a corporation’s registering to do 
business within the forum state should be a significant enough 
contact to warrant corporate-activities-based jurisdiction.518 Such 
registration establishes that the corporation is receiving an 
ongoing benefit from the state that warrants the reciprocal burden 
                                                                                                     
 516. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945) (“[T]here have 
been instances in which the continuous corporate operations within a state were 
thought so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes 
of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.”).  
 517. See id. at 313 (explaining the various activities that the salesmen 
employed by appellant undertook in the forum state). 
 518. See Jack B. Harrison, Registration, Fairness, and General Jurisdiction, 
95 NEB. L. REV. 477, 480–81 (2016) (arguing corporate registration in a state, 
appointing someone as an agent to receive service of process, and actually 
conducting business in the state should be enough to warrant jurisdiction).  
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to respond to the state’s judicial process, at least in cases where 
the state has a sufficient interest to make jurisdiction 
reasonable.519 Moreover, to the extent that the Court remains 
concerned about whether a corporation has adequate notice that it 
is subject to personal jurisdiction in a particular state, both the 
branch office and corporate registration requirements would 
provide clear and definitive notice to potential corporate 
defendants, as long as the Supreme Court clearly enunciated a 
contacts standard based on those requirements. 
Along the same lines, the Court should also recognize that the 
category of jurisdiction based upon a defendant’s consent should be 
analyzed separate and apart from the corporation’s state of 
incorporation and principal place of business, which are the 
foundation for a state’s assertion of the traditional basis of 
citizenship jurisdiction over a corporation.520 If a state wishes to 
require the consent of a corporation to jurisdiction in its court 
system as the quid pro quo for allowing the corporation to register 
to do business within the state, that should be sufficient to 
conclude that the corporation has consented to jurisdiction and 
that no other due process analysis is necessary.521 In the aftermath 
of the Court’s elimination of corporate-activities-based jurisdiction, 
a number of commentators have suggested that states could revive 
broad-based dispute-blind jurisdiction by requiring corporations 
who register to do business in the state to consent to the 
jurisdiction of the state’s courts.522 Others have opposed this tactic 
by suggesting that it is inconsistent with the Court’s requirements 
                                                                                                     
 519. See id. at 513 (explaining how the purpose of designating an agent “is to 
make a nonresident suable in local courts”).  
 520. See Daimler v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014) (“Goodyear did not hold 
that a corporation may be subject to general jurisdiction only in a forum where it 
is incorporated or has its principal place of business; it simply types those places 
paradigm all-purpose forums.”).  
 521. See Harrison, supra note 518, at 480–81 (arguing that “a corporation that 
registers to do business in a state, appoints an agent for service of process, and 
actually conducts business in the state” should be deemed to consent to general 
jurisdiction in that state).  
 522. See id. at 513 (“At least four other courts of appeals have upheld the 
constitutionality of construing state registration statutes to provide jurisdiction 
to courts in that state over corporations that comply with the statutes . . . .”).  
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for “general jurisdiction.”523 Courts have similarly differed on 
whether jurisdiction based on consent must satisfy the Daimler “at 
home” test.524 Applying the “at home” test to the separate 
traditional basis of consent conflates the categories of consent and 
citizenship, which further confuses the due process analysis. If the 
Court wishes to impose additional constraints on consent, it should 
do so based on the specific considerations that relate to waiver of 
constitutional rights and not on the requirements of other 
categories of personal jurisdiction. 
C. The Court Should Solve Its Other Personal Jurisdiction 
Categories Problem by Insuring that the Theoretical Foundations 
and Doctrinal Rules of Each Category Are Consistent with Those 
of the Others 
Even if one accepts that different categories of personal 
jurisdiction are a necessary part of the judicial landscape, the 
Court should do its best to harmonize the various categories into 
one coherent doctrine. By beginning the analysis of every personal 
jurisdiction question with the issue whether the assertion of state 
power is procedurally fair, the Court will lay a decent foundation 
for doctrinal harmonization and coherence. After establishing such 
procedural due process requirements, the Court can attend to any 
additional substantive due process requirements in a manner that 
creates consistent and theoretically sound substantive due process 
rules for each jurisdictional basis. Categories of jurisdiction are 
fine, as long as the requirements for each category are clearly 
understood, consistently named, and theoretically coherent. By 
addressing the need for theoretical and doctrinal coherence, the 
Court can mend the dysfunctional results illustrated by the 
hypotheticals at the beginning of this article and create a more 
equitable and easily administered system of personal jurisdiction. 
                                                                                                     
 523. See Kevin D. Benish, Note, Pennoyer’s Ghost: Consent, Registration 
Statutes, and General Jurisdiction after Daimler AG v. Bauman, 90 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1609, 1610 (2015) (arguing Daimler eliminated longstanding bases of 
personal jurisdiction). 
 524. See id. at 1611–12 (discussing a table of cases illustrating a circuit split 
on the issue). 
